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Abstract
Agency relationships, and associated information asymmetries, exist in many areas
of economic activity including healthcare. Information on healthcare providers’
relative performance can be used to reduce information asymmetries and hold
providers to account. This collection of essays focuses on the appropriate derivation
and use of performance measures to incentivise healthcare providers in the English
National Health Service (NHS). It gives special consideration to the role of patient
self-reported health status measures to assess the differential effect of healthcare
providers’ care on their patients’ health.
The thesis explores three themes: the relationship between variation in resource
use and quality, the appropriate assessment and reporting of multidimensional
hospital performance, and the use of performance information to motivate hospitals
in a public reporting context.
Chapter 2 examines cost variation between hospitals for the four surgical pro-
cedures covered by the national patient-reported outcome measures (PROM) pro-
gramme. It explores the empirical relationship between costs and patient health
outcomes to assess the claim of hospital providers that their higher costs are justified
by better quality of care.
Chapter 3 sets out an empirical methodology to conduct provider performance
comparisons when there are multiple dimensions of health-related quality of life
affected by treatment. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of analysing
disaggregate PROM data for the purpose of informing prospective patients, clinicians
and managers.
Chapter 4 extends the previous chapter by providing a methodology for assessing
and summarising multidimensional provider performance using dominance criteria.
This methodology is then applied to study the performance of providers of hip
replacement surgery with respect to length of stay, emergency readmissions, waiting
time and improvements in PROMs.
Chapter 5 estimates the demand elasticity of providers with respect to quality. It
makes use of choice models to assess the usefulness of disseminating hospital PROM
scores to prospective patients as a market-based incentive for providers to compete
on quality.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Economic framework
This collection of essays focuses on the appropriate derivation and use of performance
measures to incentivise healthcare providers in the English National Health Service
(NHS), giving special consideration to the role of patient self-reported health status
measures to assess the differential effect of healthcare providers’ care on their
patients’ health. The relevant economic framework for these analyses is a principal-
agent framework.
Agency relationships, in which a principal delegates a task to an agent in return
for a reward, exist in many areas of economic activity (Sappington 1991; Laffont and
Tirole 1993). Examples include car owners paying mechanics to carry out repairs
or homeowners hiring decorators to paint their living rooms. A common feature
of these relationships is that the agent enjoys an information advantage over the
principal with respect to the likely costs and outcomes of the task, and that the
principal cannot directly verify the appropriateness of the actions taken by the agent.
This information asymmetry derives from the nature of the agency relationship
and the principal’s lack of specialist knowledge about the production function and
associated constraints, and the optimal mix of inputs.1 Hence, agents are able to
extract information rent, for example, by reducing the amount of costly effort they
exert while maintaining their agreed reward; a form of hidden action.2 This prevents
1As pointed out by Arrow (1968, p.538) the “agent has been selected for his specialized knowledge
and the principal can never hope to completely check the agent’s performance”. If the principal was
in possession of the required knowledge and abilities, she could perform the task herself without
risking rent extraction. Of course, she may still decide against it for a number of other reasons such
as a more constrained production environment.
2This behaviour may not always be conscious and opportunistic. For example, the agent may simply
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the first-best allocation of resources that maximises the principal’s utility.
The market for healthcare is especially prone to agency problems due to the
complexity of healthcare and the pronounced information asymmetry between the
principal (e.g. a patient, purchaser or regulator of care3) and the agent (a provider
of care such as a doctor, nurse, or, more generally, a healthcare institution) (Arrow
1963; Evans 1974; Ryan 1992). For example, patients generally have little knowledge
of the type of illness they suffer from or how urgently they require treatment, what
treatment options are available and which treatment is most appropriate for their
condition. Furthermore, because healthcare contributes to health but is not the only
input in the health production function – health behaviour, other consumption and
random variation also play into this; see Grossman (1972) – there is considerable
uncertainty about the likely health effect of care. Similar issues arise in the agency
relationships between purchasers or regulators of care and healthcare providers. For
example, these principals can rarely verify whether costly diagnostic or therapeutic
actions taken by the agent were appropriate given the patients’ condition, or indeed
whether the reported diagnosis reflects the health condition of the patient (Dafny
2005). That said, some mechanisms such as altruism, the high status that medical
professionals enjoy in society, and peer review through other medical professionals,
may help align the interests of principals and agents and reduce the incentive for
rent extraction.
One key insight from the literature on incentive contracts is that information
about agents’ comparative performance can be incorporated into contracts to re-
not be aware of more effective ways of carrying out the task because he or she failed to invest
sufficiently into keeping abreast of the evidence base. Nevertheless, because such investments are
typically costly, i.e. they may require time, effort and expenditure on learning materials, and cannot
be directly observed this may be considered an information rent.
3In many healthcare systems patients do not bear the full cost of care but share it with a public or
private insurer. These insurers will often use their greater bargaining power and act as purchasers
of care. Consequently, both patients and purchasers enter into agency agreements with providers
of care. Similar agency problems are likely to arise at least in general, although both the principals’
objectives and the degree of information asymmetry towards the agent may differ. For example,
a purchaser will want to strike a balance between the amount of effort assigned to quality and
cost containment. In contrast, since patients are protected from most costs they will put more
emphasis on the agent’s effort to provide high quality of care. For the purpose of this introduction I
do not distinguish between different types of principals and may use one or the other to illustrate
concepts.
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duce information asymmetry and improve the principal’s utility (Holmstro¨m 1979;
Holmstro¨m 1982; Shleifer 1985; Arrow 1986). Such performance information can
be derived from comparing the observed outcome of an agent against those of other
agents or against a predetermined target; a practice known as performance assess-
ment or benchmarking. If all agents were to face identical production constraints and
experience common shocks, variation in outcome could be attributed to the effort
that agents exert (Holmstro¨m 1982). Because circumstances are rarely identical
comparisons are typically preformed within a multiple regression framework to
isolate performance variation from observable exogenous influences (e.g. case-mix
differences between providers) and random noise (Shleifer 1985; Ash et al. 2012).
The resulting performance information can then be utilised in multiple ways to
incentivise agents. For example, agents’ rewards can be adjusted retrospectively
in the context of a pay-for-performance (P4P) contract with rewards and penalties
according to observed performance. Alternatively, performance information can be
used prospectively to inform contracts, e.g. by influencing the choice of agent to
contract with in the first place. Finally, the public dissemination of performance
information can provide non-pecuniary incentives against shirking, which might be
effective if the agent cares about her reputation (Hibbard et al. 2003; Hibbard et al.
2005).
Performance assessment, public or private reporting of comparative performance
data and P4P schemes have now become common features of many healthcare
systems (Smith 2002; Marshall et al. 2003; Maynard 2012).4 Many of these schemes
are explicitly concerned about variation in the quality of care that agents provide
although some focus exclusively on costs or a combination of costs and quality. For
example, since April 2004 the UK Quality and Outcome Framework has been reward-
ing general practitioners according to the proportion of their practice population
with chronic illness which receives care that meets defined process standards (Roland
4The use of performance data to motivate agents is not restricted to healthcare; see Propper and
Wilson (2003) and Prendergast (1999) for examples from the wider public sector and the private
sector.
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2004). The underlying data are also made available to the public and may be used
by patients to choose practices (Santos et al. 2015). Similarly, the Advancing Quality
programme in the North West of England rewarded5 hospitals for their relative
performance with regard to 28 quality measures covering five clinical areas (Sutton
et al. 2012; Meacock et al. 2014). While the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
such initiatives is contested (e.g. Petersen et al. 2006; Fung et al. 2008; Emmert
et al. 2012; Maynard 2012), their popularity is growing.
1.2 Measuring quality of care through patient-reported outcomes
An important issue in the implementation of performance assessment regimes is
how to define and measure the relative quality of care provided. In his seminal
work on the definition of quality of care Donabedian (1966) delineated three broad
dimensions: structural quality (i.e. the characteristics of the care environment),
process quality (the manner in which care is provided) and outcome quality (the
change in patients’ health as a result of care). Many elements of structural quality,
such as the availability of a computer tomography scanner, are observable and
thus easily contractible. The choice between process and outcome quality remains
a point of contention between medical professionals and economists. Medical
professionals are often reluctant to be assessed on the basis of outcomes since the
link between healthcare and health is not straightforward and the outcome of care
is thus uncertain. Instead, there seems to be a preference for process measures
that are felt to be more directly under the control of the professional (Lilford and
Pronovost 2010). Economists, on the other hand, argue that healthcare is primarily
a means to improve health or avoid future deteriorations of it (Evans 1974; Porter
2010). Patients derive utility from their health and the consumption that good
health allows. The relevant concept is therefore the change in health trajectory (i.e.
the difference in cumulative health and health-related quality of life over the life
5The programme ran from October 2008 to March 2010 before being subsumed into a national P4P
programme.
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course) that patients experience as the result of treatment6 (Smith and Street 2013)
- although process utility from e.g. reassurance may also be of some importance
(McGuire et al. 1988; Mooney and Lange 1991). The change in health trajectory
has also been described as ‘the “value-added” [. . .] as a result of the contact with
the health system’ (Jacobs et al. 2006, p.23). Of course, establishing the change in
health trajectory is a formidable task, not least because patients cannot be observed
simultaneously on their treated and untreated health trajectories and for a sufficiently
long follow-up period.7 However, in a comparative performance framework with
agents providing the same type of treatment, patients’ health trajectories if untreated
do not necessarily need to be known since these are assumed to be the same for all
patients, conditional on observed pre-operative patient characteristics (Smith and
Street 2013).8
The reluctance of the medical profession to adopt changes in health trajectory as
the primary measure of their quality performance may in part stem from the lack of
sufficiently discriminating and routinely available measures of patient health. Many
healthcare systems rely on administrative data for the assessment of provider per-
formance. Historically, patient outcomes had therefore been confined to measures of
mortality after treatment over short periods of time (e.g. 30 days post-operatively).
More recently, rates of emergency readmission and severe adverse events have
gained importance and are increasingly used to adjust payments (Rosenthal 2007;
Department of Health 2012b).9 However, all these measures have a number of limit-
ations (Appleby and Devlin 2004). First, for many commonly performed healthcare
6This is not to say that structural and process quality measures do not play an important role in
managing the quality of care within institutions, e.g. by hospitals managers seeking to identify
problems in the care process. As pointed out by Donabedian (1988, p.1745), ‘good structure
increases the likelihood of good process, and good process increases the likelihood of good outcome’.
However, improving structural and process quality are a means to an end and ‘outcomes, by and
large, remain the ultimate validators of the effectiveness and quality of medical care’ (Donabedian
1966, p.169).
7Randomised controlled trials and extrapolation within a modelling framework can help overcome
these challenges. However, at least randomisation is not a feasible approach to assess the perform-
ance of healthcare providers in routine care settings.
8If, however, the aim of the analysis is to establish the productivity of the agent or compare the
cost-effectiveness of agents across different treatments, the absolute change in health would be
required.
9These do not measure patients’ health directly but indicate deteriorations of unknown magnitude.
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interventions these outcomes occur rarely. For example, the 30-day mortality rate
after elective hip replacement surgery in the English NHS is approximately 3 per
1,000 patients (Berstock et al. 2014). This complicates any statistical analysis of
performance since noise and signal are more difficult to differentiate. Second, the
ability to adjust these outcomes for patient heterogeneity (i.e. a provider’s case-mix)
and thus create a level playing field for comparisons is often limited by the available
data recorded in routine administrative records. The case-mix adjustment in many
performance assessment programmes is confined to a limited number of patient
characteristics, such as age, gender and co-morbidity burden, whereas information
on pre-treatment health status and severity are generally absent. Incomplete case-
mix adjustment may give rise to adverse behaviour such as refusal to treat high risk
patients in order to improve measured performance (Dranove et al. 2003). Third,
the effect of an adverse event or emergency re-admission on patients’ health may
differ across patient groups, yet these measures are silent about their impact on
patients’ health. Fourth, all these measures focus on negative outcomes and are
not informative about the size of the health improvement that the vast majority of
patients experience. Finally, health is multi-dimensional and different providers may
have a differential impact on these health dimensions. Indicators based on mortality,
re-admissions or adverse events cannot reveal this.
The limitations of the existing measures of outcome have led to calls for routine
collection of more detailed and comprehensive measures of patient health in the
English NHS and elsewhere (Kind and Williams 2004; Atkinson 2005; Chauhan
and Sussex 2008; McGrail et al. 2012). The term patient-reported outcome measure
(PROM) has become synonymous with a large10 number of measurement instruments
that assess the health status and health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of patients
from their own perspective (Fitzpatrick 2009). Examples include generic instruments
such as the EuroQoL-5D (EQ-5D) (Brooks 1996) or the Short Form-36 (SF-36) (Ware
10Garratt et al. (2002) identified over different 1,200 instruments during a systematic review conducted
in 2002. This number has been estimated to have increased to over 3,000 instruments by 2007
(Fitzpatrick 2009).
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and Sherbourne 1992), which can be applied to different health conditions, and
disease- or procedure-specific instruments such as the Oxford Hip and Knee Scores
(OHS/OKS) (Dawson et al. 1996; Dawson et al. 1998). Many of these instruments are
multi-dimensional and assess patients’ HRQoL along physical, emotional and social
domains. The resulting health profiles are not directly comparable across patients
but can be transformed into interval scores through the use of aggregation functions
i.e. sets of weights. These weights either express von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities,
non-utility preferences or are not preference-based, and they can be obtained from
different audiences (e.g. general population, patient groups) and using different
elicitation techniques (e.g. standard gamble, time trade-off); see Drummond et
al. (2005) and Walker et al. (2011) for more detail. Data from preference-based
instruments can be combined with information on the duration of health states to
calculate quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). These reflect the cumulative HRQoL as
generated by the long-term health trajectory of the patient.
PROMs and QALYs have an established role in clinical research and in the economic
evaluation of health technologies. Conversely, their application outside of clinical
trials and for outcome assessment in routine care has been limited. However, this is
now changing. Since April 2009, PROMs have been collected routinely for all NHS-
funded patients undergoing four elective surgical procedures in English hospitals
(Department of Health 2008a).11 These are unilateral hip and knee replacement,
groin hernia repair and varicose vein surgery. Each year, over 240,000 patients
are invited to report their health before and three or six months after surgery
using both generic the EQ-5D and EQ-VAS and disease-specific instruments; the
exception being hernia repair for which only the generic instruments are available
(see Table 1.1; details of these PROMs are provided in Chapter 2). This before
and after measurement allows calculation of changes in health as perceived by the
11To my knowledge, the English NHS is the first healthcare system to make collection of PROM data
mandatory for hospital providers. Other countries, most notably Sweden, collect PROMs as part of
clinical registers and achieve nearly full coverage (Garellick et al. 2009). However, participation is
optional for hospitals and these initiatives are not used by the regulator for routine performance
measurement.
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patient. While this falls short of the ambition to measure changes in health trajectory
over the life span, data from the national PROM programme offer important insights
into the short-term benefits that patients receive from treatment by different hospital
providers. Furthermore, information on pre-treatment health status may help to
overcome some of the challenges associated with case-mix adjustment, thereby
making comparisons more viable.
Table 1.1: PROM instruments by procedure
Procedure Condition-specific PROM Generic PROM
Post-op data
collection after
Knee replacement Oxford Knee Score (OKS) EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 6 months
Hip replacement Oxford Hip Score (OHS) EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 6 months
Varicose vein surgery Aberdeen Varicose Vein Ques-
tionnaire (AVVQ)
EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 3 months
Groin hernia repair - EQ-5D, EQ-VAS 3 months
The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) derives and publishes
performance indicators based on PROM data for all English hospitals performing
one of the four NHS-funded surgical procedures. To this end it has developed
a case-mix adjustment methodology that takes into account a number of patient
characteristics, including patients’ pre-treatment PROM response (Coles 2010).
Results are either presented as adjusted post-operative scores or, equivalently, as gain
scores. Neuburger, Hutchings, Meulen et al. (2013) have shown that performance
indicators based on EQ-5D utility scores and condition-specific PROMs are highly
correlated, but there was substantial disagreement with respect to the EQ-VAS.
Up until the financial year 2012/13, the case-mix adjustment models for joint
replacement surgery did not differentiate between primary and revision surgery.
Following clinical advice, this approach has since been revised and data for these
two patient subgroups are now analysed separately and published as separate
performance indicators.
One potential obstacle for the use of PROM data in performance assessment con-
texts is the potential for reporting bias. Patients may differ both in their underlying
latent health and in the way they report and judge their health. As a result, two
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hospitals providing equally effective services to otherwise identical patients may be
judged to perform differently. However, the availability of pre- and post-treatment
PROM data may help mitigate the problem if a) rating scales are stable over time
so that change is measured consistently, and b) reporting heterogeneity manifests
only as scale shifts and not cut-point shifts (Lindeboom and Doorslaer 2004). Also,
since PROM scores are averaged across providers’ patient populations, individual
differences in reporting may also even out. Ultimately, however, a satisfactory way to
adjust for reporting heterogeneity would require the collection of anchoring vignettes
as part of all PROM data collection (Murray et al. 2003; Rice et al. 2012).
A second issue is the substantial risk of missing data. In contrast to outcome
measures like mortality or readmission, which are based on administrative data with
nearly complete coverage, PROMs are collected as part of a survey. This opens up
the possibility of non-response. Patients are invited to participate but may decline
to do so. Also, providers, who are responsible for administering the questionnaire
as part of the pre-operative assessment, may fail to collect data or pass them on to
the HSCIC. Even where data has been collected it may not be possible to link these
to inpatient records. As a result, these data do not contribute to the calculation of
performance indicators since important information on case-mix factors is absent.
Gutacker, Street et al. (2015) have estimated that 76% of hip replacement patients
treated in the financial year 2011/12 responded to the pre-operative questionnaire
and 62% (82% of received questionnaires) could be linked to inpatient records.
Non-response is related to observable characteristics of the patient, such as their
age, gender and socio-economic background (Hutchings et al. 2014; Gomes et al.
2015). It also relates to the provider of care, with privately operated independent
sector treatment centres achieving, on average, higher response rates (Gomes et al.
2015). However, there is only a weak and not statistically significant association
between response rates and health outcome (Hutchings et al. 2014; Street et al.
2014). Furthermore, assuming that providers’ ability to improve health is indeed
uncorrelated with their patients’ propensity to take part in the PROM survey, Gomes
et al. (2015) have shown that non-response has only a relatively small impact on
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provider average scores, but a relatively large impact on the statistical uncertainty
surrounding these scores. This suggests that non-response bias may lead to more
conservative judgements about hospital performance since it reduces the risk of
being detected as a positive or negative performer.
1.3 Econometric assessment of performance using multilevel
modelling
Throughout this thesis I make extensive use of multilevel modelling techniques,
also known as hierarchical modelling, to estimate the performance of healthcare
providers. It is therefore useful to describe these techniques here in detail. Com-
prehensive reviews can be found in Snijders and Bosker (1999), Hox (2002) and
Gelman and Hill (2007).
The objective of any performance assessment is to identify the contribution of
providers’ (unobservable)12 actions to their patients’ observed outcomes (Jacobs et al.
2006). To achieve this, the provider effect must be isolated from other determinants
of outcomes, most notably patient case-mix and random noise; both of which are
assumed to be outside the providers’ control. Formally, let
Y = f(X, θ, ) (1.1)
where Y denotes the patients’ outcome of interest (e.g. post-operative PROM),
X denotes factors outside of the providers’ control (e.g. case-mix), θ denotes the
providers’ actions, and  denotes random variation.
Define performance as the systematic effect that providers have on all their patients’
outcomes. Hence, θ varies across providers but not across patients within the same
provider.13 Performance variation thus implies that patients are clustered within
12Observable actions are rarely of concern. If the principal could observe the agent’s actions, she could
also contract them.
13Only systematic variation in outcomes can be identified. If a provider’s efforts would vary randomly
across its patient population, this variation in performance could not be distinguished from random
chance variation. It would in principle be possible to allow providers’ actions to have a differential
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providers: two otherwise identical patients treated by the same provider experience
more similar outcomes than the same two patients treated by different providers.
The degree of clustering can be measured by the intraclass correlation coefficient
(ICC) defined as
ICC =
τ2
τ2 + σ2
(1.2)
where τ2 denotes the variance in outcomes Y between providers and σ2 denotes
the variance within providers. A non-zero estimate of ICC indicates performance
variation.
Provider performance cannot be directly observed. The performance assessment
literature has taken two different approaches to estimating θ, both of which are
based on the notion that, after adjusting for all other relevant factors, the remaining
variation in outcomes can be reasonably assumed to derive from providers’ actions.
In the first approach the observed outcomes for a provider are compared against
those predicted from a regression model conditioning on X. The ratio of [difference
between] average observed and predicted outcomes gives an indication of the
performance level with 1 [0] indicating expected performance and larger values
indicating better than expected performance. This form of indirect standardisation
has the advantages of being easily conducted using standard regression techniques
and of allowing performance estimates to be expressed in the natural unit of the
outcome (e.g. by multiplying the observed-over-expected ratio with the average
outcome across all providers). However, it does not exploit the clustering of patients
in providers and thus does not make use of all available information (Austin et al.
2003; Ash et al. 2012; Ding et al. 2013).
The second approach exploits the hierarchical nature of the data to estimate θ
directly. These models are known to epidemiologists and statisticians as multilevel or
hierarchical models, and are referred to as panel data models in econometrics. For
effect according to patients’ observable characteristics using e.g. random coefficient models. I focus
on the simpler case here for ease of exposition.
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example, consider the following linear model
Yij = α+X
′
ijβ + θj + ij (1.3)
with patient i = 1, . . . , nj treated in hospital j = 1, . . . , J . The coefficient α denotes
an overall intercept, whereas the coefficient θj captures provider-specific intercept
shifts.14 The random error term ij is assumed to be distributed as ij ∼ N (0, σ2).
The econometric literature emphasises two ways in which the provider-specific
intercepts can be modelled (Hsiao 1986; Wooldridge 2002). Fixed effect (FE) models
treat θj as parameters to be estimated from the data. This is typically achieved by
including a dummy variable for each provider. The associated coefficient θj captures
the difference between the average level of Yij for provider j and the overall intercept
α, conditional on other modelled covariates. Jones and Spiegelhalter (2009) point
out that the FE model implicitly assumes an identically distributed random variable θj
with infinite variance. Random effects (RE) models make the additional assumptions
that all θj are identically distributed random variables with finite variance and
are uncorrelated with the covariates. Provider effects are typically assumed to be
distributed as θj ∼ N (0, τ2) although other distributions (e.g. T-distribution) would
be possible. Crucially, only estimates of τ2, defining the distribution of provider
effects, are obtained from e.g. maximum likelihood estimation of (1.3) and the
provider-specific parameters θj need to be predicted from this distribution (Searle
et al. 1992).
A natural way to recover provider effects in a random effects framework is through
Bayes’ Theorem (Efron and Morris 1973; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009): The
posterior distribution of a parameter is obtained by combining prior beliefs about its
distribution with the data (i.e. likelihood), or
ω(θj | Yij , Xij ; τ, σ, β) = ϕ(θj ; τ)f(Yij | θj , Xij ;σ, β)
g(Yij | Xij ; τ, σ, β) (1.4)
14The model can be extended to allow for other coefficients to vary by provider. These types of models
are known as random coefficient models, whereas the model above is typically called a random
intercept model. Both are conceptually identical.
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where ω(.) is the prior, f(.) denotes the conditional density and g(.) denotes the
likelihood contribution of cluster j. In most empirical applications, the prior is taken
to be N(0, τˆ2). This practice is known as Empirical Bayes (EB) prediction (Skrondal
and Rabe-Hesketh 2009): In contrast to a fully Bayesian approach, the prior is not
independent of the data; hence ‘empirical’.
Bayes’ Theorem implies that the EB predictions of the provider effect θj are
shrunken towards the mean of the prior distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The amount of shrinkage is determined by the strength of information in the data
and the degree of homogeneity in provider performance. When information is
sparse, i.e. the number of patients nj within a provider j is low, the posterior means
resemble the mean of the prior more closely. Conversely, for units containing much
information (i.e. large nj), the results are primarily driven by the data and shrinkage
is minimal. Shrinkage can therefore be seen as a form of ‘borrowing strength’.
Since, by assumption, hospitals share some commonality in their production process,
one can reasonably utilise information on all providers to inform estimates about
individual providers. The more homogeneous providers are (i.e. smaller ICC), the
larger the potential to borrow strength. Fixed effects estimation does not allow for
such shrinkage since it ignores this commonality. This is best seen in the case of a
linear random-intercept model, for which the expectation of (1.4) can be evaluated
analytically. The EB predictor is
θˆEBj = Rˆj
[
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
(Yij − αˆ−X ′ij βˆ)
]
(1.5)
with
Rˆj =
τˆ2
τˆ2 + σˆ2/nj
(1.6)
and 0 < Rˆj < 1. Conversely,
θˆFEj =
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
(Yij − αˆ−X ′ij βˆ) (1.7)
since, by assumption, τ =∞ and therefore Rˆj = 1.
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Figure 1.1: Combining prior and likelihood to compute posterior distribution
The advantages of EB estimation and shrunken provider effects have long been
recognised in the literature on school effectiveness (Aitkin and Longford 1986;
Goldstein 1997) and more recently in the performance assessment of healthcare
providers (Bojke et al. 2011). Shrinkage is a form of precision-weighting and is
therefore a valuable mechanism to account for uncertainty in estimates for hospitals
treating a small number of patients. Indeed, shrunken estimates are shown to have
lower mean squared prediction error than non-shrunken estimates obtained from
FE estimation and are best linear unbiased predictors in linear models with random
effects (Efron and Morris 1973). Shrinkage may also be desirable because it allows
making inferences about all providers and does not require analysts to set arbitrary
inclusion cut-offs with regard to cluster size. However, shrinkage also implies a bias
towards zero. Performance estimates based on EB prediction are therefore likely to
be conservative and have higher specificity but lower sensitivity than FE estimates
(Austin et al. 2003; Kalbfleisch and Wolfe 2013).
The random effects approach and associated EB prediction techniques are com-
monly observed in the statistical and epidemiological literature. Conversely, when
confronted with clustered data, economists tend to favour the FE approach. I believe
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this is largely due to the different foci of the analyses: Interest in many economic
applications is confined to the unbiased estimation of β and unobserved hetero-
geneity through clustering is seen as a nuisance rather than of interest in itself.15
These roles are reversed in the context of performance assessment: covariates used
for case-mix adjustment and associated parameters are not of substantial interest,
whereas provider effects are. An analyst therefore has to trade off improved estima-
tion of provider effects against potential bias that enters through coefficients used
for case-mix adjustment. Where this bias is substantial, more complex modelling
strategies, such as those proposed by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982), may
be employed to obtain an unbiased shrinkage estimator of θj .
1.4 Structure of this thesis
In this thesis I make extensive use of pre- and post-operative PROM data from the
national PROM programme to study issues of performance variation in quality and
costs across English hospitals. The information gained this way can help reduce
information assymetries and can be used by various principals to select, incentivise
and hold to account the providers of healthcare with which they contract. The thesis
explores three broad themes: the relationship between variation in resource use
and quality, the appropriate assessment and reporting of multidimensional hospital
performance, and the use of performance information to motivate hospitals in a
public reporting context.
In Chapter 2 we explore whether observed outcome quality, as measured by
average patient-reported health gains, can explain some of the variation in treatment
costs reported by English NHS hospitals. Variations in costs across providers of
15RE estimation may lead to biased estimates of β and, by extension, θj if cov(Xij , θj) 6= 0, i.e. the
covariates correlate with the provider effect. Following Mundlak (1978) this bias arises because
the relationship between Xij and Yij differs from that of X¯j and Yij and X¯j varies across j. The
usual RE estimator uses between and within cluster variation in Xij to estimate β, which therefore
neither reflects the within nor between relationship appropriately. Also, if X¯j varies across j but
this is not modelled then the assumption of an identically distributed random intercept no longer
holds. The FE estimator circumvents this problem by subsuming all between-provider variation
into the provider effect so that coefficients are only estimated from within variation.
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the same care are a common finding in many healthcare systems (e.g. Busse et al.
2008; Laudicella et al. 2010) and a source of concern for price-setting regulators.
Prospective reimbursement systems based on yardstick competition, such as the
English Payment by Results (PbR), should give strong incentives for hospitals to
reduce resource utilisation and compete for elective patients on the basis of quality
(Rogerson 1994; Ma 1994). If large variations in costs exist and persist over time,
this indicates that the incentives created by the reimbursement system fail to change
provider behaviour. Also, in many publicly funded health systems hospitals face soft
budgets and are protected from the threat of market exit through public guardianship.
Therefore, any costs that exceed the reimbursement fall ultimately onto the health
budget and displace other valuable healthcare.
When challenged about their costs, hospitals may argue that they i) treat an
unfavourable case-mix, ii) operate within a difficult production environment, and/or
iii) invest in higher quality of care. We use data on hospitals’ reference cost returns16
and PROM change scores for the financial year 2009/10 to address two questions:
First, are larger improvements in patient health associated with higher average costs,
i.e. do hospitals have grounds to claim that their high costs are due to superior
quality? The economic literature on this question is inconclusive; see Hussey et al.
(2013) for a review of the US literature. Second, how much of the observed variation
in hospitals’ average costs can be attributed to quality as measured by PROM change
scores? All our analyses are conducted within a multilevel modelling framework to
account for case-mix differences, including the average pre-operative health status of
the hospital’s patient population, and observable production constraints (e.g. scale
and scope of operation). We find some empirical support for a U-shaped association
between outcome quality and costs, i.e. costs initially fall as quality increases but
then start to rise again, but this finding is sensitive to the condition under study and
the choice of PROM measure. There is no evidence that costs increase monotonically
16All NHS hospitals are required to provide information on their cost structure to the Department of
Health for the calculation of current spending and future reimbursement schedules. These data are
derived following the same accounting standards.
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in quality. We show that an adjustment for hospitals’ relative ability to improve their
patients’ health has only a modest effect on observed hospital cost variation.
In Chapter 3 we discuss appropriate means to analyse and present variation
in hospitals’ relative effect on patients’ multidimensional HRQoL. We focus on
performance information generated from EQ-5D data, where these information are
made publicly available for the purpose of informing patients’ choice of hospital. The
EQ-5D measures patients’ HRQoL along five dimensions: mobility, self-care, usual
activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. On each dimension, patients
can indicate whether they have no, some or extreme problems. Together, these
responses form the patient’s EQ-5D health profile.
Current practice in the national PROM programme is to aggregate health profiles
into interval scores using preference estimates obtained from the English general
public (NHS Information Centre 2010a; Dolan 1997). We argue that the use of
public preferences is inappropriate - and potentially misleading - if the resulting
performance estimates are intended to be used by patients choosing a hospital for
treatment. Instead aggregate performance estimates should take into account each
patient’s individual preferences since they are the relevant decision makers in this
setting and their preferences may differ substantially from those of the general public
(e.g. Mann et al. 2009).17 Because eliciting each patient’s individual preferences and
providing individualised performance reports is infeasible in practice, we suggest
generating performance estimates for each of the five EQ-5D dimensions separately
and reporting the expected probability of a patient to report, for example, no
problems post-operatively. This approach to analysis and presentation of EQ-5D
provider performance estimates is consistent with economic welfare theory since
it allows patients to exercise choices based on performance information that is
consistent with their own preferences. It may also help overcome some of the
problems in interpreting the data by patients (Hildon et al. 2012) and help hospitals
17In contrast, there is a strong argument for using the general public’s preferences when making
decisions about the adoption of new medical technologies into a tax-funded healthcare system such
as the English NHS. See Brazier et al. (2005) for a discussion.
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understand where their performance falls short or where they excel (Smith 2015).
We illustrate our approach using data on all patients undergoing hip replacement
surgery in the financial year 2009/10. We find that performance heterogeneity is
most pronounced on those dimensions that receive a low weighting in the UK time
trade-off EQ-5D tariff, i.e. the mobility and usual activities dimensions. Conversely,
performance estimates based on aggregate scores correlate well with estimates
for the anxiety/depression and pain/discomfort dimensions, which receive a high
weighting. Hence, the currently reported performance estimates based on aggregate
scores are driven by the preferences of the general public and may hide performance
variation that patients may value.
Chapter 4 builds on the theme of the previous chapter by suggesting a general
methodology to assess provider performance across multiple dimensions without
imposing strong normative judgements about the preferences of the relevant prin-
cipals. We propose the use of dominance criteria to identify providers that perform
well or poorly under only weak assumptions about the principals’ utility functions.18
To this end, we apply multivariate multilevel regression models with correction
for patients selecting into hospital to isolate performance variation from observed
and unobserved case-mix differences (e.g. demographics and pre-operative health)
and random noise (Hauck and Street 2006; Terza et al. 2008). We also propose a
methodology to construct appropriate uncertainty statements around dominance
classifications.
We apply this methodology to NHS hospitals and independent sector treat-
ment centres (ISTCs) providing hip replacement surgery during the financial years
2009/10 to 2011/12. Provider performance is assessed in terms of patients’ health
gain, probability of emergency readmission, waiting time and length of stay. A
number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis. First, all hospitals that
dominate the benchmark are ISTCs and all hospitals that fall short of the benchmark
18Our approach is similar to the Pareto Classification System proposed by Parkin et al. (2010). However,
whereas they compare changes in health profiles for individual patients over time, we compare
cross-sectional performance estimates across multiple dimensions of performance.
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are NHS hospitals. This may be due to a more streamlined production process,
since ISTCs do not provide emergency care and focus on a small number of surgical
procedures. Another important finding is a negative association between length of
stay and health gain. This is consistent with some of the health service research
literature on enhanced recovery pathways that show that care processes can be
optimised to achieve both higher quality and lower resource use (Husted et al. 2008;
Larsen et al. 2008). It also corroborates the finding of a lack of monotonically
increasing cost-quality relationship reported in Chapter 2. Finally, patient selection
into hospital has a negligible effect on outcomes, waiting time and length of stay
once patients’ pre-operative health is taken into account. Previous studies of the
US market have shown that patient selection into hospital based on unobservable
characteristics can severely bias performance estimates (Gowrisankaran and Town
1999; Geweke et al. 2003). However, these studies were limited in the availability of
good pre-treatment health measures.
The contribution of Chapter 5 is to test whether demand for hip replacement
surgery at a hospital is a function of published performance information on its
ability to improve its patients’ health. As noted before, the current prospective
reimbursement system in the English NHS gives hospitals an incentive to compete
for patients on the basis of quality. However, this requires patients to be sensitive
to publicly available information on hospital quality and hospitals to operate in
sufficiently competitive markets. The empirical work in this chapter contributes to
the debate about the effectiveness of using public reporting of performance data as
a means to incentivise healthcare providers (Cutler et al. 2004; Hibbard et al. 2003;
Hibbard et al. 2005; Ketelaar et al. 2011).
We estimate hospital demand models using data on the observed choices of over
180,000 patients undergoing primary hip replacement surgery in the English NHS
in the financial years 2010/11 to 2012/13. We find that patients respond to the
published PROM quality measures and that hospitals can increase their demand
by approximately 9% if they find ways to improve their patients’ health outcomes
by one standard deviation. However, patients’ choices are driven primarily by the
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distance to hospital. This means that a hospital’s ability to attract patients away
from competitors through increased quality (i.e. the cross-elasticity of demand)
reduces rapidly as the distance between hospitals increases. Overall this suggests
that publishing PROM quality metrics may be an effective instrument to incentivise
hospitals to provide high quality care, but its effectiveness depends on the local
circumstances.
The last chapter reviews and discusses the salient points of the previous chapters
and provides policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.
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2 Truly inefficient or providing better quality of care?
Analysing the relationship between risk-adjusted
hospital costs and patients’ health outcomes
2.1 Introduction
Any health system that aims to make the best use of its scarce resources will be
concerned about variation in costs between different providers of the same health-
care. If providers can reduce costs to the level of best practice, resources might be
released to provide benefits elsewhere. But in analysing variations in provision, it is
important to ensure that an assessment of best practice includes not only costs but
also patient outcomes. High costs are not always simply due to inefficiency but may
be associated with better outcomes. Low costs may sometimes be a symptom of low
quality care leading to poor outcomes.
A better understanding of the complex relationship between costs and quality
is required to address the important policy question of ‘which variation in cost is
justifiable’ (Keeler 1990). The health economic literature contains several studies
that explore empirically the effect of better health outcomes on costs. However
their findings remain inconclusive. While some studies report costs to be positively
related to health outcomes (Morey et al. 1992; Mukamel et al. 2001; Schreyo¨gg
and Stargardt 2010), others suggest that cost reductions and quality improvements
may be achieved simultaneously (Fleming 1991; Carey and Burgess 1999; Deily
and McKay 2006; Clement et al. 2008; McKay and Deily 2008). In an attempt
to accommodate both sets of empirical results within a unified framework, some
authors have reviewed the idea of a U-shaped cost-quality curve and found support-
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ing evidence (e.g. Weech-Maldonado et al. 2006; Hvenegaard et al. 2011). This
framework explicitly acknowledges that efforts to improve quality will sometimes
contribute to lower resource use and better health outcomes, whereas in other cases
additional resources are required to achieve better results.
An important limitation of the existing literature is its focus on negative health
outcomes resulting from inadequate quality. With few exceptions (e.g. Picone et al.
2003), health outcomes are measured as rates of mortality, re-admission or adverse
events.19 While important, these ‘failure’ measures cannot reflect the full spectrum
of patient health and are frequently deemed too noisy and insensitive to be useful
for provider comparison (Thomas 1996; Lilford and Pronovost 2010).
Reliance on rates of failure as primary measures of health outcome stems from
the lack of comprehensive data of patients’ health. This is being addressed. Since
April 2009, all providers of publicly-funded care in the English National Health
Service (NHS) are required to collect patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs)
for four procedures: unilateral hip and knee replacements, varicose vein surgery, and
groin hernia repairs (Department of Health 2008a). Standardised questionnaires,
including both generic (the EQ-5D) and condition-specific instruments, are collected
from all eligible inpatients before and 3 or 6 months after surgery. The changes
in patients’ health status can be analysed to measure the hospitals’ systematic
contribution to health with finer granularity than previously possible (Appleby and
Devlin 2004).
Building on this initiative, the work presented in this chapter has two aims. First,
we explore to what extent variation in risk-adjusted costs is associated with variation
in patient-reported health outcomes. Second, we investigate whether the new
information on health outcomes changes our judgement of relative provider cost
performance. We perform sensitivity analysis to assess the degree to which our
findings depend on the choice of PROM instrument and to the way in which the
19Instead of observed measures of quality, Romley and Goldman (2011) use observed choices of
hospitals to measure variation in unobserved, patient-perceived hospital quality and relate this to
costs. They find a positive relationship but note that revealed quality is not strongly correlated with
observed clinical quality.
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cost-outcome relationship is modelled.
Our empirical approach is to estimate multilevel models that recognise the clus-
tering of patients within providers. We treat patients as repeated observations of
the hospital’s production process. This allows us to distinguish random noise from
systematic cost variation attributable to cost containment effort (e.g. Dormont and
Milcent 2004; Olsen and Street 2008; Laudicella et al. 2010), without having to
specify the production possibility frontier; a task that has been criticised in the past
for its distributional assumptions and sensitivity to modelling choices (Newhouse
1994; Skinner 1994).
We estimate separate models for each of the four procedures, each of which is
considered as akin to a production line. This modelling approach has two important
advantages over consideration of hospital production in its entirety. First, hospitals
are multi-product organisations, consisting of multiple units such as individual
medical teams, departments and specialities, and the management (Harris 1977;
Pauly 1980). Efforts to contain costs exerted in one part of the organisation are
unlikely to affect health outcomes in other parts. Consequently, any attempt to
disentangle the complex relationship between costs and outcomes using data from
multiple units may lead to the identification of spurious relationships. By focusing
on single production lines, we can relate variation in health outcomes more directly
to variation in relevant resource use and ensure more thorough risk-adjustment
(Bradford et al. 2001). Second, we can assume a common underlying production
function that is shared by all providers of the procedure in question. This ensures
‘like-for-like’ comparisons across providers.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Social systems are often sufficiently complex to require a less-informed principal to
delegate a task to a specialised agent in return for some reward.20 The principal’s
20Such agency relationships exist not only between institutions (e.g. regulators and hospitals) but
within institutions (e.g. management and medical staff) (Harris 1977). A better understanding of
variation in effort across and within healthcare institutions is therefore crucial for policy makers
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objective is to ensure that publicly-funded services are of adequate quality and
delivered in a technically efficient manner. The potential agency problems arising in
such situations are well known (Laffont and Tirole 1993) and occur when principal
and agent have different objectives or value them differently and the agent’s effort is
unobserved. These information asymmetries allow agents to misreport effort and
pursue their own objectives.
One way of mitigating the problem of misreporting is to improve the information
base by undertaking comparative cost analysis. The problem is that when agents
are heterogeneous with respect to their products and production processes, simple
comparison does not suffice. In these instances, Shleifer (1985, p.324) proposes
multiple regression of costs on legitimate “characteristics that make firms differ, and
correct[. . .] for this heterogeneity”. The natural framework for this analysis is the
industry cost function that underlies all agents’ production processes. Following
Bradford et al. (2001), we specify this cost function at the level of the individual
patients. This formulation recognises that hospital care is tailored to the specific
characteristics and requirements of each individual. The agent’s cost function is then
C = C(X, q, r, w, Z, e) (2.1)
where C is the unit cost for the specific episode of care, X is a vector of variables
representing medical need, initial health and other case-mix factors of the patient, q
is a measure of quality of care provided, r and w are price vectors for capital and
labour, Z is a vector of environmental factors that constrain the production process
and e is the level of effort exerted by the agent.
A major source of variation in production costs is heterogeneity with respect to
patient case-mix. Even within production lines, some patients will require more
attention and resources than others because they suffer from more severe condi-
tions, present with initially lower health or differ with respect to other factors that
determine treatment costs, e.g. age, gender or number and type of comorbidities.
and local managers alike.
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Unless patients are randomly allocated to hospitals, some providers may attract a
more favourable case-mix than others and achieve similar costs while exerting less
effort. It is therefore crucial to correct for patient heterogeneity in order to allow for
fair comparison.
A second reason why production costs may differ across hospitals is because some
providers face a more adverse production environment than others. For example,
hospitals may differ in their access to factor markets and pay different prices for
capital and labour inputs. Costs may also be determined by location or the existing
infrastructure, both of which are, at least in the short run, not within the provider’s
control.
Finally, production costs may differ because of variations in the quality of care
provided. Patients seek healthcare to improve their health and health-related quality
of life or avert imminent deteriorations (Jacobs et al. 2006). Hospitals can, at
least partially, control the outcome of care through their production decisions, for
example, by investing in more effective medical technology or employing more
experienced surgeons. Any principal seeking to maximise patients’ health within a
constrained budget will therefore request increasingly higher levels of quality as long
as production remains cost-effective, i.e. the additional costs of better quality do not
outweigh its benefits. As a consequence, differences in observed costs brought about
by variation in quality should be taken into account when comparing hospital costs.
In order to determine the quality-adjusted level of cost performance, the principal
must establish the production costs of quality. The marginal costs of quality (MCQ)
are not necessarily constant over the observed range of quality. Indeed, if there are
diminishing marginal returns to factor input hospitals that provide high quality care
may find it more expensive to achieve further improvements than their low quality
peers. Moreover, MCQ may not be positive for all levels of observed quality. The
literature describes several organisational and medical interventions that lead to
better health outcomes while reducing costs, for example by mobilising patients
sooner after joint operations and discharging them earlier (Siggeirsdottir et al.
2005; Larsen et al. 2008), or preventing costly adverse events (Carey and Stefos
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2011). When some hospitals have not (yet) implemented such cost-saving quality
improvements21, they may face negative MCQ, whereas other providers cannot
improve quality without further resource use (Hvenegaard et al. 2011). This idea is
depicted in Figure 2.1.
Costs (C)
Quality (q)
MCQ<0 MCQ>0
Unit costs
Notes: Upper dotted line illustrates improvement in quality at same costs. Lower
dotted line illustrates improvement in quality at reduced costs.
Figure 2.1: The cost-quality relationship with non-constant marginal costs of quality
(MCQ)
In summary, therefore, the possibility of negative and non-constant marginal costs
of quality requires a careful approach to modelling and interpreting provider cost
performance. The principal’s judgement will differ according to where providers
are deemed to lie on the cost-quality curve. If marginal costs are positive, then
better quality justifies higher costs and cost performance estimates will need to be
adjusted for quality. If marginal costs are negative at this point of the curve, the
provider can reach higher levels of quality at equal or lower costs. This is depicted
in Figure 2.1, where the dotted lines indicate such movements. In this situation, the
principal should not consider quality information for these particular providers in
21Even when providers have utility functions that increase in quality and decrease in cost containment
effort, one may still observe such a relationship because of implementation costs, or imperfect
knowledge of best practice or of their own cost structure.
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the benchmark because cost containment and quality efforts are complements. Any
adjustment for quality would otherwise result in overstated cost performance that
cannot be justified on economic grounds.
2.3 Methods
2.3.1 Statistical analysis
We estimate multilevel models with provider-specific intercepts, separately for each
of the four procedures (Rice and Jones 1997; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Patients
form the micro observations and hospitals constitute macro units. This approach
acknowledges that some factors vary only between macro units (for example pro-
duction constraints or cost effort), whereas others vary by micro unit.
We specify our empirical model as follows:
Cij = α0 +X
′
ijβ + Z
′
jδ +M
′
jϑ+H
′
jγ + θj + ij (2.2)
where Cij is the cost of care22 for patient i = 1, . . . , nj in hospital j = 1, . . . , J .
The vectorXij contains case-mix controls that vary at micro level and Zj is a vector of
production constraints at macro level. Because we do not observe individual patients’
PROM responses (see data section), we include the average initial health status of
the provider’s patients Mj to control for observed differences in average medical
need. Similarly, the average change in health enters as a macro level covariate and
is denoted as Hj . The coefficient α0 gives the expected cost of a patient when all
variables are set to zero.23
Unexplained variation is decomposed into two components: i) a random error
22We use the natural unit of costs instead of the logarithmic transformation or more flexible generalised
linear models (GLMs). Results for models without provider random effects are similar to those
obtained from GLMs with log link and gamma / poisson distribution (see Appendix Table A2.1).
This reflects previous findings that linear models with identity link perform well in large samples
(Deb and Burgess 2003; Montez-Rath et al. 2006; Daidone and Street 2011). Furthermore, GLMs
with provider random effects are difficult to estimate in large samples due to the need to integrate
over the random effects distribution.
23One can recover the expected costs for a specific patient with Xij = X˜ treated in an average hospital
as α0 + X˜
′
β̂ + Z¯
′
δ̂.
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term ij that varies at micro level and is assumed to be distributed as ij ∼ N (0, σ2)
and ii) a provider effect θj that captures unobserved heterogeneity at macro level.
The latter is interpreted as variation in cost containment effort between hospitals.
These provider effects can be interpreted directly, representing the amount of cost
deviation from the risk-adjusted benchmark, α0. Accordingly, if θj < 0 the provider
has lower average costs than would be expected given the characteristics of its
patients and the constraints it faces, and vice versa.
In order to assess the sensitivity of estimates of provider effects to the addition of
outcome information, we estimate an alternative model where the effect of health
outcome on costs, θ, is restricted to be zero. We then calculate the difference
between estimates of θ̂j obtained from the ‘full’ and ‘restricted’ models to identify
providers for which a na¨ıve benchmark without quality controls provides misleading
assessments of cost performance.
2.3.2 Modelling the provider effect
The econometric literature posits two classes of models that can be applied in
the case of unobserved provider heterogeneity: fixed (FE) and random effects
(RE) (Wooldridge 2002). We choose a RE approach, where provider effects are
assumed to be distributed as θj ∼ N (0, τ2) and uncorrelated with the micro level
covariates. We justify this decision on the basis of three observations: First, in
our specific application, both FE and RE estimators yield estimates of β that are
virtually identical. We conclude that any bias arising from a potential correlation
between the provider effects θj and the vector Xij is a trivial concern.24 Second, the
FE estimator does not permit the inclusion of macro level covariates because they
would be perfectly collinear with the provider effects.25 This well-known limitation
24We have conducted Hausman tests to verify the assumption of exogeneity. The null hypothesis of
unbiasedness has been rejected for hip and knee replacement and groin hernia repair. However, the
coefficients differ in the magnitude of 1-2 GBP; a difference that is statistically but not economically
significant (see Appendix Tables A2.2 - A2.5). We believe that statistical significance is an artefact
of the large sample size at micro level.
25While it is possible to circumvent this problem by using Estimated Dependent Variable (EDV) models
(e.g. Lewis and Linzer 2005; Laudicella et al. 2010), this comes at the expense of additional
complexity and inefficiency, and requires the analyst to correct the resulting standard errors (Beck
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is problematic for our study because one of our key variables, health outcome, is
only observed at provider level. Third, the RE estimator is more efficient than the FE
estimator because it exploits both within- and between-hospital variation.
All models are estimated via maximum likelihood using the command xtmixed in
Stata 12.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Hospital Episode Statistics
Our study uses patient level data extracted from the Hospital Episode Statistics
database (HES) for the period April 2009 to March 2010. This database allows
us to analyse the characteristics and care received by each NHS-funded patient
from admission to discharge (Lakhani et al. 2005). All patients are allocated to a
Healthcare Resource Group (HRG v.4), the English equivalent of Diagnosis-Related
Groups (DRGs).26 We construct indicator variables for the ten most common HRGs
for each procedure, with the most common HRG set as the omitted base category in
the regressions.
The construction of any classification system necessarily requires a trade-off
between parsimony and homogeneity of the resulting groups. As a consequence,
HRGs are unlikely to capture all variation across providers. Hence, we include a
set of variables that are based on diagnostic codes (ICD-10) and procedure codes
(OPCS-4.5). These include the main reason and type of surgery27, whether it was
a primary or revision surgery, and the weighted Charlson index as a measure of
co-morbidity (Charlson et al. 1987). Further, following Laudicella et al. (2010) we
2005).
26Patients may be assigned to more than one HRG during their hospital stay if they are transferred
between departments. We focus on the HRG of the episode of care in which the PROM procedure
took place.
27We follow the classification of procedures as set out in the policy guidance document (Department
of Health 2008a) and distinguish, where appropriate, between primary and revision surgery. For
hip and knee replacement we differentiate between a main diagnosis of osteoarthritis (ICD-10:
M15-19), rheumatoid arthritis (M05-M06) or other. For varicose vein surgery we differentiate
between varicose ulcer (I83.0), varicose vein with inflammation (I83.1), without inflammation
(I83.9), with inflammation and ulcer (I83.2) or other.
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generate counts of non-duplicate, secondary diagnoses and procedure codes within
a spell as further controls for co-morbidities and complications.
We account for patient demographics by sorting patients into age quintiles and
create an indicator variable for male gender. We attribute to each patient the
proportion of residents in the patients’ neighbourhood28 that claim means-tested
benefits, which we interpret as a measure of income deprivation. This information
is obtained from the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (Noble et al. 2006). To
characterise the inpatient stay itself, we construct variables for transfers in and out
of hospital, transfers between departments, whether the patient is discharged home
or not, and in-hospital mortality.29
We construct variables that reflect (short-term) production constraints. Larger
providers may be able to realise economies of scale and we generate a measure of size
based on the count of patients treated by the provider for each of the four procedures.
To address economies of scope, we create an index of specialisation that reflects the
dispersion of HRGs treated within the hospital (Daidone and D’Amico 2009). The
index resembles a Gini index and is bounded between zero (no specialisation) and
one (all patients of hospital j fall into one HRG). Finally, hospitals are categorised
into teaching and non-teaching facilities based on the classification system adopted
by the National Patient Safety Agency (2011). Since these constraints may not be
binding, we explore the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of these variables
into our regression models.
2.4.2 Reference cost
Hospital Episode Statistics do not include information on the cost of care. However,
NHS hospitals are required to provide information on their cost structure to the
Department of Health for the annual compilation of the reference cost schedule and
28HES records patients’ locations in terms of the Lower Super Output area (LSOA; 2001 census
boundaries) in which they reside. Each LSOA contains approximately 1,500 inhabitants and is
designed to be homogeneous with respect to tenure and accommodation type.
29In-hospital mortality is less than 0.5% for all conditions studied. We therefore consider the risk of
survivorship bias to be negligible.
42
2 The relationship between risk-adjusted hospital costs and patients’ health outcomes
calculation of reimbursement prices (Department of Health 2010). Reference cost
data have been collected since 1997. They are made available both at aggregate
level (overall spending) and disaggregated, i.e for each individual provider. We
utilise individual hospitals’ 2009/10 returns to construct patient-level cost data
(Department of Health 2011b). No disaggregate data are available for private
providers of NHS-funded care, namely independent sector treatment centres. We
therefore focus our analysis on NHS hospitals.
The reference cost report is implemented using a top-down costing methodology
(Department of Health 2010). Costs are attributed to individual patients where
possible. For those cost components where this is not feasible (e.g. overheads), total
hospital costs are progressively cascaded down through a hierarchy of costing levels,
starting at treatment services, to specialities and finally to individual HRGs. Costs at
HRG-level are reported separately for departments and are further disaggregated
according to admission type (day case, elective and emergency care) and length of
stay, where HRG-specific trim points are used to differentiate long inpatient spells.30
Hence, within each department and HRG there can be up to five (since day cases
cannot be further differentiated by length of stay) different cost estimate groups
(‘cost baskets’). For two of those, namely those where length of stay exceeds the trim
point, costs also vary within providers. This allocation of resources is intended to
reflect variation in costs between patients and is governed by strict accounting rules
that all NHS providers have to adhere to.
Trusts report the average costs for each cost basket and the cost per excess bed
day above this trim point. We map these reference cost data to admission records
as described in Table 2.1 (see also Laudicella et al. (2010)). To mitigate the effects
of measurement and coding errors, we drop observations for which reported costs
are below 1% or above 99% of the observed costs within the specific cost basket
across all providers.31 We further exclude observations for one provider for which
30Trimpoints are set to the 75th percentile + 1.5*(75th - 25th percentile) of the distribution of length
of stay in this HRG in the previous financial year. They are calculated separately by admission type.
31Alternatively, one could top- and bottom-code these observations, i.e. replace the values of all
observations < 1% [> 99%] of the cost distribution with the value observed at the 1st [99th]
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the reference cost data are considered to be of insufficient quality.32
Table 2.1: Reference cost data allocation
Admission type Normal stay (los− tp ≤ 0) Long stay (los− tp > 0)
Elective CEl CEl + (los− tpEl)ebdEl
Emergency CEm CEm + (los− tpEm)ebdEm
Day-case CDc CDc
El = Elective; Em = Emergency; Dc = Day-case; los = Length of stay; tp = Trimpoint;
ebd = excess bed-day cost
Notes: C denotes the average (fixed) cost of care in this cost basket, whereas ebd denotes
variable costs. Hence, costs only vary between two patients in the same hospital department
and HRG if their length of stay differs and at least one patient’s stay exceeds the trimpoint.
We adjust patient costs by the Market Forces Factor (MFF) specific to the provider.
The MFF is an index of relative prices for buildings, land and labour that is used
by the English Department of Health to account for unavoidable variation in input
prices (Department of Health 2008b).
2.4.3 Patient-reported outcomes
Data from the PROMs programme cover April 2009 - March 2010 and are published
at hospital-level by the NHS Information Centre (IC)33 for all providers of NHS-
funded care (NHS Information Centre 2010b). The data are obtained by surveying
patients before and after their operation. For each hospital, data are available about
the average health status pre-surgery, post-surgery, and the average change in health
after treatment.34 Individual-level data, on which these average scores are based,
were not available to us at the time of study.
The PROMs survey includes both generic and condition-specific instruments for
which data are reported separately (see Chapter 1). The EQ-5D is a generic PROM
comprising a set of questions asking patients to indicate whether they have no,
percentile.
32We exclude data for Southend University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, which reports unrealistic-
ally low average unit costs of £517 for hip replacement surgery. To be consistent, we exclude this
provider from all analyses. This has no significant effect on our results.
33The NHS IC has subsequently been renamed the Health and Social Care Information Centre.
34The NHS IC also provides these averages adjusted for case-mix. However, we used the unadjusted
data because a) at the time of writing the case-mix adjustment methodology was not yet finalised,
and b) we undertake our own case-mix adjustments.
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some or extreme problems on five dimensions (mobility; self care; usual activities;
pain/discomfort; anxiety/depression) (Brooks 1996; Kind et al. 2005). These
responses are used to describe a patient’s EQ-5D health profile. That health profile
is summarised using utility35 weights obtained from members of the general public
(Dolan 1997), anchored at 1 (full health) and 0 (dead), with scores < 0 indicating
states considered worse than being dead. We multiply the EQ-5D utility scores with
100 to align its scale with the other PROMs. The patient also provides their own
assessment of their overall health state on a visual analogue scale — the EQ-VAS —
from 0 to 100 (worst to best imaginable health, respectively).
The condition-specific Oxford Hip and Knee Scores (OHS/OKS) consist of 12
questions, each of which requires responses on a 5-point severity scale (Dawson et al.
1996; Dawson et al. 1998). Equal importance is given to all questions and summary
scores range from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). The Aberdeen Varicose Vein Questionnaire
(AVVQ) contains 13 questions and scores between 0 and 100 (Garratt et al. 1993).
In contrast to the aforementioned instruments, higher scores on the AVVQ indicate
worse health states. We invert the scale of the AVVQ (i.e. 0 = worst, 100 = best) to
facilitate interpretation and comparison across instruments.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
We present descriptive statistics in Table 2.2.
Each of the four conditions is sufficiently populated to allow for precise estimation
of case-mix effects at patient level. In contrast, the number of providers is comparably
low (124 to 146 hospitals), reinforcing the value of multilevel analysis as compared
to traditional hospital-level analysis.
The cost of care varies considerably across providers for each of the four pro-
35The Dolan tariff is derived from preference data obtained through time trade-off exercises. The
resulting weights therefore do not constitute von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities since the elicitation
exercises did not involve decisions under risk. However, the UK TTO weights are commonly referred
to in the literature as ‘utility weights’ and we shall therefore follow the same convention.
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cedures. For example, for knee replacement surgery we observe average provider
costs that range from below £2,000 to more than £10,000. High cost cases are not
confined to one or two providers. Rather, we observe that many hospitals report cost
for patients in excess of two standard deviations above the national average.
The generic nature of EQ-5D and EQ-VAS allows for comparison of health out-
comes across conditions. Patients undergoing hip or knee replacement experience
on average larger increases in health status than those receiving groin hernia or
varicose vein surgery. This is consistent with the less serious nature of the underlying
conditions. We observe disagreement between EQ-5D and EQ-VAS on the direction of
health change for the latter groups of patients. Most providers report improvements
in average health when measured with the EQ-5D. In contrast, more than 50% of
providers in our sample report negative average health outcomes when measured by
the EQ-VAS. Whether this is a result of aggregation (from patient to provider level)
or a genuine difference between instruments cannot be explored with our dataset.
2.5.2 Regression results
2.5.2.1 Baseline estimates
Table 2.3 presents regression results from a model with EQ-5D outcome information.
We find significant coefficients on the majority of HRG variables (not reported;
see Appendix Tables A2.2 - A2.5 for full results). This indicates that the current
reimbursement system is able to distinguish between different types of patients and
their expected costs. That said, several other patient characteristics explain costs
over and above the allocated HRG, for example the patient’s age and certain types
of main diagnoses and procedures (see Appendix). Costs are also higher for patients
that undergo more procedures or suffer from a higher number of comorbidities as
well as for patients that are transferred in or out of hospital or are not discharged to
their usual place of residence.
The results at provider-level are less clear cut. The average cost of patients treated
in teaching hospitals is generally higher than in non-teaching hospitals but the effect
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is statistically significant only for groin hernia repair. We do not find conclusive
evidence that NHS hospitals realise positive economies of scale or scope. This is
somewhat surprising given the substantial differences in volume and, to a lesser
degree, specialisation observed across providers.
With respect to PROM scores, we find that the coefficient on initial health status
shows the expected negative sign for three out of four conditions but is only statistic-
ally significant for the two orthopaedic procedures. Hospitals serving, on average,
healthier patients have lower average patient costs than those admitting patients
with lower health status; a result that seems intuitively correct. The size of the effect
is, however, relatively small: a SD increase in average pre-operative EQ-5D score is
estimated to decrease the cost of knee replacement surgery by merely -£293. The
association between average health outcome and costs is negative in all four models.
This would indicate that some providers are able to secure greater health gains and
provide care at lower costs than other providers. However, no results are statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level.
2.5.2.2 Alternative PROM instruments
While there are good reasons to prefer generic instruments over condition-specific
instruments, for example because the former facilitates broader comparisons across
disease areas, one should not a priori exclude the latter for comparative cost ana-
lysis. We re-estimate the various models using condition-specific PROMs and, as an
alternative to utility weighted EQ-5D profile, the EQ-VAS, and present results in the
first column of Table 2.4.
With few exceptions, coefficients on health gain are negative, indicating that, on
average, larger changes in patient health are associated with lower costs. However,
only the coefficient on health gain measured by the EQ-VAS for knee replacement
surgery is statistically significant. All coefficient estimates can be interpreted as
marginal effects, i.e. a one point increase in average EQ-VAS health outcome is
expected to reduce unit costs after knee replacement by about £79.
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Table 2.4: Relationship between health outcome and costs
Constant MCQ Non-constant MCQ
Variable H H H2
Test of joint
significance
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE χ2(2)
Knee replacement
EQ-5D -6.5 22.7 32.6 31.7 -0.8 0.7 1.59
EQ-VAS -78.6 37.0 * -117.8 44.6 ** 5.5 4.6 7.19 *
OKS -53.9 66.1 382.3 228.2 -15.5 7.7 * 5.15
Hip replacement
EQ-5D -22.0 31.9 -313.1 164.2 3.7 2.1 4.27
EQ-VAS -55.7 40.0 -105.9 58.5 3.3 3.4 3.66
OHS 36.0 86.0 -2,466.3 778.2 ** 63.7 20.2 ** 10.05 **
Groin hernia repair
EQ-5D -2.2 14.0 -42.9 33.4 2.3 1.8 1.72
EQ-VAS -10.2 17.4 -10.0 18.2 0.3 4.3 0.36
Varicose vein surgery
EQ-5D -1.8 8.8 8.3 18.7 -0.5 0.7 0.59
EQ-VAS 17.5 12.0 26.1 11.1 * 4.2 1.9 * 9.86 **
AVVQ 14.8 20.1 147.9 71.1 * -7.6 4.0 4.46
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
OHS/OKS = Oxford Hip/Knee Score; AVVQ = Aberdeen varicose vein questionnaire; MCQ = marginal costs of
quality; H = health outcome, i.e. the change in health status after treatment
2.5.2.3 Non-constant marginal costs of quality
So far, we have assumed that the marginal costs of quality are constant across the
entire range of observed health outcomes. This assumption may be too restrictive
to accommodate previous empirical findings and theoretical considerations (see
Section 2.2). Following Fleming (1991) and Weech-Maldonado et al. (2006), we
allow for a non-linear association between costs and outcomes by including squared
terms in our model. Coefficient estimates are presented in the third and fifth column
of Table 2.4. We focus on those which are jointly significant at a critical value of
α=0.05.
For hip replacement surgery, we observe a statistically significant, non-linear
association between health outcomes and risk-adjusted costs when the former are
measured by the OHS. The marginal effect of outcomes on costs is negative at low
levels of health outcome but turns positive after passing a saddle point. At the 25
percentile of the OHS outcome distribution, a one point increase in average outcome
is associated with a cost reduction of £70 per patient. In contrast, unit costs are
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expected to increase by £79 when starting at the mean value.
For knee replacement surgery, the coefficient on the linear EQ-VAS health outcome
term is statistically significant and negative but the squared term is insignificant. For
varicose vein surgery, the estimated relationship is positive and exponential for the
EQ-VAS. One may interpret this as the right-hand side of the U-shaped relationship
that we observe for hip replacement surgery since EQ-VAS scores for varicose vein
surgery also take on negative values.
Results for the other models are statistically insignificant or similar to the linear
models.
We tested the robustness of these results to the exclusion of variables representing
provider-level constraints (i.e. measures of scale and scope, and teaching status)
since these may not be binding. Results are very similar; see Appendix Table A2.6.
We also re-estimated all models excluding two specialised orthopaedic hospitals36
since these may, arguably, operate under different production constraints (e.g. case-
mix) that are unobservable to us. Again, results are robust to this modelling choice
(Appendix Table A2.7).
2.5.3 Impact on provider effects
We now turn to the assessment of providers’ efforts to contain costs. We illustrate
our results using the example of hip replacement surgery and the Oxford Hip Score.
Figure 2.2 shows the Empirical Bayes estimates of provider effects obtained from
the restricted model where health outcomes are not taken into account. Hospitals to
the left of the graph have lower average costs than hospitals to the right. Bayesian
95% credible intervals are formed from the posterior distribution of each provider
effect (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009).
We find substantial differences in provider effects after accounting for case-mix,
production constraints and average initial health. 95% of providers are located within
the range of -£2,700 to +£3,920 around their expected costs (here normalised to
36These are the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital in Birmingham (provider code: RRJ) and the Royal
National Orthopaedic Hospital in London (RAN).
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Figure 2.2: Hospital cost performance for hip replacement surgery, unadjusted for
health outcomes
zero). The ‘best’ hospital has risk-adjusted production costs that lie about £4,210
below the benchmark, whereas the ‘most expensive’ hospital lies about £7,270 above.
Neither of these two hospitals are specialised orthopaedic providers, nor are they
otherwise unusual in their observable characteristics.
Differences in costs, while substantial, do not seem to be driven by variation in
average health outcome when marginal costs of quality are modelled as constant.
Comparing the estimates of a model with linear OHS health outcome term and the
restricted model, we find that, for most hospitals, the adjustment does not result in
different judgements with regard to their relative cost performance (Figure 2.3a;
ordered as in Figure 2.2). Only one hospital experiences a change that is statistically
significant. The magnitude of the adjustment is £279.
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(b) OHS, non-constant marginal costs of quality
Figure 2.3: Change in estimated provider cost performance after accounting for
average health outcome
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The picture changes when comparing provider effects from the restricted model
and a model with non-constant marginal costs of quality (Figure 2.3b). For a large
number of hospitals, quality-adjusted cost performance differs statistically signific-
antly from their unadjusted estimate by less than £500 in absolute terms. This said,
a small group of hospitals experience changes greater than £1,000. Unsurprisingly,
the hospital with the largest adjustment (-£3,828) reports the largest health outcome
and therefore profits most from allowing for a non-linear relationship between costs
and quality. Note that, out of 74 hospitals that experience statistically significant
changes only 34 are ‘economically significant’. These hospitals are estimated to
face positive marginal costs of quality. As we earlier argued, regulators should not
amend judgement about the 30 hospitals that face negative marginal costs of quality
(‘economically insignificant’).
Results for the other procedures and PROMs are reported in Appendix Table A2.8.
Again, we do not find estimates of hospital cost performance to be greatly affected
by the addition of health outcome information.
2.6 Discussion
The objective of this study is to measure cost variation in the provision of four
surgical procedures and to account for differences in the quality of care provided.
Our work builds on a new policy initiative by the English Department of Health to
collect patient-reported health outcome data using generic and condition-specific
instruments. This study is a first attempt to incorporate patient-reported health
outcomes into comparative cost analysis and explore whether this new measure of
quality changes judgements about the relative performance of NHS hospitals. We use
multilevel modelling techniques to distinguish random cost variation at patient-level
from systematic variation at provider-level. We obtain precision-weighted Empirical
Bayes estimates of provider effects and interpret these as relative measures of cost
containment effort.
Our results suggest that even after allowing for (exogenous) patient or production
54
2 The relationship between risk-adjusted hospital costs and patients’ health outcomes
process characteristics there exists systematic cost differences across hospitals in the
provision of surgical procedures. These differences are substantial and economically
significant. For example, even after excluding very high/low cost providers (top and
bottom 2.5% of the distribution), hospitals still report average risk-adjusted costs for
hip replacement surgery that differ by up to £6,600. Some of this variation in costs
is associated with provider differences with respect to their patients’ pre-operative
health, although the overall effect is small. Variation in costs may also relate to
the average health outcomes and we find evidence of a non-linear relationship
between costs and outcomes for hip replacement surgery. For some hospitals, such
health outcome adjustment leads to significant improvement in their relative cost
performance but the effect is generally small in magnitude. Furthermore, we have
argued that the economic judgement should differ depending on whether the hospital
faces positive or negative marginal costs of quality and can reduce costs without
negative effects on health outcomes.
Several implications for policy makers and future research arise from our results.
First, even a number of years after the introduction of PbR, there remains marked,
and largely unexplained, variation in costs across providers of the same care. This
suggests that the prospective payment system with yardstick competition has failed
one of its purposes, namely to reduce variation and change provider behaviour. Since
policy makers in the English NHS seem reluctant to let providers exit the market as
a result of overspending, losses due to excessive production costs will ultimately fall
onto the health budget and displace other valuable healthcare.
Second, as the impact of health outcome information on estimates of cost contain-
ment effort seems, at best, minimal, it casts doubt on claims that might be made by
some hospitals that their substantially higher production costs are a consequence
of investing in better care that produces better health outcomes. Similarly, we find
that only a small part of the observed variation in costs is explained by differences
in patients’ pre-operative health after adjusting for patient case-mix. Taken together,
this suggests that, for the condition studied, the link between health and expenditure
is weak.
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Third, if the relationship between cost and quality is indeed non-linear, pay-
for-performance and quality bonus programs have to acknowledge non-constant
marginal costs and set different prices for different levels of health outcome. If the
association between outcomes and cost is negative or non-existent (see e.g. groin
hernia repair) then quality bonus payments of any form should be understood as
incentive payments in excess of production costs. The way in which quality incentive
schemes are designed might therefore differ by procedure.
Fourth, at this early stage of the PROM initiative and on the basis of our pre-
liminary analysis, we cannot single out a preferred PROM instrument that should
be applied exclusively in future analyses of hospital cost performance. Users of
PROM information may prefer different instruments for a number of valid reasons.
For example, one may argue that the vague definition of endpoints on the EQ-VAS
(‘best/worse imaginable’) make it difficult to compare across patients or even across
repeated responses by the same patient, and hence prefer to base inferences about
provider performance on the EQ-5D descriptive system. However, the present study
was not designed to explore differences in responsiveness and construct validity
across PROMs, nor should any normative statements be made on the basis of de-
scriptive statistics of the data. We therefore recommend using both generic and
condition-specific instruments and conducting sensitivity analysis with regard to the
choice of instrument as we have done here.
Our study has a number of relevant limitations, many of which are data related.
First, while PROM data are collected at patient-level, these were not available to us
at the time of study. Instead, our analysis utilises publicly available data averaged
at provider-level. This may be problematic for two reasons: i) the association
between costs and health outcomes is estimated from less variable data and statistical
power is reduced accordingly, and ii) within-hospital heterogeneity with respect
to health outcomes cannot be taken into account. Depending on the degree of
heterogeneity, one may observe an association at provider-level that differs from (or
even contradicts) the true association at patient-level (Robinson 1950).
Second, our measure of costs is derived from a top-down costing system, where
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overall costs are assigned to HRGs on the basis of activity within cost centres.
Currently, this forms the best estimate of patient-level costs routinely calculated in
the England NHS and is used in applied research (e.g. Laudicella et al. 2010) as well
as for price setting purposes (Department of Health 2002; Daidone and Street 2011).
However, there is a risk that overhead and indirect costs are assigned incorrectly
or that patients are assigned equal costs when consuming different amounts of
resources (limited within-product variation). Other healthcare systems, most notably
the US Veterans Health Administration system, operate bottom-up (i.e. activity-
based) costing systems, where resources devoted to individual patients are measured
at the level of intermediate products (e.g. day on ward, unit of medication) and then
summed across the inpatient stay (Carey and Burgess 2000). Bottom-up costing is
generally regarded as preferable because it reflects true resource consumption more
accurately.37 Carey and Stefos (2011) have compared cost data derived from both
systems and found patient costs to be higher and more variable under bottom-up
costing, leading to different estimates of the costs of adverse events. While we cannot
assess whether their findings hold for English hospitals, we have to acknowledge
that our results may understate the impact of quality on costs. This may also explain
why we do not observe evidence of economies of scale.38
Third, because we use observational data our analysis may suffer from various
forms of endogeneity bias. We are especially concerned about the potential endo-
geneity of health outcomes and costs (Braeutigam and Pauly 1986; Gertler and
Waldman 1992). If providers choose their level of resource allocation and quality
of care simultaneously, the health outcomes in our model would be endogenous,
and coefficient estimates would be biased downwards. To address this problem, one
requires suitable instrumental variables (IV) that are sufficiently correlated with
outcomes, but not with costs. Carey and Burgess (1999) use measures of past quality
37However, as pointed out by Jackson (2001) all costing systems make assumptions about cost
allocation, so that a perfect representation of true resource use is unlikely to be achieved.
38An alternative to cost analysis would be to study variation in length of stay; a proxy for resource
utilisation. See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the potential trade-off between length of stay and
health outcome.
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to instrument current quality. Focussing on the effect of resource use on outcomes
Hauck and Zhao (2011) employ weekday and month of admission as IVs for length
of stay, whereas Picone et al. (2003) and Schreyo¨gg and Stargardt (2010) explore
variation in regional price levels. Given our data limitations and the focus of our
analysis, none of these IVs are applicable. Furthermore, as we model the relationship
between patient-level costs and provider-level quality measures, we would expect
endogeneity to be less accentuated. Still, we must conclude that our study has only
explored the association between cost and health outcomes, but cannot ascertain
causality.
Finally, while patient-reported outcome measures provide a more detailed picture
of the health outcomes experienced by patients, they may not completely reflect the
quality of hospital care for various reasons: i) PROMs are, by definition, subjective
and may thus be affected by reporting bias, ii) health outcomes may be influenced by
events taking place before admission or after discharge over which the hospital has
no control, e.g. the care provided after discharge, and iii) PROM scores may be prone
to selection bias in the form of non-random participation or drop-out if patients
suffer poor outcomes (notably death).39 We cannot explore these issues with our
data. However, the use of hospital mean scores may prove helpful in this situation
because some of the above effects are likely to be mitigated by averaging across
patients. Clearly, further research is required to explore the validity and limitations
of patient-reported health outcomes for provider performance assessments.
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3 Hospital variation in patient-reported outcomes at the
level of EQ-5D dimensions
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a growing trend to measure and publish hospital data on
health outcomes in order to facilitate patient choice and increase provider account-
ability (Marshall et al. 2003; Cutler et al. 2004). The focus of these activities has
been on measures of mortality, re-admission or adverse events, which are easily
derived from clinical records but reveal little about the health of the vast majority of
patients. In order to allow for a more sensitive assessment of hospital performance it
is necessary to move away from a focus on relatively rare ‘failure’ outcomes towards
more comprehensive and sensitive measures of patients’ health outcomes (Kind and
Williams 2004; Appleby et al. 2010; McGrail et al. 2012).
Since April 2009, all providers of publicly-funded inpatient care in the English
National Health Service (NHS) have been required to collect both EQ-5D (Brooks
1996) and condition-specific data for four elective procedures: unilateral hip and
knee replacements, varicose vein surgery, and groin hernia repairs (Department of
Health 2008a). Eligible patients are invited to report their health status before and
three or six months after surgery. The changes in patients’ health status are expected
to ‘provide an indication of the outcomes or quality of care delivered to NHS patients’
(Department of Health 2008a, p.5) and can be analysed to identify systematic
variation across hospital providers with finer granularity than previously possible.
Traditionally, patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) have been collected
and analysed primarily within clinical trials to assess the treatment effect on patients’
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health. Their application in the context of routine performance assessment on a
national scale breaks new ground and requires an appropriate methodology which
takes into account the characteristics of the data and their intended use as measures
of the relative quality of hospital treatment (Smith and Street 2013).
The NHS Information Centre has developed a preliminary risk-adjustment method-
ology that is currently being applied to the PROMs data (Coles 2010). For the EQ-5D,
this involves transforming the patients’ EQ-5D health profiles into utility-weighted
index scores and estimating linear regression models to relate post-treatment utility
scores to the pre-treatment scores and case-mix controls. The advantage of this
approach is that patient health is expressed in terms of a (quasi-)continuous score,
which facilitates statistical analysis and allows for ranking of hospitals with respect
to a single performance metric: their ability to influence post-treatment utilities or,
equivalently, changes in scores over time. However, for the purposes of performance
measurement, identifying best practice and informing patient choice, the costs of
aggregation may outweigh the benefits. We build this argument around three points.
First, any form of aggregation causes loss of detail and information (Smith 2002).
Once constructed, an index measure cannot reveal information about the underlying
components and the degree to which hospitals affect these. Certain hospitals may
perform well on one EQ-5D dimension but fall short on another. Detailed information
on the performance on each dimension can help to identify the source of the problem
and foster improvement through adoption of best practice (Smith 2002).
Second, the use of an aggregation function introduces exogenous variation that can
bias statistical inference and raises normative concerns about whose preferences the
weights should reflect (Smith 2002; Goddard and Jacobs 2009; Parkin et al. 2010).
In some circumstances, one may be willing to accept the weights underpinning
the aggregation function, for example, when conducting economic evaluations of
health technologies from a societal perspective (Siegel et al. 1997). But this is
not always justified. The use of aggregate outcome data to inform patients’ choice
of hospital raises normative concerns because it imposes a common valuation of
health dimensions. In fact, reporting relative hospital performance with respect to
61
3 Performance variation across multiple health dimensions
risk-adjusted post-operative EQ-5D utility is only justified if all (prospective) patients
share the same relative values. But patients may be heterogeneous with respect to
their relative valuations of health dimension or their relative valuations may differ
from those of the general public (De Wit et al. 2000; Mann et al. 2009). If so,
analysing variation on the level of health dimensions is more appropriate as it allows
patients to apply their own values when interpreting performance data.40
Third, the use of performance data derived from EQ-5D utility scores may be
limited by patients’ difficulties in interpreting these quantities. In a recent qualit-
ative study, Hildon and colleagues 2012 interviewed patients and clinicians about
their views on four different metrics of hospital PRO performance, including mean
follow-up score, mean change in score, proportion reaching a specified threshold at
follow-up, and proportion reaching a minimally important difference. Their results
suggest that ‘for patients [. . .], unlike measures of height or weight, PRO[..] scores are
unfamiliar and their values have no immediate meaning. It’s therefore necessary to
transform them into interpretable forms, or indeed into experiences rather than met-
rics, to make them useful’. Furthermore, patients ‘could not distinguish between the
four [metrics], but liked a percentage or what was for them intuitive scaling’ (Hildon
et al. 2012, p.11). Analysing responses on EQ-5D dimensions rather than utility
scores allows reporting performance in a similar form to the way that the data
were originally collected. Hospitals could then be compared with respect to the
risk-adjusted probability of a given patient to report, for example, no problems with
mobility or pain/discomfort at follow-up.
To explore these claims, we assess hospital performance with respect to self-
reported health outcomes for hip replacement patients. We focus on the EQ-5D
and develop multilevel risk-adjustment models for each of the five functional di-
mensions. Our approach draws on the literature on longitudinal modelling (Bryk
and Raudenbush 1988; Molenberghs and Verbeke 2005; Hedeker and Gibbons
40Devlin et al. (2010) propose using Pareto dominance criteria to compare changes in patients’ EQ-5D
health profiles across time without imposing value judgements. However, this approach leads to
information loss since neither the magnitude of change nor the distribution of health effects across
health dimensions is considered.
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2006) and performance assessment (Raudenbush and Willms 1995; Goldstein and
Spiegelhalter 1996) to analyse variation in treatment impact across hospitals. More
specifically, we model the hospital-specific contribution to post-treatment EQ-5D
response as a random coefficient that varies between hospitals. The Empirical Bayes
(EB) estimates of this coefficient are then interpreted as capturing relative hospital
quality. We assess the correlation between performance assessments on the level of
EQ-5D dimensions and aggregated utility scores.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Data
Our study exploits EQ-5D data routinely collected from English patients having a
hip replacement during April 2009 to March 2010. All providers of NHS-funded
care are required to participate in the survey (Department of Health 2008a). This
includes all NHS-operated hospitals and private treatment centres. Patients aged
15 or over that undergo elective, unilateral hip replacement surgery are invited
to take part in the survey (Department of Health 2008a). We extract information
on each patient’s pre- and post-operative EQ-5D health profile and EQ-5D utility
score, where the latter is calculated using the UK time trade-off (TTO) utility weights
(Dolan 1997). The pre-treatment (baseline) survey is collected either during the
initial outpatient appointment that precedes hospital admission or at the day of
admission. Follow-up data are collected by the NHS Information Centre via postal
survey approximately 6 month after surgery. To ensure consistency with respect to
the timing of measurements while retaining as much information as possible, we
exclude all observations for which the recorded time between baseline survey and
admission exceeds 12 weeks or the follow-up period is either shorter than 20 weeks
or longer than one year.
We link these data to the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) inpatient database,
which contains detailed information on all inpatient care provided in English hos-
pitals. The depth of information contained in HES allows us to account for a wide
63
3 Performance variation across multiple health dimensions
range of clinical and demographic risk adjusters. These include the most frequent
main diagnoses (e.g. osteoarthritis (ICD-10: M15-19), rheumatoid arthritis (ICD-10:
M05-06))(Singh 2011), the weighted Charlson score of comorbidities (Charlson et al.
1987; Sundararajan et al. 2004; Bjorgul et al. 2010), the number of additionally
coded comorbidities, whether it was a primary or revision surgery and whether
the revision was due to problems with the existing implant (ICD-10: T84), patient
age, gender and the deprivation profile of the patient’s neighbourhood of residence
(Noble et al. 2006; Clement et al. 2011; Neuburger, Hutchings, Black et al. 2013).
We only retain patient records that can be matched to the PRO survey and for which
we observe a full EQ-5D profile at baseline and follow-up.
3.2.2 Statistical modelling
The objective of the empirical analysis is to obtain estimates of the relative system-
atic impact of hospital providers on patients’ post-treatment health outcomes. We
estimate hierarchical ordered probit models (Breslow and Clayton 1993; Gibbons
and Hedeker 1997; Greene and Hensher 2010), separately for each of the five EQ-5D
dimensions. We then compare the results to those obtained from a linear regression
on the EQ-5D utility scores to study the practical implications of using disaggregated
health dimensions for assessment of hospital performance.
Let y∗ijt denote the health status (with respect to e.g. anxiety/depression) of
patient i = 1, . . . , nj in hospital j = 1, . . . , J at time point t ∈ [0, 1]. Health status is
assumed to be continuous but not directly observable. Instead, we observe patients’
own assessment of their status on the three-point EQ-5D response scale (m = 1, 2, 3
with 1 = no problems, 2 = some problems, 3 = extreme problems). The mapping
of latent, continuous status y∗ijt to observed, discrete responses yijt is given by the
standard threshold model (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975)
yijt =

3, if y∗ijt ≤ κ1
2, if κ1 < y
∗
ijt ≤ κ2
1, if y∗ijt > κ2
(3.1)
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where the threshold parameters κ are unobserved and must be estimated from the
data. The categories are ordered from worst to best. This facilitates the qualitative in-
terpretation of regression coefficients, where a positive sign indicates improvements
in latent health and, thus, the probability of reporting no problems.
Each patient provides measures of their health status pre- and post-treatment. Both
responses are outcomes of the same measurement process as well as being (partly)
determined by common factors, such as patient characteristics and baseline level of
latent health. Our interest lies in the latent health gain that follows from hospital
treatment and the degree to which variation in health gain can be systematically
associated with the provider of care. We make the assumption that, conditional
on baseline health and a set of risk-adjustment factors, patients do not select into
hospitals based on unobservable characteristics and that the health of patients in
different hospitals would follow the same trajectory if untreated. This allows us to
interpret hospital variation in latent health gain as a measure of relative quality.
Our data are characterised by a hierarchical structure, with measurement points
clustered in patients, which themselves are clustered in hospitals. Given the non-
linear nature of our model, these data can be analysed in two ways. One can
collapse the hierarchy into two levels and model post-treatment latent health as
a function of lagged, observed (pre-treatment) response yij0, observed patient
characteristics and a hospital effect (e.g. Contoyannis et al. 2004). Alternatively, one
can treat both pre- and post-treatment latent health as left-hand side variables and
estimate longitudinal models with unobserved patient heterogeneity (i.e. growth
curve modelling) (Molenberghs and Verbeke 2005; Hedeker and Gibbons 2006;
Greene and Hensher 2010). This is the model advocated by Bryk and Raudenbush
(1988) to study variation in learner’s trajectories across schools. We adopt this
approach because it allows us a) to explicitly account for unobserved, time-invariant
determinants of latent health, b) to utilise information contained in both observations
to estimate threshold parameters, c) to acknowledge heterogeneity in latent health
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within a response group as well as random noise in reported pre-treatment health41,
and d) to extend the model in a natural way as more measurement points become
available in the future.42
Latent health status at any time point t is then described by the outcome equation
y∗ijt = αij + ζj + x
′
ijβ + T ∗ (νj + x
′
ijδ) + ijt (3.2)
with
νj = µ+ θj (3.3)
The vector xij is a set of patient-level risk adjustment variables which are, in this
study, time-invariant and assumed to be strictly exogenous.43 Treatment is modelled
as a dummy variable T , which takes a value of 1 if t = 1 (post-treatment) and 0
otherwise. The direct effect of treatment on post-treatment health is given by the
coefficient νj . We also interact T with xij to allow for differential effects of patient
characteristics on health status at baseline and on the effect of treatment.
Unexplained variation is decomposed into four variance components: i) a patient-
specific intercept αij ∼ N
(
0, σ2α
)
that captures unobserved, time-invariant patient
heterogeneity in latent health44, ii) a hospital-specific, time-invariant intercept ζj ∼
N
(
0, τ2ζ
)
that addresses hospital clustering and differences in intake, iii) a random
coefficient θj ∼ N
(
0, τ2θ
)
that varies between hospitals and describes the systematic
hospital effect on post-treatment latent health, and iv) a serially uncorrelated error
term ijt ∼ N (0, 1) that leads to the well-known probit specification. We do not
allow for treatment effects to vary by patient, as in e.g. Bryk and Raudenbush
41Conversely, in a two-level model we would implicitly assume that pre-operative health status, rather
than the patients’ self-classification of it, is observed and that patients with identical responses have
therefore identical pre-operative health.
42The National Joint Registry has announced plans to ‘extend[] the pre-operative and post-operative
capture of PROMs undertaken through the [Department of Health] programme’ and ‘capture further
post-operative PROMs from patients having undergone joint replacement surgery’ at one, three and
five years post-operatively (National Joint Registry 2011, p.35).
43There exists no formal test to verify the assumption of exogeneity in non-linear models of this kind
(Greene and Hensher 2010, p.278). Note that patient fixed effects are ruled out by the low number
of observations (T≤2) on this level and the resulting incidental parameter bias.
44This is equivalent to specifying a model with unobserved patient heterogeneity in threshold para-
meters.
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(1988), since we only observe patients twice. Covariance terms between random
effects on the same level of the hierarchy are freely estimated, whereas terms across
levels are constrained to zero. The variance partition coefficient ρ describes the
extent to which unexplained variation in post-treatment latent health occurs at the
level of the hospital and is calculated as follows (Goldstein et al. 2002):
ρ =
τ2θ + 2 ∗ cov(θ, ζ) + τ2ζ
σ2α + τ
2
θ + 2 ∗ cov(θ, ζ) + τ2ζ + σ2
(3.4)
Larger values of ρ indicate that more variation in post-treatment latent health is
attributable to hospital heterogeneity as captured in the hospital-level intercept and
the random coefficient on treatment.
For the EQ-5D utility model, we adapt (3.2) to a linear specification with an
identity link function (i.e. y∗ijt = yijt) and ijt ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
.
All ordered probit models are estimated by maximum likelihood using GLLAMM in
Stata 13, where the integrals for the random effects are approximated by adaptive
quadrature (8 integration points per random effect) (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2002).
Threshold parameters and the scale of the coefficient are identified through con-
straints on the mean and variance of the error term and the mean of the intercept.
The linear EQ-5D utility model is estimated by maximum likelihood using xtmixed
in Stata 13.
3.2.3 Provider profiling
Our interest lies in estimates of the relative quality of each hospital, θj , captured
by the hospital-specific deviation from the average effect of treatment, µ. This
parameter is not directly estimated but can be recovered in post-estimation using
Bayes Theorem with variance estimates plugged in for the unknown population
parameters; a technique known as Empirical Bayes prediction (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh 2009).
For the ordered probit models, we describe hospital performance in two different
ways. First, we rank hospitals according to their impact on latent health status
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y∗ij1. This can be directly inferred from θ̂j , where more positive values indicate
better performance. Second, we compute the probability of reporting a specific
post-treatment outcome (m = 1, 2, 3), based on the estimated quality effort of the
hospital. For the average patient treated in a hospital of average patient intake, this
is given by
Pr
(
yj1 = m|x, θ̂j , α̂ij = ζ̂j = 0
)
= Φ (κm − Sj1)− Φ (κm−1 − Sj1) (3.5)
where
Sj1 = µ̂+ x
′
β̂ + x
′
δ̂ + θ̂j (3.6)
and κ0 = −∞, κ3 = +∞. We calculate 95% credible intervals around θ̂j based on
their posterior distribution. Because our interest is on profiling hospital performance
with respect to treatment impact we do not consider uncertainty in other parameters
estimates when calculating credible intervals for Pr (yj1 = m).45
Both methods produce identical rankings of relative hospital performance. How-
ever, only the second method relates the result back to the original scale of the PRO
survey instrument and allows differences across hospitals to be investigated in terms
of the probability of achieving a specific health outcome.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics and transition matrices
Our sample consists of 22,528 patients treated in 230 NHS and private hospitals. The
number of patients in each hospital ranges from 1 to 545 (median=70, interquartile
range (IQR)=14-147). We present descriptive statistics of patient characteristics in
Table 3.1.
Elective hip replacement surgery is performed predominantly on elderly patients
45Note that these credible intervals are only appropriate for single comparison against a given quantity,
like the average, but are too wide for direct comparisons of specific hospitals (Goldstein and Healy
1995).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of patient characteristics
Variable Description Mean / % SD
male =1, if patient is male 0.42 0.49
age Patient’s age in years 67.83 10.69
deprivation Index of Multiple Deprivation, income domain 0.12 0.10
wcharlson Weighted Charlson index of comorbidities 0.30 0.66
add comorbidities Number of additional non-Charlson comorbidities 1.97 1.96
osteoarthritis =1, if main diagnosis is osteoarthritis (OA) 0.87 0.34
rheumatoid arthritis =1, if main diagnosis is rheumatoid arthritis (RA) 0.05 0.23
other maindiag =1, if main diagnosis is not OA or RA 0.00 0.07
revision complications =1, if revision surgery due to complications 0.01 0.09
revision other =1, if revision surgery due to other reasons 0.07 0.25
pretest Time between pre-operative assessment and admis-
sion (in days)
18.26 23.70
posttest Follow-up (in days) 207.54 29.82
N Patients 22,528
J Hospitals 230
(mean=67.8, SD=10.7), with osteoarthritis being the most common reason for
surgical intervention. The majority of patients in our sample are female (58.3%)
and admitted for primary replacement of the hip joint (92.6%). The median time
elapsed between baseline survey and date of admission is 14 days (IQR=5-28). The
median follow-up period is 197 days (IQR=192-211).
Table 3.2 presents the transition matrices for each of the five EQ-5D dimensions.
Rows report the patients’ own classification of their status at baseline and columns
show self-reported status six months after surgery. Accordingly, patients in the lower
triangle report improvements in health status, whereas those in the upper triangle
report deteriorations.
For each of the five dimensions, a considerable number of patients report no
problems at baseline. This is especially pronounced on the dimensions self-care and
anxiety/depression where 44.5% and 57.8% of patients fall into this category. 6.6%
of patients report no problems prior to treatment with respect to mobility, whereas
nearly all patients report at least moderate problems with pain/discomfort (99.1%).
72 patients report to have no problems in any of the EQ-5D dimensions.46
The number of patients improving since treatment varies greatly by the health
46Of these, 21 (29.2%) underwent revision surgery. The remainder underwent primary surgery,
typically for rheumatoid arthritis (n=46, 63.9%).
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Table 3.2: Transition matrices for all EQ-5D dimensions
post-treatment
pre-treatment
no
(=1)
some
(=2)
extreme
(=3) Total
Mobility
I have no problems in walking about (=1) 1,236 257 0 1,493
I have some problems in walking about (=2) 11,133 9,791 13 20,937
I am confined to bed (=3) 21 73 4 98
Total 12,390 10,121 17 22,528
Self-Care
I have no problems with self-care (=1) 9,092 916 13 10,021
I have some problems with self-care (=2) 7,910 4,242 71 12,223
I am unable to wash or dress myself (=3) 79 155 50 284
Total 17,081 5,313 134 22,528
Usual Activities
I have no problems with performing my usual activities (=1) 1,077 290 24 1,391
I have some problems with performing my usual activities (=2) 8,940 7,374 438 16,752
I am unable to perform my usual activities (=3) 1,413 2,427 545 4,385
Total 11,430 10,091 1,007 22,528
Pain / Discomfort
I have no pain or discomfort (=1) 156 46 1 206
I have some pain or discomfort (=2) 7,609 5,123 254 12,986
I am extreme pain or discomfort (=3) 3,978 4,708 653 9,339
Total 11,746 9,877 908 22,528
Anxiety / Depression
I am not anxious or depressed (=1) 12,017 949 57 13,023
I am moderately anxious or depressed (=2) 5,686 2,501 202 8,389
I am extremely anxious or depressed (=3) 489 465 162 1,116
Total 18,192 3,915 421 22,528
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dimension under consideration. The dimension most improved since treatment is
pain/discomfort, where 72.3% of the patients report improvements as indicated
by a transition to a more favourable category. In contrast, only 29.5% of patients
report improvements on the anxiety/depression dimension. This reflects the large
proportion of patients reporting to be not anxious or depressed prior to treatment.
Figure 3.1 presents the empirical distribution of the EQ-5D utility scores pre-
and post-intervention. The mean pre-intervention score is 0.353 and the mean
post-operative score is 0.763. Both distributions exhibit typical characteristics of
empirical EQ-5D distributions observed for a wide range of medical conditions,
including multimodality, discontinuity, and clustering at 1 (‘full health’) (Basu and
Manca 2012; Herna´ndez Alava et al. 2012). 87.3% of patients report improvements
in health as measured by the EQ-5D utility index, whereas 6.5% report deteriorations.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of EQ-5D utility scores pre- and post-treatment
3.3.2 Regression results
Table 3.3 presents parameter estimates and associated standard errors for each of
the five dimension models and the EQ-5D utility index model.
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3 Performance variation across multiple health dimensions
We find several variables to be associated with self-reported health at baseline.
These include male gender (+), higher weighted Charlson index score (-), number
of additional comorbidities (-), and the deprivation profile of the patient’s neigh-
bourhood of residence (-). The mean effect of treatment on post-treatment latent
health is positive and significant for all dimensions, resulting in substantial increases
in the probability of reporting no problems after surgery (Table 3.4). The number
of comorbidities and the indicators for revision surgery are negatively associated
with the treatment effect, indicating that treatment is less beneficial for multimorbid
or revision patients. Similarly, patients living in more deprived areas experience,
on average, less improvement in latent health than those residing in less deprived
areas. Longer follow-up is also associated with a smaller increase in post-operative
latent health, albeit the effect being small. For example, for a patient of average
characteristics, the probability of reporting no problems on anxiety/depression is
estimated to reduce by 0.3% per additional week of follow-up. Post-operative EQ-5D
utility scores are expected to reduce by 0.002 per additional week of follow-up.
Table 3.4: Predicted probabilities of reporting a given health status for a patient of
average characteristics
no (=1) some (=2) extreme (=3)
t = 1 t = 0 change t = 1 t = 0 change t = 1 t = 0 change
Mobility 0.543 0.026 0.517 0.457 0.974 -0.517 0.000 0.001 -0.001
Self-Care 0.838 0.412 0.426 0.162 0.587 -0.425 0.000 0.001 -0.001
Usual Activities 0.460 0.044 0.416 0.534 0.778 -0.244 0.006 0.178 -0.172
Pain/Discomfort 0.485 0.012 0.473 0.506 0.550 -0.044 0.009 0.438 -0.429
Anxiety/Depression 0.897 0.615 0.282 0.102 0.376 -0.274 0.000 0.009 -0.009
All variance components are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level
as confirmed by likelihood ratio tests. The exception is the variance of the random
effect on treatment for the dimension self-care (p<0.054). In contrast, only the
covariance term in the EQ-5D utility model is statistically significant. About 1.0%
(anxiety/depression) to 3.1% (usual activities) of the unexplained variation in latent
health is estimated to be associated with the hospital itself.
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3.3.3 Assessment of hospital performance
3.3.3.1 Performance on individual EQ-5D dimensions and EQ-5D utility score
Figures 3.2a - 3.2e present estimates of hospital performance on the latent health
scale (left graph) and the probability scale (right graph), where the latter is calcu-
lated for the average patient. Figure 3.2f presents the results of the EQ-5D utility
model, where performance is measured directly on the utility scale. Hospitals located
to the left side of each graph perform better than those to the right.
The random coefficient is standardised to zero which represents the expected
outcome for a hospital with average case-mix. Hospital performance heterogeneity,
as represented by the slope of the curve, is most pronounced on the mobility and
usual activities dimensions. For the vast majority of hospitals, credible intervals
contain zero but a small number of hospitals have a statistically significantly different
treatment impact. Credible intervals on the mobility dimension are wider than on
any other dimension. This reflects the lesser amount of information contained in the
data, with only two outcome categories being reasonably well populated.
Hospital heterogeneity on the latent health scale translates into differences with
respect to hospital-specific probabilities of reporting a given post-treatment health
status (see also Table 3.5). The expected probabilities of reporting no problems
on the usual activities dimension six month after surgery range from 35.6% to
61.3% (calculated for the average patient). In contrast, expected probabilities for
the same outcome on the self-care dimension are significantly less dispersed and
consistently above 80% for all hospitals. Performance variation is most pronounced
on the dimensions mobility and usual activities, with gaps between best and worst
performing hospital of 18.1% and 25.7%, respectively. The probability of reporting
extreme problems after surgery is close to zero for all models. We refrain from
reporting credible intervals around these predicted probabilities in Figures 3.2a -
3.2e to improve the readability of the graphs.
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(d) Pain/Discomfort
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Figure 3.2: Performance estimates on the latent health and outcome scale
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Table 3.5: Differences between providers in terms of the probability of reporting no
problems post-operatively
EQ-5D dimension Min Max Range central 95% IQR
Mobility 0.470 0.650 0.181 0.145 0.035
Self-Care 0.815 0.865 0.050 0.031 0.006
Usual Activities 0.356 0.613 0.257 0.178 0.047
Pain/Discomfort 0.435 0.562 0.128 0.086 0.020
Anxiety/Depression 0.876 0.927 0.051 0.030 0.007
Note: Calculated for a patient of average characteristics. The column ‘central 95%’
gives the differences between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the distribution of
hospitals.
3.3.3.2 Association of performance estimates on EQ-5D dimensions and the EQ-5D
utility index
We explore the global agreement between estimates of hospital performance based
on individual EQ-5D dimensions and the utility weighted EQ-5D index values by
calculating Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients (Spearman’s ρ) and inspecting
correlation patterns visually (Figure 3.3).47
The highest rank correlation is observed between performance estimates on the
pain/discomfort dimension and EQ-5D utility index (ρ=0.333), followed by the
anxiety/depression dimension (ρ=0.263). The rank correlation for all other dimen-
sions and the EQ-5D utility index is smaller (ρ <0.2) and, indeed, not statistically
significantly different from zero.
To explore whether judgement about individual providers would differ depending
on which metric is used to assess performance, we identify providers with statistically
significantly above/below average performance on each metric (Thomas et al. 1994;
Laudicella et al. 2010; Racz and Sedransk 2010) and compare the overlap. In 16 out
of 230 cases, performance classifications differ across metrics (Table 3.6).
47Correlations between performance estimates on individual EQ-5D dimensions are reported in
Appendix Table A3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Hospital performance estimates on EQ-5D dimensions and EQ-5D utility
scores
Table 3.6: Examples of hospitals for which performance assessments differ
across EQ-5D dimensions and the EQ-5D utility model
Hospital
EQ-5D
utilities Mobility Self Care Usual activity
Pain /
Discomfort
Anxiety /
Depression
A above - - above - -
B above - - - above -
C above - - - - above
D - above - above - -
E - - - above - -
F - - - above - -
G - - - above - -
H - - - above - -
I - - - below - -
J - - - below - -
K - - - below - -
L - - - below - -
M - - - below - -
N - - - below - -
O - - - below - -
P below - - above - -
Note: Hospitals are either statistically above or below the average or not different from the average (-).
Not adjusted for multiple testing.
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Three hospitals (A-C) are identified as above average performers according to
the EQ-5D utility model and one other EQ-5D dimension but do not stand out with
respect to the other four dimensions. Five hospitals (D-H) achieve above average
results with respect to at least one dimensions of the EQ-5D but this performance is
not reflected in their performance estimate on aggregate utilities. Seven hospitals
(I-O) fall short of the average benchmark on the dimension usual activities but
would not be identified as underperformers in terms of their impact on utilities.
The disagreement between performance in terms of EQ-5D utilities and individual
dimensions is most apparent in the case of hospital P, where the hospital is classified
as a low performer in terms of its impact on utilities but is a high performer with
respect to restoring its patients’ ability to carry out their usual activities.
3.4 Discussion
We set out an analytical strategy to explore patient-level and hospital-level variation
in categorical responses within and across dimensions of the EQ-5D. This approach
does not require assumptions about how to aggregate across health dimensions
and offers insight about which dimensions are particularly affected by hospital
heterogeneity. We find heterogeneity in performance to be more pronounced across
the mobility and usual activities dimensions and less so for the pain/discomfort,
anxiety/depression and self-care dimensions. Furthermore, we find that performance
on the utility scale correlates well only with the dimensions anxiety/depression and
pain/discomfort. Incidentally, these are the dimensions that receive the highest
weighting in the UK TTO EQ-5D tariff (Dolan 1997). In contrast, the dimensions
mobility, usual activities, and self-care have relatively low weights attached to them
and performance heterogeneity remains undetected when analysing aggregated
EQ-5D utility data. These findings re-emphasise the need to consider carefully the
role that value sets play in hospital performance estimates based on aggregate utility
scores. However, we note that our results are based on analysis of data for one
specific condition and instrument and the influence of value sets may be more or
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less pronounced in other settings.
Policy-makers are interested in assessing the change in patient-reported outcomes
as a result of treatment. There are various ways that this change can be measured
and modelled. Our approach has been to model both pre- and post-treatment
health status as outcomes of the same reporting process and to conduct multilevel
analysis with measurement points clustered in patients, which themselves are nested
in hospitals (see also Bryk and Raudenbush 1988). We argue that this is the
appropriate modelling strategy because it acknowledges the features of the data
generating process, allows for patient heterogeneity with respect to observed and
unobserved factors and makes best use of the available information. The presented
methodology is readily applicable to other conditions for which EQ-5D data are
collected and, in principle, can be extended to other PRO instruments.
In recognition of the expectation that health outcome data are to be used by
an audience unfamiliar with the interpretation of complex statistical results (e.g.
patients and their relatives, family doctors, managers), we have suggested an in-
tuitively appealing way of summarising the differential impact that hospitals have
on treatment outcomes. Our graphical representation indicates the probability of
reporting a given health outcome, and shows how these probabilities vary across
health dimensions and hospitals. Prospective patients (or their agents) who place
greater weight on a particular dimension may use this information to select a hospital
that has a differentially greater impact on this than its peers do.
The primary limitation of our proposed approach is the increase in dimensionality
of the decision problem for patients. Whereas aggregated scores result in one
estimate of hospital performance, our approach generates five, potentially divergent,
answers. In a recent study, Dijs-Elsinga et al. (2010) have shown that a large group
of patients favour simple data presentation and prefer one overall measures of
hospital quality.48 But many patients intend to use more detailed quality information
48The phenomenon of ‘information overload’ is well-established in decision theory and refers to
difficulties in collating, triangulating and interpreting a large amount of information (e.g. Keller
and Staelin 1987). This may lead to a number of biases, including ‘status quo bias’ (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988) with patients ignoring information about poor performance and going to
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when making decisions about where to seek care in the future (Dijs-Elsinga et al.
2010). The question then arises how much information should be provided for the
different objectives for which performance information can be used (i.e. patient
choice, accountability, identification of best practice) and who decides about the
relative weighting of each component and objective (Parkin et al. 2010; Steyerberg
and Lingsma 2010). Our study does not intend to resolve this debate. Rather, we
present a means of making inferences about hospital quality and presenting results
when health outcomes are assessed through the EQ-5D PRO instrument. How best
to communicate such performance data requires careful consideration, to ensure it
can be effectively understood and used.
Several issues remain that we have not addressed in this study. First, based on
the full information contained in HES, we can identify those patients that have not
participated or were not included in the follow-up. We find that, in our dataset, only
about 50% of eligible hip replacement patients participate in the baseline survey,
with a further 8% dropping out of the subsequent survey. These numbers should
improve in time when data collection procedures become more established. However,
falsely assuming that any substantial amount of missing values are generated at
random could lead to biased inferences from a non-representative population (Little
and Rubin 1987), raising questions about the validity of the assessment.
Second, in this study we have controlled for patient risk-factors that are deemed
clinically relevant, assumed to be exogenous to the hospital, and can be derived
from routine inpatient records. However we do not claim that this set of control
variables is exhaustive: health outcomes may be affected by non-randomly distrib-
uted, unobserved patient characteristics such as severity of the medical condition or
health-related behaviour. That said, a strength of our study is that we control for the
initial health status with which the patient presents at admission. In many studies
this is unobserved, and makes our analysis more robust than possible in the absence
their local hospital by default even though other providers would have been preferable given their
preferences. In a study of switching behaviour in the mobile telecommunication market, Jilke
(2015) found evidence that people with low educational attainment are especially prone to such
biases.
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of such information.
Third, we do not control for characteristics of the hospital in our analysis, our
rationale being that these are within the hospital’s control.49 But they may not
be. Hospitals may be constrained in their ability to choose and combine medical
resources to their best effect by local regulation, access to factor markets or, in the
short-run, the existing capital structure such as age and functionality and whether
the hospital operates the service over multiple sites (Street et al. 2010). In this case,
the assumption of exchangeability underlying the hierarchical modelling approach
may not hold. Furthermore, procedures such as hip replacement are generally
followed by extensive physiotherapy, which may be delivered outside the hospital. If
constraints bind or if quality is not attributable solely to the hospital, our estimates
of hospital performance may be biased.
Fourth, our study makes use of a large administrative dataset that contains rich
information on patient characteristics and the type of care provided. The presented
econometric approach is tailored to the data at hand. However, in other countries or
disease areas, sample sizes may be smaller or information may be sparse. If patient
characteristics are unobserved or cannot be included due to low degrees of freedom,
then more of the time-invariant variation between patients would be captured by
the patient random effect. Again, the assumption of exchangeability, i.e. that the
unobserved patient heterogeneity is drawn from a random distribution, may become
unrealistic and results may be biased (Hausman 1978). The same argument applies
to the random coefficient and the interactions of covariates with the treatment effect.
Researchers will need to consider this limitation case-by-case, based on their data
and the available set of risk-adjustment variables.
Fifth, our econometric model could be extended in a number of ways. For example,
49Another implication of this is that our estimates of provider performance are ‘Type A’ effects in the
terminology of Raudenbush and Willms (1995); see also Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996). Such
Type A effects are appropriate for patients selecting providers that are most likely to improve their
health, independent of whether this is due to the providers’ quality efforts or favourable production
environments. In contrast, regulators seek estimates of providers’ efforts net of the influence of
binding constrains imposed by the production environment; so-called type Type B effects. See
Chapter 2 for an example of such Type B performance estimates.
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one limitation of the ordered probit model is the assumption of ‘proportional odds’,
i.e. a change in covariate has a proportional effect on all outcome probabilities
since the associated coefficient does not vary across outcome categories. In order to
relax this assumption one could replace the ordered probit model with an unordered
multinomial logit model; see Gray et al. (2006) for an application in the context of
mapping between PROMs. Other extensions could seek to model cut points more
flexibly as functions of observed parameters (Greene and Hensher 2010) or model
the full joint multivariate distribution of outcomes. Also, while in linear models
modelling changes in responses categories is equivalent to modelling post-operative
responses conditional on pre-operative responses (Nuttall et al. 2015), this may not
extend to the non-linear models employed here and one could explore the sensitivity
of our results to this modelling choice. For example, one could model variation in
the probability of improvement on individual dimensions, rather than derive this in
post-estimation as we have done here.
Finally, further consideration should be given to the role that patient-reported
health outcome performance information can play in existing quality assessment
frameworks. While measures of risk-adjusted mortality, re-admission and adverse
events have been criticised for their limited granularity and sensitivity (Lilford and
Pronovost 2010), one should not a-priori dismiss their ability to identify high and
low quality providers of care. Further research is required to establish the additional
value of patient-reported outcome data for hospital quality assessments (see also
Chapter 4 and 5) and contrast it to the costs of collection.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Stephen Barasi, Stephen Bloomer,
David Nuttall, David Parkin, Aurore Pelissier, Wolfgang Greiner, three anonymous
referees and those received during presentations at the University of Manchester, the
Health Econometric Data Group seminar series (York), the EuroQoL plenary meeting
2012 (Rotterdam), the European Conference on Health Economics (Zurich) and the
83
3 Performance variation across multiple health dimensions
joint CES-HESG Winter conference 2012 (Marseille). The project was funded by the
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) in England under the Health Services
Research (HSR) stream (project number 09/2000/47). The views expressed are
those of the authors and may not reflect those of the NIHR HSR program or the
Department of Health.
Hospital Episode Statistics copyright c© 2015, re-used with the permission of The
Health & Social Care Information Centre. All rights reserved.
84
4 Multidimensional performance assessment of healthcare
providers using dominance criteria
4.1 Introduction
Variation in healthcare quality and costs are well documented (Wennberg and
Gittelsohn 1973; Keeler 1990; Busse et al. 2008; Bernal-Delgado et al. 2015) and
may arise when providers enjoy discretion over how their services are organised and
provided (Arrow 1963). Regulators, who are charged with overseeing the provision
of care, are concerned about variation if it is not caused by differences in healthcare
needs or patient preferences as it may signal inequity, inefficiency or unsafe care. To
address this, many healthcare systems have implemented routine benchmarking (or
‘profiling’) of healthcare providers to identify comparative performance levels. This
might help single out ‘positive deviants’ (Bradley et al. 2009; Berwick 2008; Lawton
et al. 2014), or exemplars of best practice, that can be studied further or rewarded as
part of a pay-for-performance scheme. At the other extreme, poor performers might
be subject to penalties for falling short of their peers or to interventional actions by
regulators.
Healthcare providers share two important features with other public sector organ-
isations that complicate the assessment of their performance (Dixit 2002; Besley and
Ghatak 2003; Propper and Wilson 2012). First, they lack a single overarching object-
ive, such as profit, against which their performance can be assessed. Instead, they
pursue multiple, sometimes conflicting, objectives and this requires the regulator
to measure and incentivise achievements along a range of performance dimensions.
These achievements are typically non-commensurate and include different aspects
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of performance reflecting resource use, clinical effectiveness, and other dimensions
of quality such as accessibility (Smith 2002; Goddard and Jacobs 2009; Porter 2010;
Devlin and Sussex 2011). Second, providers typically serve several stakeholders
(e.g. patients, purchasers of care, and politicians) and the values these stakeholders
attach to objectives are often not known to the regulator50, but are unlikely to be
identical (Smith 2002; Propper and Wilson 2012); see Devlin and Sussex (2011) for
examples from healthcare and the wider public sector.
The lack of a set of common, explicit valuations for individual performance dimen-
sions makes it difficult to construct a single, unidimensional performance measure.
If valuations were known and common across stakeholders, it would be possible
to aggregate multiple performance scores into unidimensional composite scores.
Such measures are attractive as they allow a complete and transitive ranking of
providers, facilitate the presentation and dissemination of performance information
to stakeholders, and offer a simple means to adjust rewards in a pay-for-performance
framework (Dowd et al. 2014). But without such knowledge, there is no guidance
on how to aggregate achievements appropriately.
The empirical literature has addressed this problem in different ways: Some
studies restricted their assessment of provider performance to those performance
dimensions for which explicit valuations have been expressed. Examples include
Timbie et al. (2008), Timbie and Normand (2008) and Karnon et al. (2013), all of
which translate hospital mortality estimates into monetary units using the expressed
valuation of a statistical life. The obvious shortcoming of this approach is that
performance dimensions which lack explicit valuations (e.g. waiting times, patient
satisfaction, or emergency re-admission rates51) are necessarily omitted from the
50It may be possible to estimate the preferences of individual stakeholders or groups thereof by means
of elicitation or through the study of revealed preferences (Ryan et al. 2001). However, this would
likely be a very difficult and costly undertaking and is therefore rarely done in practice.
51It may be possible to translate achievements on some objectives, e.g. emergency readmission rates or
other measures of health outcomes, into quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) by means of modelling
(Timbie et al. 2009; Appleby et al. 2013; Coronini-Cronberg et al. 2013). A monetary valuation
of QALYs has been expressed in the English NHS and elsewhere. However, the data requirements
are substantial and the statistical uncertainty introduced through modelling is likely to further
compound the problem of differentiating between true performance signal and noise.
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analysis. Their omission may lead to tunnel vision, whereby providers concentrate
their efforts on performance dimensions with explicit valuations at the expense of
other dimensions (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991; Goddard et al. 2000).
Alternatively, analysts often either choose a set of weights, implement pre-defined
scoring algorithms such as equal weighting, or derive weights from the data using
approaches based on item response theory (Landrum et al. 2000; Landrum et al.
2003; Daniels and Normand 2006; Teixeira-Pinto and Normand 2008), data envel-
opment analysis (Dowd et al. 2014), and more ad-hoc econometric specifications
(Chua et al. 2010). However, such practice conflicts with one of the key tenets of
economic welfare theory, namely that the stakeholders are the only legitimate judges
of their own preferences and that, ultimately, responsibility for specifying valuations
for performance dimensions should rest with the relevant stakeholders (Smith and
Street 2005). There is no guarantee that weights imposed by analysts, however these
are arrived at, match the preferences of all stakeholders. Consequently, organisations
being assessed might legitimately question the validity of the generated index.
There is an alternative way to address the problem of determining appropriate
weights. Multidimensional performance assessment circumvents the issue by ana-
lysing performance against each achievement individually and then combining the
results into an overall performance profile. In doing so, it makes explicit how health-
care providers perform on each performance dimension and how these dimensions
correlate. The multidimensional approach has enjoyed increasing popularity in the
health economic literature: Hall and Hamilton (2004) assess the performance of
surgeons in terms of 30-day mortality and morbidity using a Bayesian hierarchical
bivariate probit model. Hauck and Street (2006) use multivariate multilevel models
to study the performance of health authorities across 13 performance indicators.
Gutacker et al. (2013) study hospital performance with respect to five health dimen-
sions and compare their results to those based on an composite measure. Portrait
et al. (2015) compare Dutch Diabetes care groups in terms of costs and a broad
range of quality indicators, whereas Ha¨kkinen et al. (2014), Kruse and Christensen
(2013) and Street et al. (2014) study the performance of hospitals in terms of costs
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and a single measure of patient health outcome for different conditions.
But multidimensional performance assessment is not a panacea for the problem of
judging performance across multiple objectives. A multidimensional performance
profile does not permit ranking of hospitals or comparison to some performance
standard. Hence it remains unclear which providers excel or perform poorly across
multiple performance dimensions. This constitutes a major limitation of the multidi-
mensional approach for practical purposes, and one that we seek to overcome in this
study. More specifically, we propose the use of dominance criteria to judge hospital
performance against a multidimensional benchmark. The concept of dominance has
the attractive feature that it allows comparison of multidimensional performance
profiles against benchmarks under relatively weak assumptions about stakehold-
ers’ utility functions. Indeed, the only requirement is that the regulator can judge
whether the marginal utility of an achievement is positive or negative and that this
qualitative judgement applies to all stakeholders. We believe this to be a reasonable
pre-requisite in most contexts.
We apply our approach to data on providers of hip replacement surgery in the
English NHS during the period April 2009 to March 2012. Performance is assessed
along four risk-adjusted performance metrics: inpatient length of stay (‘efficiency’),
waiting times (‘access to care’), 28-day readmission rates and improvements in
patient-reported health status after surgery (both ‘clinical quality’). Each of these
metrics has been the focus of recent health policy in England (Department of Health
2008a; Department of Health 2012b; Propper et al. 2008; Siciliani et al. 2014)
and have been widely used in the academic literature to measure performance
differences and changes therein over time (e.g. Jensen et al. 2009; Siciliani et al.
2013).52 We estimate multivariate multilevel models to account for the clustering
of patients in providers and exploit the correlation of provider achievements across
52Note that these metrics are not without criticism. For example, like mortality, emergency readmis-
sions may not always be avoidable (Fischer et al. 2014). Hence, performance indicators based upon
them may be noisy. Also, short length of stay, which would be interpreted as an indicator of efficient
discharge management, may actually be harmful if patients are discharged prematurely (Qian
et al. 2011). This may in turn increase emergency readmissions (Carey 2015). These limitations
highlight the need to analyse and interpret performance estimates jointly.
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dimensions (Zellner 1962; Hauck and Street 2006). Empirical Bayes estimates of
the provider-specific posterior means and variance-covariance matrices are used to
classify hospitals into three categories: dominant, dominated, and non-comparable.
We quantify the uncertainty surrounding this classification in the form of Bayesian
probability statements.
The study is the first to apply dominance criteria to multidimensional performance
assessment of healthcare providers and derive appropriate confidence statements.
Besides this, we make three further contributions to the empirical literature on
hospital performance. First, we provide evidence about the correlations, and thus
the potential for trade-offs, between a number of objectives that healthcare providers
typically face. Previous research has focused predominantely on the association
between hospital costs and mortality (see Hussey et al. (2013) for a review), largely
ignoring other important dimensions such as waiting times or health-related quality
of life. Second, in contrast to previous studies conducted at hospital level (e.g.
Martin and Smith 2005), we focus on a single homogeneous patient population,
thereby reducing the risk of ecological fallacy. Third, by exploiting novel data on
pre-operative health status in addition to the co-morbidity markers that are usually
available in administrative records, we are better able to isolate from case-mix
differences the true impact that providers have on performance measures (‘value
added’).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In section 4.2 we set out
the assessment framework in conceptual terms. Section 4.3 presents the empirical
methodology and section 4.4 describes our data. We report results in section 4.5 and
offer concluding comments in section 4.6.
4.2 Multivariate performance assessment using dominance criteria
Assume that a regulator, acting on behalf of stakeholders, seeks to determine the
overall performance of a number of hospital providers. Let there be k = 1, . . . ,K
performance dimensions with observed achievement Yk. Each achievement is de-
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termined by two factors, namely factors under the control of the provider θk and
external production constraints Xk, so that
Yk = f(Xk, θk) (4.1)
for each provider.
The parameter θk can be interpreted as the provider’s contribution to achieve-
ment k over and above the circumstances in which they operate. This parameter
is generally not directly observable and thus forms the target for inferences about
performance. In order to isolate θk from Xk, the regulator must establish the contri-
bution of production constraints to observed achievement by means of comparison
with other providers, i.e. through risk-adjustment as applied in yardstick competition
(Shleifer 1985).
Stakeholders derive utility from the providers’ performance on each dimension,
so that U = U(θ1, . . . , θK), which is assumed to be monotonic in θk over the range
of realistic values for all k ∈ K. The regulator has only limited knowledge about
the characteristics of this utility function. This may be because there are multiple
stakeholders with heterogeneous and/or unknown preferences. More specifically,
the regulator has no information about the marginal utility ∂U/∂θk that each stake-
holder derives from achievements on each performance dimension, and hence the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) at which each stakeholder is willing to trade
off performance on one dimension against that on another, i.e. ∂θk/∂θk′ for k 6= k
′
.
However, the regulator has knowledge about the sign of ∂U/∂θk, i.e. whether
achievements are expressed positively or negatively. To simplify the exposition, we
assume from now on that achievements can be expressed so that utility increases in
θk.
If only one performance dimension is assessed (K = 1) or the MRS across mul-
tiple dimensions are known then achievements can be expressed as unidimensional
(composite) scores. The regulator can then conduct either a relative or absolute
assessment of performance. The first involves ranking the providers j ∈ J according
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to their adjusted (composite) achievement θj , where θj > θj′ implies U(θj) > U(θj′ )
for j 6= j′ . This will result in a complete and transitive ordering of providers, assum-
ing no ties. One can then designate a specific number of providers as performing
well or poorly based on their relative ranking, e.g. whether they fall within a given
percentile of the distribution. Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996) provide a dis-
cussion of the statistical challenges associated with this approach. Alternatively,
providers’ performances can be classified based on θj − θ∗ being larger or smaller
than zero, where θ∗ denotes an absolute performance standard to which providers
are compared.53 The latter is often employed in the context of quality performance
assessment, e.g. with respect to standardised mortality after surgery (Spiegelhalter
2005; National Clinical Audit Advisory Group 2011).
When multiple performance dimensions are assessed (K ≥ 2) and the MRS is
unknown, a complete and transitive ordering of providers is no longer guaranteed
and relative assessments are unfeasible. As a result, it becomes impossible to identify
providers that perform well or poorly in terms of stakeholders’ aggregate utility.
This is a well-known problem in the field of welfare economics and consumer
theory (Boadway and Bruce 1984; McGuire 2001). However, some combinations of
performance levels may be strictly preferable (dominant) or inferior (dominated) to
other combinations, leading to a partial ordering of providers. As an analogue to
the Pareto dominance criteria we can formalise the following general dominance
classification rules54:
A provider either
1. dominates the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk > θj′k for some
k ∈ K, or
2. is dominated by the comparator if θjk ≤ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk < θj′k for
53Note that, when no external standards are specified, performance standards are typically based
on the performance of all organisations, i.e. an internal performance standard (Shleifer 1985;
National Clinical Audit Advisory Group 2011). Hence, a provider will be considered to perform
well when the observed achievement is better than a reference value derived from all providers. In
many cases, this reference value is simply the average across all providers, i.e. θ∗ = 1
J
∑
θj .
54Devlin et al. (2010) propose the use of a similar classification system to compare EQ-5D health
profiles over time without resorting to making strong assumptions about patients’ preferences.
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some k ∈ K, or
3. is non-comparable to the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for some k ∈ K and θjk ≤
θj′k for the remaining k ∈ K,
where j 6= j′ and θj′k denotes the performance level of the comparator, which may
be either another provider or an absolute internal or external performance standard
θ∗.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Empirical approach
The aims of the empirical analysis are to obtain estimates of providers’ performance
θjk and of the correlation of θjk across each of the K = 1, . . . , 4 performance
dimensions, and to classify providers according to the dominance classification set
out in section 4.2. We estimate multivariate multilevel models (MVMLMs) with
achievement score Yijk observed for patients i = 1, . . . , nj who are clustered in
hospitals j = 1, . . . , J . Multilevel (i.e. random intercept) models have become
a staple tool in the field of performance assessment and allow us to i) adjust
achievements for differences in case-mix across providers, ii) decompose unexplained
variation in achievement into random (within-provider) variation at patient level
and systematic (between-provider) variation at provider level, and iii) obtain more
reliable (precision-weighted or shrunken) estimates of performance (Goldstein 1997;
Normand et al. 1997; Ash et al. 2012).
The multivariate nature of the data is taken into account through correlated
random terms at each level of the hierarchy. These random terms are assumed
to be drawn from multivariate normal distributions (MVN) with unconstrained
variance-covariance matrices (Zellner 1962; Hauck and Street 2006). Allowing
for correlation across achievements is beneficial for several reasons. First, we can
construct multivariate hypothesis tests of parameters of interest that take into account
the correlation between dimensions and achieve correct coverage probabilities. We
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discuss this in detail below. Second, we can achieve efficiency gains and obtain more
precise estimates of relevant parameters if either the components ofXijk differ across
k or non-identity link functions are employed for at least some of the regression
equations (Zellner 1962; Thum 1997; Bailey and Hewson 2004). Finally, by utilising
a maximum likelihood estimator, data about achievements that are missing for any
particular performance domain can be assumed missing at random conditional on
all modelled covariates and achievements (Little and Rubin 1987; Goldstein 1986).
Hospital achievements are measured using two continuous and two binary vari-
ables. In order to ascertain the conditional normality of error terms as imposed by
the MVN assumption55, we apply appropriate transformations (e.g. logarithmic)
for the continuous achievement variables and specify probit models for the binary
achievement variables. The latter can be motivated by considering each binary
achievement variable as the observed realisation of a latent truncated Gaussian
variable.
The empirical model to be estimated is specified as
Y ∗ijk = αk +X
′
ijkβk + θjk + ijk (4.2)
with Y ∗ijk = f(Yijk) for k = 1, 2 and
Yijk =
 1 if Y
∗
ijk > 0
0 if Y ∗ijk ≤ 0
for k = 3, 4.
The variable Yijk denotes the observed outcome, Y ∗ijk is the corresponding latent
underlying variable, f(.) is a transformation function chosen to normalise the condi-
tional distribution of ijk, Xijk is a vector of explanatory variables whose components
may differ across dimensions, αk is an intercept term, θjk denotes a random effect at
provider level and ijk denotes the random error term at patient level. Both random
55In principle it is possible to use other multivariate distributions such as multivariate gamma.
However, such models are not typically implemented in standard statistical software packages and
are therefore rarely used in practice.
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terms are assumed to be MVN distributed with mean vector zero and a K × K
variance-covariance matrix, so that θjk ∼MVN(0,Σ) with
E(θjk) = 0
var(θjk) = τ
2
k
cov(θjk, θjk′ ) = ρθτkτk′
for all k 6= k′ , and similarly ijk ∼MVN(0,Ω) with
E(ijk) = 0
var(ijk) = σ
2
k for k = 1, 2
var(ijk) = 1 for k = 3, 4
cov(ijk, ijk′ ) = ρσkσk′
for all k 6= k′ . The model reduces to a set of univariate models if all off-diagonal
elements of Σ and Ω are zero, i.e. achievements are uncorrelated conditional on
observed patient factors.
Estimation was performed in MLwiN 2.32 called from within Stata 13 using the
runmlwin programme (Leckie and Charlton 2013).
4.3.2 Classification of provider effects and multivariate hypothesis tests
We compare providers against a common absolute performance standard, here
defined as the expected performance of a (hypothetical) hospital of average perform-
ance αk, i.e. the conditional mean. We base our assessment of provider performance
on estimates of θjk, which represent the provider-specific deviation from this bench-
mark. These parameters are not directly estimated in a random effects framework
but can be recovered in post-estimation using Empirical Bayes predictions techniques
(Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2009). We stack performance estimates into vector
coordinates to denote the provider’s location in the k-dimensional performance space
with the origin being normalised to zero. A provider’s dominance classification is
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then determined by comparing its estimated adjusted achievements to that of the
performance standard across all four dimensions simultaneously. This leads to three
possible classifications: dominant, dominated, or non-comparable.
In order to quantify the uncertainty around these possible classifications we
take a Bayesian perspective and calculate the posterior probability that a given
provider truly dominates [is dominated by; non-comparable to] the multidimensional
performance standard. This involves calculating the area under the MVN probability
density function that covers each of the three possibilities, for each provider.56
Figure 4.1a illustrates this for the two-dimensional case with two highly correlated
bivariate normal distributed achievements (ρ = 0.6). The centroid of the density
is given by X and the ellipse shows the central 95% of this density. The density is
dissected by two lines which intersect at the benchmark. The density covered by
the areas A and B equal the probability of dominating or being dominated by the
benchmark, whereas the density covered by area C gives the probability for the
non-comparable outcome. To calculate these probabilities, we follow the simulation
approach of O’Hagan et al. (2000). Our simulation involves drawing S repeated
samples from the MVN posterior distribution of the provider-specific Empirical
Bayes estimates of the mean vector θj and associated variance-covariance matrix
Σj . We then apply the dominance criteria to each simulation and calculate posterior
probabilities by averaging across simulations. Formally,
Pr(dominant |J = j) = 1
S
S∑
s=1
4∏
k=1
I(θsjk > 0) (4.3)
Pr(dominated |J = j) = 1
S
S∑
s=1
4∏
k=1
I(θsjk < 0) (4.4)
56Our problem is similar to that encountered in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, where
one wishes to compute the probability that a new treatment is cost-effective for a given level of
willingness to pay (Van Hout et al. 1994; Briggs and Fenn 1998; O’Hagan et al. 2000).
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and by construction
Pr(non-comparable |J = j) = 1− (Pr(dominant |J = j) + Pr(dominated |J = j))
(4.5)
where S is the total number of simulations (here S = 10, 000), θsjk denotes the
simulated provider-effect in simulation s, and I is an indicator function that takes
the value of one if the condition is true and zero otherwise. This approach has
several advantages over a series of univariate assessments: Most importantly, it
accounts for the correlation between performance dimensions and thus achieves
correct coverage of the confidence region (Briggs and Fenn 1998). Figure 4.1b
illustrates the difference between probability statements if performances on both
dimensions are incorrectly assumed to be independent. The dashed line outlines the
resulting ‘confidence box’, which is formed by the end points of two independent 95%
confidence intervals that are adjusted for multiple testing. Furthermore, because
we make probability statements about a single quantity of interest, the provider’s
location in the k-dimensional performance space, we avoid such issues of multiple
testing.
4.3.3 Risk-adjustment
Perhaps the primary reason that observed achievements differ across hospitals is
because they treat different types of patients. To account for this, we develop
specific risk-adjustment models for three of the performance dimensions. Based on
previous research (Gutacker et al. 2013; Street et al. 2014), we identify a set of ‘core’
variables common to all models: patient age, gender, pre-treatment health status,
primary diagnosis (coded as osteoarthritis (ICD-10: M15-19), rheumatoid arthritis
(ICD-10: M05-06), or other) comorbidity burden, socio-economic status, and year
of treatment. Other variables considered were time with symptoms, whether the
patient lived alone, whether the patient required assistance filling in the PROM
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questionnaire, or whether she considered herself disabled.57 Finally, in the length
of stay model, we controlled for the healthcare resource group (HRG, the English
equivalent of Diagnosis Related Groups) to which the patient was allocated.
Preliminary modelling of potential risk-adjusters was conducted on the basis of
univariate multilevel regression models and visual inspection of LOWESS plots (for
continuous variables) and box plots (for categorical variables). A significance level
of p < 0.05 was required for variables to be retained. All continuous variables were
first added linearly to the regression model and we subsequently explored whether
squared terms improved the fit of the model. As expected, our exploratory work
confirmed the importance of all core variables in explaining variation in each of the
three performance dimensions. Time with symptoms, assistance and living alone
did not explain variation in the probability of being re-admitted and were thus not
included in the final model. Non-linear effects were found for age (all performance
dimensions) and pre-treatment health status (only length of stay and post-operative
OHS).
No risk-adjustment was performed in the analysis of waiting times because pro-
viders are expected to manage their waiting lists so as to balance high priority cases
and those with less urgent need for admission.
4.3.4 Endogeneity due to patient selection of healthcare provider
Patients in the English NHS have a right to choose their provider of inpatient care
for most elective procedures. This may lead to bias in the estimates of hospital
performance if both the choice of hospital and the achievements for an individual
patient are driven by common underlying factors that are not controlled for as part
of Xijk. This may arise if patients self-select into hospitals based on unobserved
characteristics or providers cream-skim (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke
et al. 2003). Examples include unobserved severity, health literacy or other factors
57We only consider information contained in the pre-operative questionnaire since the e.g. need for
assistance in filling in the post-operative questionnaire may be endogenous to the outcome of the
care process.
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that enter the personal health production function and are also determinants of
hospital choice.
In order to test for bias due to patient selection and to obtain correct estimates
of hospital performance, we estimate the model in (4.2) and perform two-stage
residual inclusion (2SRI) as suggested by Terza et al. (2008). In the first stage, we
estimate a multinomial choice model of hospital choice, where choice is assumed
to be determined by the straight-line distance58 from the patient’s residence to the
provider, an unobserved patient effect and random noise. Distance is commonly
chosen in the literature as an instrumental variable as it is a major driver of hospital
choice and is exogenously determined, on the reasonable assumption that patients
do not choose where to live based on hospital performance (Gowrisankaran and
Town 1999). The residual from this regression captures both the unobserved patient
effect and random noise. In the second stage, we enter this residual as an additional
regressor into each of the four achievement regression models. If the coefficients on
the first-stage residuals are estimated to be statistically significantly different from
zero this provides evidence of selection bias and the need for adjustments based on
2SRI (Terza et al. 2008).
4.4 Data
Our primary source of data is the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data warehouse,
which contains detailed inpatient records for all patients receiving NHS-funded
care in England. We extract information on all patients undergoing unilateral hip
replacement (identified through the primary procedure code; see Department of
Health (2008a)) in the period April 2009 to March 2012.59 Patients were excluded if
58We also include distance2 and distance3 as well as an indicator for whether the hospital is the
closest alternative. Hospitals with less than 30 patients were removed from the choice set. The
patient’s residence was approximated by the centroid of the lower super output area (LSOA) in
which the patient lives. LSOAs are designed to include approximately 1,500 inhabitants, i.e. they
are substantially smaller than US ZIP codes.
59HES records activity at the level of ‘finished consultant episodes’ (FCEs) and we link consecutive
episodes within the hospital stay and across hospital transfers to form continuous inpatient spells
(CIPS). A CIPS is deemed complete when the patient is discharged from one provider and not
re-admitted to another provider within 2 days.
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they were aged 17 or younger at the time of admission, underwent revision surgery,
were admitted as emergencies or day-cases, or if information on important risk-
adjustment variables was missing. Patients were also excluded if they attended a
provider that treated fewer than 30 patients in the same financial year. We record
any hospital admission occurring within 28 days after the initial admission for hip
replacement surgery. All linkage was achieved using unique patient identifiers.
For each patient, we extract information on demographics and socio-economic
background, medical characteristics and information pertaining to the admission
process and the hospital stay itself. These data are used to construct three achieve-
ment measures: i) inpatient length of stay (top-coded at the 99th percentile), ii)
emergency re-admission within 28 days of discharge for any condition (coded as
0=not re-admitted, 1=re-admitted), and iii) waiting time, measured as the time
elapsed between the surgeon’s decision to admit and the actual admission to hospital.
Waiting time is categorised into waits of no more than 18 weeks (=0) and waits
exceeding 18 weeks (=1) to mirror the contemporaneous waiting time performance
standard in the English NHS.60 We also derive the following risk-adjustment vari-
ables from HES: age, sex, comorbidity burden as measured by individual Elixhauser
comorbidity conditions recorded in secondary diagnosis fields (Elixhauser et al.
1998), number of emergency admissions to hospital within the last year (coded as
0=none, 1=one or more), and patients’ approximate socio-economic status based on
level of income deprivation in the patient’s neighbourhood of residence as measured
by the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (Noble et al. 2006).
We link HES records to data from the national Patient Reported Outcome Measures
(PROM) survey. This survey invites all patients undergoing unilateral hip replacement
to report their health status before and six months after surgery using the Oxford
Hip Score (OHS) (Dawson et al. 1996).61 The OHS is a reliable and validated
60The current performance standard is defined in terms of proportion of patients exceeding a waiting
time of 18 weeks between the GPs referral and the admission (Department of Health 2015).
Unfortunately, data on the time elapsed between the GPs referral and the surgeon’s decision to
admit are not recorded in HES. Our performance estimates will therefore be overstated.
61All patients are also invited to fill in the EuroQol-5D (EQ-5D) questionnaire, a generic health-
related quality of life instrument (Brooks 1996). However, we focus on the OHS as it is better
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measure of health status for hip replacement patients and consists of twelve questions
regarding functioning and pain. For each item, the patient is asked to respond
on a five-item scale. These items are summed up to generate an index score
ranging from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). The post-operative OHS forms the fourth
achievement measure and the pre-operative OHS score is used to control for initial
health status at admission. Because we observe pre-operative health status in
addition to the co-morbidity markers that are usually available in administrative
records, our estimates of performance are more likely to indicate the true impact
that providers have on performance measures (‘value added’) rather than reflect
residual case-mix differences. The PROM survey also gathered additional information
on duration of problems, and whether the patient lives alone, considered herself
disabled, or required help filling in the questionnaire. Pre-operative survey responses
are collected by paper questionnaire during the last outpatient appointment or on
the day of admission, whereas follow-up responses are collected via mailed survey
to the patient’s home address. Participation in the PROM survey is voluntary for
patients but mandatory for all providers of NHS-funded care. Approximately 60% of
patients returned completed pre-operative questionnaires that can be linked to HES
(Gutacker, Street et al. 2015).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics
The estimation sample consists of 95,955 patients treated in 252 providers during
April 2009 and March 2012. Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics. Patients
are on average 67 years old, and approximately 41% of patients are male. The
majority (68%) report having had problems with their hip joint for 1 to 5 years,
approximated by a continuous distribution and we do not seek to make comparisons across
disease areas. Furthermore, the OHS is the relevant outcome measure for the newly introduced
best practice tariff (a pay-for-performance scheme) in the English NHS that was introduced in
April 2014 (Monitor and NHS England 2013). Previous comparisons have demonstrated that
performance assessments based on the EQ-5D and OHS lead to similar conclusions (Neuburger,
Hutchings, Meulen et al. 2013).
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although about 8% of patients experienced symptoms for more than 10 years and
14% reported problems for less than 1 year. Approximately 39% of patients classify
themselves as having a disability, and 27% live alone. Another 90,158 patients have
been excluded from the analysis because of missing data, predominantly with respect
to pre-operative health. These patients tend to be slightly older (68.7 vs 67.4 years),
less likely to be male (39% vs 41%) and more likely to have been admitted as an
emergency in the past year (11% vs 8%); see Appendix A4.1 for full descriptive
statistics.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the empirical distributions of the achievement variables on
their untransformed scales. The average post-operative OHS is 38.5 (SD=9.2) and
the average length of stay is 5.4 days (SD=3.8), with both distributions showing
substantial skew. Approximately 5.2% of patients were readmitted to hospital within
28 days of discharge, and about 17.5% of patients waited longer than 18 weeks to
be admitted to hospital. There is a substantial proportion of missing responses in
terms of post-operative OHS (15.2%) and, to lesser degrees, waiting time (4.0%)
and length of stay (0.1%). Conversely, emergency re-admission status is recorded
for all patients.
4.5.2 Provider heterogeneity and correlation between performance dimensions
All achievements are adjusted for case-mix. The estimated coefficients on risk-
adjustment variables and associated standard errors are not the focus of this study
and are reported in Table A4.2 in the Appendix. The first-stage residuals from the
selection equation are jointly statistically significant (χ2(4) = 14.97; p<0.01) when
entered into the main equations, suggesting that self-selection into hospital may
bias performance estimates if uncontrolled for (see Table A4.3 in the Appendix for
first-stage estimates). We therefore focus on results from models with adjustment
for self-selection.
From the estimated variance-covariance matrices Σ and Ω we can calculate the
correlation across performance estimates. The lower off-diagonal in Table 4.2 shows
the correlation between performance estimates at provider level, whereas the upper
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Description N Mean SD
Achievement measures (Dependent variables)
Post-operative OHS 81,336 38.50 9.21
Length of stay (in days) 95,878 5.36 3.75
Waiting time > 18 weeks 92,154 0.17 0.38
28-day emergency readmission 95,955 0.05 0.22
Patient characteristics (Control variables)
Patient age (in years) 95,955 67.43 11.29
Patient gender (1=male, 0=female) 95,955 0.41 0.49
Pre-operative OHS 95,955 17.66 8.28
Primary diagnosis
Osteoarthritis 95,955 0.93 0.25
Rheumatoid arthritis 95,955 0.01 0.07
Other 95,955 0.06 0.24
Number of Elixhauser comorbidities
0 95,955 0.35 0.48
1 95,955 0.29 0.45
2-3 95,955 0.26 0.44
4+ 95,955 0.10 0.31
Previously admitted as an emergency (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.08 0.28
Socio-economic status 95,955 0.12 0.09
Disability (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.39 0.49
Living alone (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.27 0.44
Assistance (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.21 0.41
Symptom duration
< 1 year 95,955 0.14 0.35
1 - 5 years 95,955 0.68 0.47
6 - 10 years 95,955 0.11 0.31
> 10 years 95,955 0.08 0.26
Healthcare Resource Group
HB12C - category 2 without CC 95,955 0.77 0.42
HB11C - category 1 without CC 95,955 0.10 0.29
HB12B - category 2 with CC 95,955 0.07 0.26
HB12A - category 2 with major CC 95,955 0.04 0.19
HB11B - category 1 with CC 95,955 0.01 0.11
other 95,955 0.02 0.12
Legend: N = Number of observations, SD = Standard deviation; OHS = Oxford Hip
Score; CC = complications or co-morbidities.
Notes: Healthcare Resource Groups refer to major hip procedures for non-trauma
patients in category 1 (HB12x) or category 2 (HB11x). Socio-economic status is
approximated by the % of neighbourhood residents claiming income benefits. This
characteristic is measured at neighbourhood level (lower super output area (LSOA)).
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Table 4.2: Correlation between performance dimensions
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.34 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.26 -0.31 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) 0.03 -0.49 0.16 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at
provider level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation
between random effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level.
Bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significantly different
from zero at the 95% level.
off-diagonal shows the correlation at patient level. Bold numbers indicate that
the correlation coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero (p<0.05;
Huber-White standard errors).
We focus our discussion on the correlation between performance dimensions at
provider level. Our results suggest significant correlations for four combinations of
dimensions. Hospitals with shorter length of stay also realise better post-operative
health status for their patients (ρ = -0.34; SE = 0.067; p<0.001). This is consistent
with findings from randomised controlled trials that tested the effectiveness of so-
called ‘fast track’ or ‘enhanced recovery’ pathways and found that hospitals that
mobilise patients sooner after surgery were able to discharge them quicker and
achieve better post-operative outcomes (Husted et al. 2008; Larsen et al. 2008;
Paton et al. 2014). We also find evidence to suggest that hospitals with shorter
length of stay also have a lower proportion of patients waiting more than 18 weeks
to be admitted (ρ = 0.26; SE = 0.065; p<0.001), suggesting better management of
capacity and of their waiting lists. This would be consistent with a queuing model of
limited bed capacity, where prospective patients cannot be admitted until current
patients are discharged. Hospitals that have better post-operative health outcomes
also tend to have a lower proportion of patients waiting for more than 18 weeks (ρ=
-0.31; SE = 0.071; p<0.001). Finally, the correlation between post-operative health
status and probability of an emergency readmission within 28 days is negative and
statistically significant (ρ = -0.49; SE = 0.078; p<0.001). Overall, these correlations
indicate that inferences based on a series of univariate assessments would likely be
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misleading and that our MVMLM is preferable for this empirical analysis of provider
performance.
It is also of interest to understand how much of the observed variability in adjusted
achievement scores can be attributed to providers (Hauck et al. 2003). We calcu-
late the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC)62 for each of the four performance
dimensions with confidence intervals formed by the delta method. The largest ICC
is observed for waiting times with 27.4% (SE = 0.020; p<0.001) of unexplained
variation in achievements occurring between providers, followed by length of stay
with approximately 13.3% (SE = 0.011; p<0.001). In contrast, the ICCs on the
achievements post-operative OHS (1.7%; SE = 0.002; p<0.001) and emergency
readmission (2.2%; SE = 0.003; p<0.001) are substantially smaller; implying that
providers have less influence over these performance dimensions.
We have conducted sensitivity analyses with respect to a number of modelling
choices (results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.4 to A4.6): First, we excluded
privately own and operated providers (so called ‘independent sector treatment
centres’ (ISTCs)) as these may be argued to operate under different production
constraints (see below). The estimated covariance terms in Σ are somewhat at-
tenuated and the correlations of waiting time with length of stay (p=0.174) and
post-operative health status (p=0.857) are no longer statistically significant. Second,
we included additional regressors based on patient risk factors averaged at provider
level to correct for potential bias arising from correlation between Xij ’s and the hos-
pital random effects (Mundlak 1978).63 Due to convergence problems, we restricted
this to patient age, pre-operative PROM score and level of income deprivation. Again,
covariance terms are smaller in size but remain statistically significant. Finally, we
restricted the risk-adjustment to variables that can be derived from routine adminis-
trative data, i.e. we excluded all variables based on the PROM survey. Results are
62The ICC for performance dimension k is ICCk =
τ2k
τ2
k
+σ2
k
.
63This bias is likely to be small. We compared coefficient estimates from fixed and random effects
estimators using Hausman tests and found little practical difference between those estimates,
although the tests all rejected the assumption of unbiasedness for the random effects approach.
This is likely to be due to our large sample, where within effects swamp between effects and the
Hausman test is over-powered. Results are reported in Appendix Tables A4.7 to A4.10.
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robust to this omission.
4.5.3 Provider performance assessment
We now turn to the assessment of multidimensional provider performance. Fig-
ure 4.3 shows the location of each provider in the four-dimensional performance
space, where each panel presents scatter plots for two dimensions. The axes for all
performance dimensions except post-operative health status are reversed (i.e. multi-
plied by −1) so that higher scores indicate better performance. Hence, providers in
the NE quadrant perform better than the benchmark on both dimensions, whereas
those in the SW quadrant perform worse. Providers that dominate or are dominated
by the multidimensional benchmark with at least 90% probability are highlighted as
darker points.
Figure 4.3 shows that we identify five dominant and eight dominated providers
at a probability level of 90%. It turns out that all dominant providers are privately
owned and operated treatment centres that perform mainly orthopaedic procedures,
here marked as triangles, whereas all dominated providers are public NHS providers,
marked as circles, that provide a wider mix of services, including emergency care.
Note however that not all ISTCs are located in NE quadrant, and not all NHS
providers are located in the SW quadrant. To test whether the observed performance
advantage of ISTCs also holds on average, we re-estimated the models and included
an indicator variable for private ownership. We found statistically significant effects
on length of stay (beta=-0.100; SE = 0.020; p<0.001), post-operative health status
(beta=1.205; SE = 0.157; p<0.001), probability of being readmitted (beta=-0.084;
SE = 0.072; p<0.001), and the probability of waiting longer than 18 weeks (beta=-
0.820; SE = 0.030; p=0.007).
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for dominant and dominated providers
in the financial year 2011/12. Both groups are comparable in terms of the annual
volume of NHS-funded procedures provided. This suggests that volume-outcome
effects may be less important in explaining overall performance differences. Con-
versely, we find that dominant providers operate in more competitive markets as
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indicated by the lower Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).64 This finding is con-
sistent with the theory of quality competition in price-regulated markets (Gaynor
et al. 2015). Note however, that these comparisons are based on a small number of
observations (J=13) and should be interpreted as associations. Ideally one would
compare dominant ISTCs and dominated NHS hospitals across a wider range of
characteristics (e.g. staffing ratios, experience of surgical teams, profit margin,
etc.) to generate further hypotheses about the likely causal factors underlying those
performance differences. Unfortunately, data limitations, especially with respect to
ISTCs, prevent us from doing so.
Table 4.3: Characteristics of dominant and dominated providers (in 2011/12)
Dominant (J=5) Dominated (J=8)
Description Mean SD Mean SD
Annual volume of hip replacements 361.60 198.16 365.38 190.04
Ownership (1=private, 0=NHS) 1.00 - 0.00 -
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.60 0.05 0.78 0.07
4.5.4 Comparison with approaches based on series of univariate probabilities
It is instructive to compare the results from our MVMLM assessment with two
alternative approaches: 1) a series of four univariate multilevel regressions, and
2) an ‘intermediate’ MVMLM regression that takes into account the correlation
between achievements during the estimation stage but treats performance estimates
as independent. In both cases a provider is judged to be dominant [dominated] if
all four individual probabilities of exceeding [falling short of] the benchmarks are
greater or equal to a specified probability threshold (‘confidence box approach’). The
second approach can thus be seen as an intermediate between a simple univariate
approach and the full multivariate approach employed in this study.
64The HHI for provider j is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of all providers
j∗ = 1, . . . , J∗ that service LSOA a = 1, . . . , A, here denoted as saj , weighted by the proportion of
the provider’s observed total activity originating from this LSOA, sja, so that
HHIj =
∑
a
sja ∗ [
∑
j∗
(saj∗)
2] (4.6)
Hospital catchment areas are defined as all LSOAs within a radius of 30km around the hospital.
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Table 4.4: Number of dominant/dominated providers under different estimation
approaches and assumptions about the correlation between performance
dimensions
Probability
threshold Pr∗
(1) Univariate
(2) Intermediate
multivariate (3) Full multivariate
Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated
0.50 5 8 7 10 24 30
0.80 2 3 5 5 12 18
0.90 1 1 2 2 5 8
0.99 0 0 0 1 1 1
(1) Univariate approach - separate univariate models are estimated for each of the four
performance dimensions and providers are considered dominant [dominated] if the independent
probability of being dominant [dominated] exceeds 1 − (1 − Pr∗)/4 on each of the four
dimensions.
(2) Intermediate multivariate approach - multivariate model is estimated and providers are con-
sidered dominant [dominated] if the independent probability of being dominant [dominated]
exceeds 1− (1− Pr∗)/4 on each of the four dimensions. Correlation between performance di-
mensions is exploited in the estimation stage but ignored when forming probability statements.
(3) Fully multivariate approach - multivariate model is estimated and providers are considered
dominant [dominated] if the probability of being dominant [dominated] on all four dimensions
jointly exceeds Pr∗. See section 4.3.2 for details.
The univariate and intermediate multivariate approach both involve comparing
four independent probabilities against a threshold value, which would lead to
inflated risk of classifying providers as dominant [or dominated] when they are
not (type I error). We adopt here the Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple
comparisons, i.e. we require (1-(1-Pr∗)/4)*100% probability on each of the four
dimensions to designate a provider as dominant/dominated, where Pr∗ equals the
desired level of certainty.
Table 4.4 shows the number of providers identified as dominant/dominated un-
der each of these approaches. At a probability threshold of 90% (Pr∗=0.9), the
univariate and intermediate multivariate both identify just one or two dominant
and dominated providers, which is fewer than the full MVMLM. The intermediate
multivariate approach is more efficient than the univariate approach. This becomes
apparent when applying an 80% threshold. At this probability threshold the univari-
ate assessments identify two dominant and three dominated providers, whereas the
intermediate MVMLM identifies five dominant and five dominated providers. The
full MVMLM approach identifies 12 dominant and 18 dominated providers at the
80% threshold.
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4.6 Discussion
Rarely are stakeholders explicit about the valuations they attach to different dimen-
sions of performance, nor are these valuations likely to be identical. This renders the
construction of a composite performance indicator that is appropriate for all audi-
ences unfeasible. To circumvent this, we have set out a methodology for comparing
healthcare providers in terms of their performance across a range of dimensions
in a way that does not require valuation of each dimension and is consistent with
economic theory. Building on previous literature, we analyse relative provider per-
formance for each dimension and allow for correlation across dimensions (e.g. Hauck
and Street 2006; Martin and Smith 2005; Hall and Hamilton 2004). We extend this
literature by employing dominance criteria to compare providers against a multi-
dimensional benchmark, and by constructing multivariate (rather than univariate)
hypothesis tests of parameters that account for correlation between dimensions
and thereby achieve correct coverage probabilities. Failure to perform multivariate
tests can lead to incorrect inferences about multidimensional performance as we
illustrate.
We have applied our MVMLM approach to study the performance of English pro-
viders of care to patients having hip replacement. By focusing on a single procedure,
we can draw more robust conclusions about performance than studies conducted at
hospital level. Our use of patient-level data allows us to employ multilevel models to
control for a diverse range of patient characteristics and, thereby, to isolate the pro-
vider’s impact on observed achievements. We study four dimensions of performance,
namely long waiting times (>18 weeks), length of stay, 28-day readmission rates,
and patient-reported health status after surgery. Achievements on some of these
dimensions are correlated, implying that our multivariate estimation framework is
appropriate. Our results do not suggest trade-offs between achievements on the
four performance dimensions we studied. Instead, we observe positive, albeit weak,
correlations. We wish to stress that these results do not necessarily imply a causal
relationship between achievements, although some of our findings confirm those
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of randomised controlled trials conducted in routine care settings.65 Nevertheless,
this suggests that pairs of achievements are either a) driven by common underlying
factors that enter both production functions, such as organisational effort, or b) that
achievements on one dimension enable achievements on another. This information is
of interest itself as it informs the debate whether incentive schemes can be simplified
to reward providers on a subset of correlated measures, as suggested by Glazer
et al. (2008), or whether regulators should instead ascertain performance across all
individual performance dimensions of interest.
Our estimation yields, for each provider, one performance estimate per perform-
ance dimension, which together form a provider’s performance profile. To translate
this profile into a single statement about performance we employ a set of dominance
criteria and classify providers into three groups: (i) dominant providers, which are
‘positive deviants’ that exhibit outstanding performance across all performance di-
mensions; (ii) dominated providers, which are ‘negative deviants’ with sub-standard
performance; and (iii) the remainder. In this study of patients having hip replace-
ment, all dominant providers were found to be privately operated treatment centres
specialising in elective (i.e. non-emergency) hip and knee replacement, while all
dominated providers were public NHS providers providing a wide range of services.
ISTCs have previously been found to achieve on average better health outcomes than
public providers (Browne et al. 2008; Chard et al. 2011) and to discharge patients
earlier (Siciliani et al. 2013), and we can confirm these findings in our data. This
may be the result of a more stream-lined production process: ISTCs typically focus
exclusively on elective orthopaedic procedures, such as hip and knee replacement,
whereas NHS providers offer a wide range of service, including emergency care.
If the organisational set-up of ISTCs allows them to specialise, this may result in
performance advantages. Our data do not allow us to unpack the reasons for the
observed performance further, and we stress that performance assessment results
should form the starting point for further investigations involving site visits and
65Importantly, these trials also provide evidence on the direction of the causal effect, i.e. what causes
what.
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qualitative analysis (Bradley et al. 2009). As with most regression analyses, general
differences between types of providers can be identified using conditional mean
comparisons, in which indicator variables are used to specify provider types. But our
approach also allows us to identify positive and negative deviants within these broad
categories of provider type. This is important as otherwise regulatory efforts may be
accidently directed at those NHS hospitals that are found to perform relatively well;
and vice versa for the identification of best practice in ISTCs.
The appeal of the dominance approach lies in the absence of strong assumptions
about the various stakeholders’ utility functions and its ability to reduce multiple
performance estimates into a single assessment. However, this comes at a price.
Because the approach requires providers to perform better than the benchmark on all
dimensions, there is no scope to compensate for average or poor performance on one
dimension through excellent performance on another. This very strict yardstick is
difficult to achieve and so we identify only a small number of providers as dominant
or dominated. Also, as the number of objectives under consideration increases
it becomes increasingly more difficult to satisfy the dominance criteria (Pedraja-
Chaparro et al. 1999). Nevertheless, although we have illustrated our methodology
by analysing only four dimensions, it is generalisable to multiple dimensions.
These qualifications not withstanding, we advocate the dominance approach
to multidimensional performance assessment as a useful addition to regulators’
toolboxes.
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5.1 Introduction
Many European healthcare systems have recently extended patients’ right to choose
their provider of elective hospital care (Vrangbaek et al. 2012). Enhanced choice
can accommodate patients’ preferences for provider characteristics (e.g. proximity,
quality or availability of amenities) and create market conditions that incentivise
providers to compete (Besley and Ghatak 2003). Patients in the English National
Health Service (NHS) have to be referred to inpatient services by their general
practitioner, who acts as a gatekeeper, but are free to choose their preferred provider
of care. Prices for hospital care are set nationally and patients do not bear the cost
of treatment, so providers are expected to compete for elective patients on the basis
of quality. Two prerequisites for such quality competition are that patients and their
agents66 have access to reliable, meaningful and understandable information about
the quality of care offered by alternative providers, and that they act upon such
information (Besley and Ghatak 2003; Marshall et al. 2004; Faber et al. 2009).
English patients can access comparative information on hospital quality through
several channels, including the NHS Choices website, the Health & Social Care
Information Centre (HSCIC) website and the Dr Foster Hospital Guide. These
present information on risk-adjusted 28-day mortality and emergency readmission
rates, calculated from routine hospital discharge data. Such indicators have been
criticised as being incomplete and noisy measures of quality, revealing little about the
66These may include the patient’s general practitioner (GP) as well as family, friends and others.
Some patients may not be willing or able to make a choice and their referring GP may choose the
most appropriate hospital for them, i.e. the GP acts as an agent to the patient. It is generally not
possible to distinguish between decision makers using administrative data. For simplicity, we will
henceforward denote the decision-maker as the patient.
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changes in health that the vast majority of patients will experience as the result of
treatment (Appleby and Devlin 2004; Lilford and Pronovost 2010). This is especially
so for mortality rates for common elective operations such as hip (0.3%) and knee
replacement (0.2%), which are generally very low (Berstock et al. 2014; Belmont
et al. 2014).
New hospital quality measures that address these concerns are increasingly avail-
able. Since April 2009, all providers in the English NHS have been required to
collect patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) for all NHS-funded patients
undergoing unilateral hip and knee replacement, varicose vein surgery or groin
hernia repair (Department of Health 2008a). PROMs are validated questionnaires
used to elicit patients’ health status and health-related quality of life (HRQoL). Each
eligible patient is invited to complete a PROM questionnaire before and three or
six months after their surgery. The changes in scores can be interpreted as the
improvement in patients’ health and are used for hospital benchmarking (Nuttall
et al. 2015; Gutacker et al. 2013).
Hospital quality measures derived from PROMs improve over ‘failure’ measures
such as mortality or emergency readmission rates in several ways. First, they capture
the entire spectrum of health (Appleby and Devlin 2004; Gutacker et al. 2013) and
thus allow inferences about improvements in health as a consequence of treatment.
Second, because post-operative health status is adjusted for pre-operative status,
it can be argued that they adjust better for case-mix. Finally, PROMs reflect the
patients’ view on their health and health improvement. This, one may argue, makes
them especially relevant for prospective patients who are about to choose their
provider.
It has been the English Department of Health’s expressed ambition to establish
patients’ self-reported outcomes as an important component of hospital quality
assessment. It was also hoped that such information would be used “by patients and
GPs exercising choice” (Department of Health 2008a, p.6). Consequently, provider-
specific average risk-adjusted changes in health status have been disseminated online
on a regular basis since the beginning of the national PROM programme (Health &
116
5 Do patients choose hospitals that improve their health?
Social Care Information Centre 2013b). Some patients might access this information
directly, whereas others might rely on their general practitioners, who act as their
agent, to retrieve, interpret and communicate this information.
In this study we test whether hospital demand responds to PROM-based measures
of hospital quality in addition to more conventional measures such as mortality and
readmission rates. We estimate a hospital choice model for elective hip replacement
surgery in the English NHS to identify how hospital choice responds to hospital
and patient characteristics. Our focus is on two key aspects of hospital choice: 1)
whether hospitals with better PROM-derived quality (as measured by the changes
in patients’ Oxford Hip Score (OHS)) face higher demand and 2) whether patients’
response to quality differs according to their morbidity, as measured by the pre-
operative health status, and other characteristics such as age or income deprivation.
To address potential endogeneity we use lagged quality and waiting times. We also
undertake robustness checks using hospital fixed effects and by comparing the effects
of quality on choices by elective hip replacement patients with those by emergency
hip replacement patients who we expect to be less sensitive to quality.
This is the first study which explores whether hospital demand responds to quality
as measured by average patient health gains at provider level, which are derived from
patient self-reported outcome measures. The existing literature has predominantely
focused on failure measures such as mortality rates, either measured at aggregate
hospital level or for specific conditions (Sivey 2008; Beckert et al. 2012; Moscone
et al. 2012; Gaynor et al. 2012), readmission rates (Varkevisser et al. 2012; Moscone
et al. 2012), as well as hospital reputation and other composite scores (Pope 2009;
Varkevisser et al. 2010; Varkevisser et al. 2012; Ruwaard and Douven 2014); see
Brekke et al. (2014) for an overview. These studies have typically reported a positive
relation between quality and hospital demand. Second, we make novel use of
pre-operative individual level PROMs data to explore such questions as whether
sicker patients travel farther and choose hospitals with higher quality of care as
often assumed in the literature (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al.
2003). Previous studies have either relied on instrumental variable approaches
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to approximate the role of (unobserved) pre-operative health status on demand
(Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al. 2003) or have used measures of
comorbidity burden and past utilisation as proxies for health status. Our data allow
us to explore this issue more directly. Third, our study contributes to the small
literature on hospital choice in publicly funded health systems where demand is
rationed by waiting time (Sivey 2012; Beckert et al. 2012; Moscone et al. 2012;
Gaynor et al. 2012). Our analysis differs from Beckert et al. (2012), who also
study choice of provider for hip replacement surgery in England, in that we use
provider quality measures which are procedure-specific and more directly related to
the quality of care provided67, explore the role of pre-operative health status, and
model the entire relevant market, including private providers of NHS-funded care.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: in the next section we
describe the data used in this study in more detail. Section 5.3 describes our
econometric model and sets out our strategy to mitigate potential endogeneity bias.
In Section 5.4 we present the estimated marginal utilities of hospital characteristics
and show how these vary with observed patient characteristics. Section 5.5 presents
the estimated effects of changes in providers’ quality on their own demand and that
of their competitors. Finally, the last section offers a discussion of the results.
5.2 Data
We use patient-level data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for all elective
admissions for patients aged 18 or over who underwent NHS-funded primary (i.e.
non-revision) hip replacement surgery68 between April 2010 and March 2013 in NHS
or private providers. HES contains rich information on patients’ demographic and
67Beckert et al. (2012) model hospital quality using hospital-wide mortality and MRSA infection
rates. Aggregate hospital level quality indicators, such as the summary hospital mortality indicator
(SHMI) used in the English NHS, do not correlate well with procedure-specific outcome measures
(Gravelle et al. 2014). In 2010/11, the Pearson correlation coefficients between SHMI and the
quality measures used in this study were -0.09 (OHS), -0.05 (emergency readmission rate) and
0.10 (mortality rate), respectively.
68See Department of Health (2008a) for procedure codes. We exclude patients that underwent revision
surgery to ensure a more homogeneous sample and because these are believed to be likely to return
to the place of initial surgery, independent of observed hospital attributes.
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medical characteristics, small area of residence and on the hospital stay. Privately
funded patients treated in the private sector are not included in HES and are excluded
from our analysis.69
We derive a number of patient variables from HES: patients’ age, gender, the
number of emergency admissions during the 365 days prior to their hip replacement
admission, and the number of Elixhauser comorbid conditions recorded in admissions
in the previous year (Elixhauser et al. 1998; Gutacker, Bloor et al. 2015). We also
obtain an identifier of the GP practice that the patient is registered with. These are
available for all patients. We use the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (Noble
et al. 2006) to attribute to each patient the proportion of residents claiming means-
tested benefits in their Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)70, which we interpret as a
measure of income deprivation. We measure a patient’s distance from a hospital as
the straight-line distance from the centroid of their LSOA.71
The PROM survey invites all NHS-funded hip replacement patients to report their
health status and HRQoL before and six months after surgery using a paper-based
questionnaire. The pre-operative questionnaire is administered by the hospital either
as part of the admission process or during the last outpatient appointment preceding
admission. The post-operative questionnaire is administered by a central agency and
posted to the patient. Participation in the PROM survey is compulsory for providers
but optional for patients. Approximately 60% of patients provide complete pre-
and postoperative PROM questionnaires that can be linked to their HES record
(Hutchings et al. 2014; Gutacker, Street et al. 2015).
Each PROM questionnaire contains three instruments: the Oxford Hip Score
69Approximately 11% of the English population have private (supplementary) insurance and approx-
imately 16% of hip replacement surgeries are funded privately, either out-of-pocket or through
private insurance (Commission on the Future of Health and Social Care in England 2014).
70HES records patients’ locations in terms of the LSOA (2001 census boundaries) in which they reside.
Each LSOA contains approximately 1,500 inhabitants and is designed to be homogeneous with
respect to tenure and accommodation type.
71We determine a hospital’s location on the basis of its headquarter’s postcode (for NHS trusts) or
the postcode of the individual hospital’s site (for ISTCs). We do not model NHS hospital sites
individually as quality information for these providers is only recorded at trust level and hospital
site codes are often poorly recorded in HES data. This is likely to induce noise to our distance
measure.
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(OHS), the EuroQoL-5D (EQ-5D) descriptive system, and the EuroQol Visual Ana-
logue Scale (EQ-VAS). The OHS is a condition-specific instrument that consists of 12
questionnaire items regarding hip-related functioning and pain (Dawson et al. 1996).
Each item is scored on a five-point scale, with four indicating no problems and zero
indicating severe problems. The overall score is calculated as the sum of all items
and ranges from zero (worst) to 48 (best). Both EuroQol instruments are generic
PROMs, i.e. they can be applied to different health conditions, and are described in
detail elsewhere (Brooks 1996). Previous analysis showed substantial correlation
between the EQ-5D and OHS (Neuburger, Hutchings, Meulen et al. 2013). Since the
OHS is a condition-specific measure and hence plausibly more likely to affect hospital
choice for hip replacements we focus on the OHS throughout this study. Also, the
OHS is the relevant outcome measure for the newly introduced best practice tariff for
hip replacement surgery (a pay-for-performance scheme) and we therefore expect
providers to be more concerned with their performance on it (Monitor and NHS
England 2013).
We use PROMs data in two ways. First, we obtained risk-adjusted hospital-specific
PROM change scores for the OHS from the HSCIC website (Health & Social Care
Information Centre 2013b). Data are reported by financial year, which run from April
to March of the next year. The HSCIC excludes from these reports providers with less
than 30 valid pre- and post-operative PROM returns due to concerns about statistical
validity and patient anonymity. The case-mix adjustment methodology is reported
elsewhere (Department of Health 2012a).72 There is some evidence to suggest that
the hospital-specific mean scores are robust to missing data (Gomes et al. 2015).
Second, in some of our models, we use the information in the individual patients’
pre-operative PROMs questionnaires to measure their pre-operative morbidity and
investigate whether choice of provider is affected by pre-operative morbidity. Because
patients can decline to participate or providers may fail to administer a questionnaire
72The adjustment takes into account a range of patient characteristics including age, sex, pre-operative
PROM score, socio-economic status, comorbidity burden, whether the patient lives alone as well as
other indicators of disability.
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there is scope for missing data and selection bias, and we explore this in the empirical
analysis for the subset of models which make use of pre-operative morbidity.
We calculate risk-adjusted hospital-specific 28-day emergency readmission and
28-day mortality rates after hip replacement as additional quality measures. These
data are presented on patient information websites (such as NHS Choices). To
compute them, we link our HES data to Office of National Statistics death records
and apply the HSCIC case-mix adjustment as set out in the readmission outcome
indicator specification (Health & Social Care Information Centre 2013a).73
We group providers into seven categories used by the National Patient Safety
Agency: NHS small / medium / large non-teaching trust, NHS teaching trust, NHS
specialised orthopaedic provider, NHS multi-service provider, and NHS Primary
Care Trusts (PCTs).74 We also distinguish NHS hospitals from Independent Sector
Treatment Centres (ISTCs) which are private providers treating NHS patients.
Finally, we derive from HES the median time (in months) that patients in each
hospital had to wait between the specialist’s decision to add the patient to the
waiting list and the admission (the inpatient wait). Patients in the English NHS do
not pay for their care directly and waiting times thus serve as a rationing mechanism
(Iversen and Siciliani 2011). We use the median rather than the mean because it
is less affected by a small number of patients with very long wait and thus more
representative of the expected waiting time for a prospective patient. We also
conduct sensitivity analysis using the proportion of patients in this hospital that
waited longer than 120 days.
73Both readmission and mortality rates are adjusted for age (in 5-yr bands), sex, socio-economic status,
comorbidity burden as captured by the Charlson index and the number of emergency admissions in
the last year.
74PCTs are responsible for purchasing care for their resident population and, with the exception of the
Isle of Wight PCT, do not provide care themselves.
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5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Model specification
We use a random utility choice model (McFadden 1974). Utility of patient i =
1, . . . , N at provider j = 1, . . . , J at time t = 1, . . . , T is Uijt = Vijt + ξjt + ijt,
where Vijt depends on observable hospital characteristics and travel distance, ξjt are
unobserved hospital characteristics, and ijt is unobserved random utility. Patients
choose from a set of hospitals Mit ∈ J . Assuming ijt is iid extreme value yields
the multinomial logit (MNL) model in which the probability that patient i chooses
hospital j is
Pijt = exp
Vijt + ξjt∑
j∈Mit Vij′ t + ξj′ t
(5.1)
We assume that all patients who require treatment are treated, i.e. there is no outside
option.
In our baseline specification, utility is a linear additive function of the distance
from the patient’s residence to the hospital Dij , distance squared D2ij , hospital
quality metrics Qjt−1, waiting time Wjt−1, and a vector of time-invariant hospital
characteristics Zj , so that
Uijt = D
′
ijβd,i +D
2′
ijβd2,i +Q
′
jt−1βq,i +W
′
jt−1βw,i + Z
′
jtβz,i + ξjt + ijt (5.2)
where ξjt and ijt are unobserved. We assume that anticipated utility at a provider is
based on its previous period’s quality and waiting time because relevant information
are available only with a lag (see section 5.3.2). Varkevisser et al. (2012) make a
similar assumption. We also estimate models with contemporaneous waiting time
and quality scores in sensitivity analyses.
We allow preferences to vary across patients according to their observed charac-
teristics. Thus the marginal utility of quality for patient i is
βq,i = βq +X
′
iδq (5.3)
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and similar for distance, waiting time, and other hospital characteristics. All con-
tinuous covariates in Xi are mean centred and base categories for categorical
characteristics are set to their mode. Thus, the vectors of coefficients βd, βd2 , βq, βw,
βz reflect the preferences of an average/modal patient, hereafter referred to as the
‘reference patient’.
We also estimate models which allow for unobserved patient heterogeneity in
tastes over quality, with
βq,i = βq +X
′
iδq + σqαi (5.4)
where σq is the standard deviation of a normal variable with mean zero and αi
is an unobserved patient effect. The latter may capture, for example, differences
in the ability to access and interpret quality information. This random coefficient
multinomial logit (RCMNL) or mixed logit model (Hensher and Greene 2003; Train
2003), unlike the MNL model, allows for unrestricted substitution patterns, thereby
relaxing the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).75 If σq = 0
then the RCMNL model reduces to the MNL model in (5.2).
While the MNL model has a closed form solution that can be estimated via
maximum likelihood, the RCMNL needs to be approximated through simulation. To
reduce the computational burden76 of the RCMNL model we assume uncorrelated
normally distributed random coefficients for the quality metrics in Qjt−1 and no
random coefficients for other covariates. The RCMNL model is estimated with
maximum simulated likelihood using 50 Halton draws.
All models are estimated in Stata 13 with clogit and the user-written command
mixlogit (Hole 2007b). Standard errors are clustered at the GP practice level to
allow for agent-induced correlation across patients: patients in the same practice
are expected to make more similar choices than patients in different practices if GPs
have an influence on their decisions.
75The IIA states that the probability of choosing one hospital over another depends solely on the
characteristics of these two hospitals and not on the characteristics of any other hospital. The
standard MNL model imposes the IIA assumption, whereas the RCMNL does not.
76Even after imposing those constraints the RCMNL model with our baseline specification still took
over 5 days to compute on a high-performance computing system.
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5.3.2 Endogeneity
To interpret βq as an unbiased estimate of the marginal utility of hospital quality
(up to a linear transformation) requires that the unobserved hospital effect ξjt is
uncorrelated with any of the independent variables, i.e. all observed variables are
exogenous. This assumption may not hold for four reasons (Varkevisser et al. 2012;
Gaynor et al. 2012; Brekke et al. 2014).
First, hospitals may learn by doing so that higher volume providers have higher
quality (Luft et al. 1987; Gaynor et al. 2005). Thus changes in demand will also
affect quality and induce simultaneity bias. Based on the institutional context of this
study we argue that this concern can be dismissed. While volume-outcome effects
have been reported for elective joint replacement surgery, these scale effects tend to
occur only in very low volume hospitals that treat less than 100 patients per year
(Judge et al. 2006; Ma¨kela¨ et al. 2011). The increasing incidence of hip replacement
surgery in England and trends to aggregate services in high-volume hospitals mean
that all NHS providers in our sample are comfortably above this threshold and has
led commentators to suggest that volume effects are of little relevance in the English
NHS (Judge et al. 2006). For private providers we cannot ascertain their true level
of activity as treatment of non-NHS patients is not recorded in HES, but we expect
those to perform a sufficient number of procedures to operate profitably. The average
hospital in our sample treats over 300 patients per year.
Second, because of short run capacity constraints, changes in demand will also
affect waiting time in the same period (Gaynor et al. 2012).77 While our primary
interest is not in the effect of waiting time on demand, we are concerned that any
bias introduced through endogenous variables will filter through to our estimate of
βq (Wooldridge 2002). However, if, as we assume, demand depends on past, rather
than current, quality and waiting time, then demand changes in period t cannot
affect waiting time at t− 1.
77It may also be that supply and demand are determined simultaneously, i.e. hospitals react to demand
shocks by adjusting their supply, e.g. by performing more surgeries on weekends. We do not
consider this in our model explicitly, although the use of lagged waiting time circumvents this
problem as well.
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Third, sicker patients may choose higher quality hospitals or hospitals may turn
away or discourage patients with characteristics that make them less likely to achieve
a large improvement in health status. If such systematic selection occurs and is
not controlled for in the calculation of hospital quality scores then those scores
would in part be determined by patients’ choices or provider selection. However,
provider quality scores are adjusted for a rich set of demographic, socio-economic,
and morbidity patient characteristics, including, in the case of PROMs, the patients’
self-reported pre-operative health status. Hence, we do not believe that unobserved
patient selection is likely to bias the quality scores significantly.
Finally, there may be unobserved hospital characteristics that affect demand and
are correlated with observed covariates (Jung et al. 2011). For example, hospitals in
areas with better amenities may attract better staff thereby ensuring higher observed
clinical quality but also unobserved interpersonal aspects of quality. Our assump-
tion that patients use information on previous period quality and waiting times
when choosing hospitals does not remove omitted variable bias operating through
unobserved non-transitory hospital characteristics. However, the low correlations
between the PROM quality measure and the conventional readmission and mortality
measures suggest that omitted variables may not lead to serious bias. We undertake
two types of sensitivity analyses to explore the size of the potential omitted variable
bias. Our first approach is to estimate the choice model in (5.2) with alternative-
specific time-invariant fixed effects (FEs) (Hodgkin 1996; Monstad et al. 2006;
Sivey 2012). These hospital FEs capture the utility of non-transitory unobserved
hospital characteristics. The coefficients on observed hospital characteristics are now
identified solely through variation within providers over time, thereby removing
any endogeneity bias operating through unobserved time-invariant characteristics.
However, this approach is quite demanding of the data, and because we only observe
providers over three years we expect this approach to result in imprecise estimates of
the marginal utility of hospital quality. Also, because our market structure changes
over time, due to the opening of new independent sector treatment centres, the FEs
do not correspond to observed market shares in each time period. This may bias
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estimates if incumbent providers differ systematically from new entries. We therefore
also estimate a model based on NHS trusts only, whose numbers are relatively stable
over time.
Our second approach is to follow Pope (2009) (see also Gaynor et al. (2012))
and gauge the possible impact of unobserved hospital heterogeneity by using a
control group of emergency hip replacement patients whose choice of provider is less
responsive to quality and waiting time. The majority of emergency hip replacement
patients suffer from a fractured neck of the femur as a result of a fall and official
recommendations are that they should be treated within 48 hours (NICE 2011).
Further delays are linked to worse outcomes (Moja et al. 2012). We therefore expect
provider choice by emergency hip replacement patients to be less affected by publicly
reported information on quality and more by distance to providers and time-invariant
unobserved factors, such as long-standing reputation or dimensions of accessibility
not captured by our distance measure (e.g. parking charges or connection to the
public transport system).
If we assume that emergency patients’ demand is entirely inelastic to observed
quality and they do not wait78, but value the same unobserved hospital characteristics
as elective patients, then their true utility is given by
UEmerijt = D
′
ijβ
Emer
d,i +D
2′
ijβ
Emer
d2,i + ξjt + ijt (5.5)
If we estimate the model specified in (5.2) for emergency patients and find
β̂Emerq 6= 0, we conclude that cov(Qjt−1, ξjt) 6= 0. Moreover, if we assume that
elective and emergency patients have the same preferences for unobserved hospital
characteristics, then the effect of quality on elective demand, purged of omitted
variable bias, is β∆q = β
Elec
q − βEmerq . Since coefficients in separate MNL models may
be scaled differently, we estimate a pooled model for elective and emergency patients
78Elective waiting time and associated supply constraints do not apply to emergency patients, i.e. there
is always sufficient capacity to treat an emergency patient. Given the urgent nature of the condition,
patients will usually be treated within hours of arrival, not weeks or months. Explorations of our
data revealed that elective waiting time is only weakly correlated with the volume of emergency
patients, suggesting that supply for these distinct groups is separate.
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by interacting all covariates with an indicator variable for emergency. This forces
the scaling to be the same. The coefficients on the interaction terms are estimates of
β∆k for k ∈ [d, d2, q, w, z].
If emergency patients are also sensitive to elective quality79, or emergency quality
that correlates with it, or if unobserved hospital characteristics have different effects
on choices by emergency and elective patients and are correlated with observed
quality, then β∆q can no longer be interpreted as the unbiased effect of quality on
elective demand. If unobserved hospital factors are not correlated with quality, then
β∆k reflects the differences in preferences in two distinct groups of patients: those
that require urgent care and have less time to compare hospitals, and those that have
sufficient time to reach an informed decision. In this case, we expect that β∆q > 0:
elective patients will be more sensitive to quality than emergency patients.
5.3.3 Elasticities, changes in demand and willingness to travel
The estimated coefficients on quality are estimates of the marginal utility from quality.
Since the utility function is unique only up to a linear transformation, the coefficients
only convey information about the sign of marginal utility of hospital characteristics
and hence about the sign of the effect of quality on demand. The ratio of estimated
marginal utilities (the negative of the marginal rate of substitution) is unaffected
by linear transformations and so provides quantitative and comparable information
about patient preferences. We estimate the reference patient’s willingness to travel
(WTT) for a one standard deviation (SD) increase in quality as
WTT =
∂Dij
∂Qj
|UijSD(Q) = −
∂Uij
∂Dij
/
∂Uij
∂Qj
SD(Q) =
−βq
βd + 2βd2D
SD(Q) (5.6)
where D is the median distance to hospitals in patients’ choice sets. We estimate
standard errors by the delta method (Hole 2007a). WTT is the extra distance in
kilometres that the reference patient located the median distance away from a
79As with elective patients, we do not observe who chooses the hospital for emergency hip replacement.
This may be the patient, a family member, GP, or the ambulance crew.
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provider would be willing to travel to that provider if its quality was increased by
SD(Q), where SD(Q) is averaged across hospitals and years.
We are also interested in whether providers could attract more patients by im-
proving their quality. Expected demand at provider j is Yjt =
∑
i∈Sjt Pijt, where Sjt
is the set of patients whose choice set includes provider j, i.e. for whom j ∈ Mit.
Following Santos et al. (2015) we calculate the average partial effect of a one SD
increase in quality on provider j’s demand, i.e. demand responsiveness to quality, as
∂Yjt
∂Qjt−1
SD(Q) = SD(Q)
∑
i∈Sjt
∂Pijt
∂Qjt−1
= SD(Q)
∑
i∈Sjt
βqPijt(1− Pijt) (5.7)
We report the mean of (5.7) over all providers and years.
We calculate the elasticity of demand of provider j with respect to own quality as
E
Qjt−1
jt =
∑
i∈Sjt
∂Pijt
∂Qjt−1
Qjt−1
Yjt
=
∑
i∈Sjt
βqPijt(1− Pijt) Qjt−1∑
i∈Sjt Pijt
(5.8)
We report the mean of (5.8), weighted by providers’ predicted demand
∑
i∈Sjt Pijt.
Finally, we compute the cross-elasticity of demand for provider j with respect to
the quality of provider j
′
as
E
Q
j
′
jt =
∑
i∈Sjt∩Sj′ t
∂Pijt
∂Qj′ t−1
Qj′ t−1∑
i∈Sjt Pijt
= −
∑
i∈Sjt∩Sj′ t
βqPijtPij′ t
Qj′ t−1∑
i∈Sjt Pijt
(5.9)
with j 6= j′ . Note that for some combinations of j and j′ the cross-elasticity is zero
because no patients have both providers in their choice sets.
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Our main sample is 173,773 elective hip replacement patients treated in 230 pro-
viders during the period April 2010 to March 2013.80 Their average age is 68 years
and 40% are male (Table 5.1). The average pre-operative OHS is 17.5 and 9% of
patients have been admitted to hospital as an emergency at least once during the
preceding 365 days (average number of admissions = 0.13). Self-reported pre-
operative OHS is only weakly correlated with past emergency utilisation (ρ = -0.10)
and the number of comorbidities (ρ = -0.14). This suggests that past emergency
utilisation and comorbidity burden are poor proxies for current health status81 as
experienced by the patient.
On average, within 30km patients have a choice of 8 providers, with over 90% of
patients having access to at least two different providers. Even within 10km there
are on average 1.6 hospitals and over 20% of patients can choose between two or
more providers. To reduce computational burden we restrict patient choice sets to
the 50 nearest providers.82 The 741 patients (or 0.04% of the sample) who chose a
provider outside this set were dropped from the analysis.
Patients live on average 14.7 kilometres from their chosen hospital. Figure 5.1
shows that just over half (53.7%) of patients bypassed the local hospital and nearly
a fifth (18.3%) bypassed the nearest three hospitals. On average, patients travel 5.4
km (SD=14.8) beyond their nearest hospital to be treated.83
80The number of providers varied slightly over this period because of mergers, changes in coding and
market entry, especially with respect to private facilities. There were 157 providers in 2010/11,
202 in 2011/12, and 212 in 2012/13, of which 18 (11.5%) in 2010/11, 62 (30.7%) in 2011/12,
and 78 (36.8%) in 2012/13 are privately operated.
81We also calculated the correlations between these measures and the EQ-5D utility score, which one
may argue is a more holistic measure of health-related quality of life. The correlations are similar:
ρ = -0.10 for past utilisation, and ρ = -0.14 for comorbidity burden.
82Choice sets are deliberately chosen to be large to avoid introducing selection bias. Not many
patients may search out information on all 50 hospitals’ characteristics before making a choice.
However, given the strong preference for hospitals nearby and the assumption of IAA, including
extra alternatives should not affect the model estimates.
83These numbers are somewhat higher than those reported by Beckert et al. (2012), presumably
because our data also cover private providers treating NHS-funded patients.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics - elective sample
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 173,773 14.7 17.7
Distance travelled past closest provider (in km) 173,773 5.4 14.8
Number of providers within 10km radius 173,773 1.6 1.7
Number of providers within 30km radius 173,773 8.5 7.3
Age 173,773 68.0 11.5
Male 173,773 0.40 0.49
Past utilisation 173,773 0.13 0.49
Number of Elixhauser conditions 173,773 0.43 0.94
Income deprivation 173,773 0.12 0.09
Pre-operative Oxford Hip Scorea 71,614 17.5 8.2
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 571 304.3 209.1 94.7%
Waiting time (in months) 571 2.5 1.1 77.4%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 571 19.8 1.4 57.0%
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 571 5.65 2.41 36.8%
28-day mortality rate (in %) 571 0.17 0.36 3.4%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient.
Notes: Patient characteristics for patients choosing provider between April 2010 and March 2013.
Provider waiting time, change in Oxford Hip Score, readmission rate, mortality rate are for financial
years 2009/10 to 2011/12. Provider characteristics are unweighted.
a Responders to PROM survey that were treated between April 2010 and March 2012.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of elective patients who went to their Nth nearest hospital
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The hospital waiting time and quality scores are lagged by one year and are for
financial years 2009/10 to 2011/12. The risk-adjusted OHS health again has a mean
of 19.8 with a SD of 1.4. There are much larger coefficients of variation for hospital
emergency re-admission and mortality rates. The average waiting time at provider
level is 2.5 months, which is substantially lower than in previous years (see Appendix
Figure A5.1 and Siciliani et al. 2014). The provider OHS change scores are only
weakly correlated with waiting time (ρ=-0.30), readmission rates (ρ=-0.28) and
mortality rates (ρ=-0.05). This suggests that choice models that are restricted to
mortality and readmission rates may not even indirectly pick up the effect of PROM
measures on demand.
The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) shows that just over half of the ob-
served variation in OHS change scores is between providers (ICC=57%) rather
than over time.84 Between-provider variation is markedly greater for waiting times
(ICC=77%). Most of the variation in readmission rates and mortality is within
providers.
5.4.2 Regression results
5.4.2.1 Main effects
The results from for the RCMNL model (see Appendix Table A5.1) suggest no
significant variation in the random coefficients on the quality metrics. Hausman
tests also did not reject the IIA assumption. We therefore concentrate on the MNL
models reported in Tables 5.2 to 5.5.
Table 5.2 is our preferred specification with distance, lagged waiting time, the
three lagged quality metrics and indicators for the type of provider as well as inter-
actions with patient age, gender, past utilisation, comorbidity, and local area income
deprivation (we explore interactions with pre-operative OHS in section 5.4.2.2).
This specification does not include hospital FEs. The main effects are the estimated
84These ICCs differ from those reported in previous chapters, which focused on variation in individual
patients’ scores across providers.
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marginal utilities for the reference patient with mean or modal characteristics. The
reference patient prefers shorter distances with the marginal disutility from distance
declining with distance. She prefers specialised providers to non-specialised pro-
viders. She is also more likely to choose a public provider over a private provider
after accounting for distance, waiting time and quality.85
Table 5.2: Estimated marginal utilities
Variable Est SE
Main effects
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002***
Distance2 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099***
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038***
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072***
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045***
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206***
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004***
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026
Interaction with distance
x Patient age -0.002 0.000***
x Male 0.002 0.001
x Past utilisation -0.003 0.002
x Comorbidity count -0.004 0.001***
x Income deprivation -0.186 0.017***
Interaction with waiting time
x Patient age 0.003 0.000***
x Male -0.009 0.009
x Past utilisation -0.006 0.012
x Comorbidity count -0.018 0.007**
x Income deprivation 0.046 0.084
Interaction with change in Oxford Hip Score
x Patient age 0.001 0.000*
x Male -0.007 0.005
x Past utilisation -0.010 0.007
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.003**
x Income deprivation -0.455 0.047***
Interaction with 28-day emergency readmission rate
continued
85During our study period ISTC were funded through block contracts and paid to provide care to a
pre-specified number of NHS patients. However, most ISTCs did not fulfil their quotas although
they generally had low waiting times (Naylor and Gregory 2009). Our results are consistent
with this observation and suggest a positive preference for public providers by NHS-funded hip
replacement patients. Brown et al. (2015) also found evidence of a pro-public preference in the
stated preferences of the general public in New Zealand.
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Table 5.2: Estimated marginal utilities
Variable Est SE
x Patient age -0.0003 0.000*
x Male 0.000 0.003
x Past utilisation 0.011 0.003**
x Comorbidity count 0.001 0.002
x Income deprivation 0.125 0.026***
Interaction with 28-day mortality rate
x Patient age -0.001 0.001
x Male -0.053 0.022*
x Past utilisation 0.046 0.026
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.015
x Income deprivation -0.025 0.168
WTT(OHS change) 1.287 0.085***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.981 0.079***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.086 0.072
Number of patients 173,032
Number of providers 230
BIC 460,994
Pseudo R2 0.637
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients
treated between April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate
and mortality rate are lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio
of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the
median distance (in km). Interaction terms with distance2 and provider type not reported
(available on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
Reference patient demand is increasing with the OHS change score and falling
with emergency admission rates. The estimated WTT for a one SD increase in OHS
is 1.3 km or 8.7% of the average distance travelled to the chosen provider. The WTT
for a SD decrease in emergency readmission rates is 1.0km. There is no statistically
significant effect of procedure-specific mortality rates on demand. Nor does the
waiting time affect choice of provider, which may be a result of the historically short
waiting time during our study period.86
Results are robust to the use of contemporaneous rather than lagged waiting time
and quality (Appendix Table 7.4, model 1). Contemporaneous waiting time has a
positive but statistically insignificant coefficient. When we use the proportion of
patients waiting longer than 120 days as a waiting time measure the coefficient is
86A similar argument has been made by Brown et al. (2015), who estimate the waiting time elasticity
of demand in New Zealand to be -0.004, much lower than values of -0.07 to -0.14 previously
reported in the literature (Martin et al. 2007).
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negative and statistically significant (Appendix Table 7.4, model 2). The coefficients
on the quality measures are almost unaffected by the use of contemporaneous
waiting time and quality.
The HSCIC also produces hospital quality scores based on the case-mix adjus-
ted change in the EQ-5D utility score. This is highly correlated with the OHS
change score (Neuburger, Hutchings, Meulen et al. 2013) and when we estimate
the baseline specification with EQ-5D substituted for OHS we find similar WTT
(Appendix Table 7.4, model 3). Results are also robust to exclusion of independent
sector treatment centres from patient choice sets (Appendix Table 7.4, model 4).
5.4.2.2 Patient heterogeneity
The coefficients on the interaction terms in the lower parts of Table 5.2 suggest
that preferences vary across types of patient. We find, like other studies (Propper
et al. 2007; Beckert et al. 2012), that older patients dislike distance more. They
care less about waiting time and get greater marginal utility from improvements
in the OHS change score, reductions in emergency readmissions and reductions
in mortality rates. There is little difference between the preferences of male and
female patients except that male patients have a greater dislike for providers with
higher mortality. Preferences vary little by morbidity as measured by past emergency
admissions. In contrast, patients with more comorbidities have a greater dislike of
distance and waiting time, but care less about readmission rates. Finally, patients
from neighbourhoods with greater income deprivation care more about distance and
less about quality.
The existence of detailed patient reported pre-operative health status measures
in our dataset allows us to explore in more detail whether patients in worse health
status are more sensitive to quality and more willing to travel, as commonly assumed
in the literature on hospital quality (Gowrisankaran and Town 1999; Geweke et al.
2003). The correlations between patients’ pre-operative OHS and their routinely
available morbidity measures are low, suggesting that they measure different aspects
of the patient’s condition at the time of admission.
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The first model in Table 5.3 is the same as our preferred specification but with
additional patient pre-operative OHS interactions. Interaction terms with other
patient characteristics are suppressed for brevity. Due to data limitations, we focus
on patients treated during April 2010 and March 2012. We find that healthier
patients are more willing to travel. Although the marginal utility from higher quality
is similar for healthier patients, the reduced distance cost for these patients implies
they are more willing to travel for higher quality. Healthier patients are also more
likely to choose a private provider, which is consistent with observed differences in
intake across provider types (Browne et al. 2008).
The fact that pre-operative OHS data are available for only about 60% of patients
raises concerns about response bias if unobserved factors affect propensity to respond
and utility from providers.87 To investigate if responders to the pre-operative
PROM questionnaire have different preferences to non-responders we re-estimate
the preferred specification of Table 5.2 for our full sample (responders and non-
responders) but interact a dummy variable for responder status with all the main
and interacted explanatory variables; pre-operative health status is not modelled.
The pre-operative PROM questionnaire is administered after the patient has chosen
the provider. Hence, it is unclear whether the response indicator variable reflects
patient preferences or whether the choice determines the response indicator. For
example, private providers have higher response rates than NHS hospitals (Gomes
et al. 2015; Gutacker, Street et al. 2015) and also tend to have higher observed
quality and shorter waiting times. We address this concern by including the observed
provider pre-operative response rate as a provider characteristic when modelling
the choices of responders and non-responders. This variable is informative about
the individual’s propensity to fill in a pre-operative PROM questionnaire given the
chosen provider.88 We find that responders and non-responders have generally very
87We are not concerned about the implications of response rates for the hospital level case-mix adjusted
OHS change scores as these have been shown to be robust to variations in response rate (Gomes
et al. 2015).
88As a check, we first re-estimate the responder only model with the addition of provider pre-
operative response rates. The results are robust to this sensitivity analysis, with the WTT of 1.4km
(SE=0.102) for a standard deviation increase in PROM quality being slightly larger than in our
135
5 Do patients choose hospitals that improve their health?
Ta
bl
e
5.
3:
C
ho
ic
e
m
od
el
s
al
lo
w
in
g
fo
r
pa
ti
en
t
pr
e-
op
er
at
iv
e
O
xf
or
d
H
ip
Sc
or
e
Pa
ti
en
ts
w
it
h
pr
e-
op
O
H
S
(1
)
Pa
ti
en
ts
w
it
h
pr
e-
op
O
H
S
(2
)
A
ll
pa
ti
en
ts
(3
)
R
es
po
nd
er
s
(3
a)
N
on
-r
es
po
nd
er
s
(3
b)
D
if
fe
re
nc
e
(3
c)
Va
ri
ab
le
Es
t
SE
Es
t
SE
Es
t
SE
Es
t
SE
Es
t
SE
M
ai
n
ef
fe
ct
s
D
is
ta
nc
e
(i
n
km
)
-0
.1
85
0.
00
2*
**
-0
.1
85
0.
00
2*
**
-0
.1
85
0.
00
2*
**
-0
.1
88
0.
00
7*
**
0.
00
3
0.
00
7
D
is
ta
nc
e2
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
*
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-m
ed
iu
m
-0
.5
26
0.
03
7*
**
-0
.6
46
0.
03
7*
**
-0
.6
41
0.
03
7*
**
-0
.5
58
0.
03
9*
**
-0
.0
83
0.
03
4*
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-m
ul
ti
-s
er
vi
ce
-0
.9
02
0.
13
3*
**
-0
.9
73
0.
13
1*
**
-0
.9
65
0.
13
0*
**
-0
.5
19
0.
10
4*
**
-0
.4
46
0.
12
3*
**
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-s
m
al
l
-0
.8
20
0.
04
5*
**
-0
.9
07
0.
04
5*
**
-0
.9
02
0.
04
4*
**
-0
.8
57
0.
04
5*
**
-0
.0
45
0.
04
1
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-s
pe
ci
al
is
t
1.
05
2
0.
07
9*
**
0.
86
9
0.
08
2*
**
0.
85
6
0.
08
2*
**
0.
97
3
0.
08
9*
**
-0
.1
17
0.
07
0
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-t
ea
ch
in
g
-0
.4
45
0.
03
9*
**
-0
.5
03
0.
03
9*
**
-0
.4
89
0.
03
9*
**
-0
.6
08
0.
03
9*
**
0.
11
9
0.
03
8*
*
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
se
ct
or
tr
ea
tm
en
t
ce
nt
re
-1
.3
73
0.
06
5*
**
-1
.4
99
0.
06
3*
**
-1
.5
15
0.
06
3*
**
-1
.6
70
0.
06
7*
**
0.
15
5
0.
05
9*
*
Pr
im
ar
y
ca
re
tr
us
t
-0
.9
78
0.
22
3*
**
-1
.3
01
0.
22
3*
**
-1
.2
98
0.
22
4*
**
-1
.2
72
0.
23
5*
**
-0
.0
26
0.
23
2
W
ai
ti
ng
ti
m
e
(i
n
m
on
th
s)
-0
.0
11
0.
02
0
0.
03
5
0.
02
0
0.
03
3
0.
02
0
-0
.0
54
0.
02
3*
0.
08
7
0.
01
8*
**
C
ha
ng
e
in
O
xf
or
d
H
ip
Sc
or
e
0.
16
1
0.
01
0*
**
0.
13
9
0.
01
0*
**
0.
13
7
0.
01
0*
**
0.
10
4
0.
01
1*
**
0.
03
3
0.
01
0*
*
28
-d
ay
em
er
ge
nc
y
re
ad
m
is
si
on
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
-0
.0
50
0.
00
6*
**
-0
.0
46
0.
00
6*
**
-0
.0
46
0.
00
6*
**
-0
.0
52
0.
00
6*
**
0.
00
6
0.
00
6
28
-d
ay
m
or
ta
lit
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
-0
.1
35
0.
03
5*
**
-0
.0
68
0.
03
2*
-0
.0
67
0.
03
2*
-0
.0
14
0.
03
6
-0
.0
53
0.
03
3
R
es
po
ns
e
ra
te
2.
04
4
0.
09
3*
**
2.
03
8
0.
09
2*
**
-2
.2
87
0.
08
0*
**
4.
32
5
0.
08
6*
**
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
pr
e-
op
er
at
iv
e
O
xf
or
d
H
ip
Sc
or
e
x
D
is
ta
nc
e
(i
n
km
)
0.
00
1
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
0*
**
x
D
is
ta
nc
e2
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
0*
**
x
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-m
ed
iu
m
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
x
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-m
ul
ti
-s
er
vi
ce
-0
.0
04
0.
00
7
-0
.0
06
0.
00
7
x
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-s
m
al
l
-0
.0
02
0.
00
2
-0
.0
02
0.
00
2
x
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-s
pe
ci
al
is
t
0.
01
7
0.
00
4*
**
0.
01
6
0.
00
4*
**
x
N
H
S
tr
us
t
-t
ea
ch
in
g
-0
.0
05
0.
00
2*
-0
.0
08
0.
00
2*
**
x
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
se
ct
or
tr
ea
tm
en
t
ce
nt
re
0.
03
8
0.
00
3*
**
0.
03
5
0.
00
3*
**
x
Pr
im
ar
y
ca
re
tr
us
t
-0
.0
02
0.
00
8
-0
.0
05
0.
00
8
x
W
ai
ti
ng
ti
m
e
(i
n
m
on
th
s)
0.
00
4
0.
00
1*
**
0.
00
4
0.
00
1*
**
x
C
ha
ng
e
in
O
xf
or
d
H
ip
Sc
or
e
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
x
28
-d
ay
em
er
ge
nc
y
re
ad
m
is
si
on
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
x
28
-d
ay
m
or
ta
lit
y
ra
te
(i
n
%
)
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
00
2
x
R
es
po
ns
e
ra
te
0.
02
0
0.
00
5*
**
W
T
T(
O
H
S
ch
an
ge
)
1.
71
7
0.
11
1*
**
1.
47
5
0.
11
3*
**
1.
46
5
0.
11
2*
**
1.
04
8
0.
13
6*
**
0.
41
7
0.
13
3*
*
W
T
T(
R
ea
dm
is
si
on
ra
te
)
-0
.9
41
0.
10
7*
**
-0
.8
67
0.
10
5*
**
-0
.8
79
0.
10
5*
**
-0
.9
32
0.
13
2*
**
0.
05
4
0.
12
7
W
T
T(
M
or
ta
lit
y
ra
te
)
-0
.4
74
0.
12
2*
**
-0
.2
38
0.
11
2*
-0
.2
24
0.
10
7*
-0
.0
45
0.
11
3
-0
.1
80
0.
10
7
N
um
be
r
of
pa
ti
en
ts
71
,3
29
71
,3
29
11
3,
75
1
N
um
be
r
of
pr
ov
id
er
s
20
6
20
6
20
6
B
IC
18
2,
40
7
17
9,
62
8
28
3,
98
9
Ps
eu
do
R
2
0.
64
9
0.
65
4
0.
65
7
**
*
p<
0.
00
1;
**
p<
0.
01
;*
p<
0.
05
N
ot
es
:
C
on
di
ti
on
al
lo
gi
tm
od
el
of
ch
oi
ce
of
ho
sp
it
al
fo
r
el
ec
ti
ve
hi
p
re
pl
ac
em
en
tp
at
ie
nt
s
tr
ea
te
d
be
tw
ee
n
A
pr
il
20
10
an
d
M
ar
ch
20
12
.
O
H
S
ch
an
ge
,w
ai
ti
ng
ti
m
e,
re
ad
m
is
si
on
ra
te
an
d
m
or
ta
lit
y
ra
te
ar
e
la
gg
ed
by
on
e
ye
ar
.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
m
ar
gi
na
lu
ti
lit
ie
s.
W
T
T
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
th
e
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
on
th
e
qu
al
it
y
va
ri
ab
le
to
th
e
m
ar
gi
na
lu
ti
lit
y
of
di
st
an
ce
ev
al
ua
te
d
at
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
di
st
an
ce
(i
n
km
).
M
od
el
s
in
(1
)
an
d
(2
)
ar
e
fo
r
pa
ti
en
ts
re
po
rt
in
g
a
pr
e-
op
er
at
io
n
O
H
S.
M
od
el
in
(3
)
is
fo
r
al
lp
at
ie
nt
s
an
d
in
te
ra
ct
s
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
fo
r
re
po
rt
in
g
a
pr
e-
op
er
at
io
n
O
H
S.
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
ef
fe
ct
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
(3
c)
.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
al
so
co
nt
ai
n
a
fu
ll
se
t
of
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
of
ag
e,
ge
nd
er
,p
as
t
ut
ili
sa
ti
on
,E
lix
ha
us
er
co
m
or
bi
di
ti
es
,
an
d
de
pr
iv
at
io
n
w
it
h
ho
sp
it
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
an
d
di
st
an
ce
(n
ot
re
po
rt
ed
).
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
G
P
pr
ac
ti
ce
le
ve
l.
136
5 Do patients choose hospitals that improve their health?
similar revealed preferences, with the exception of preferences for waiting times
(non-responders prefer shorter waiting times) and PROM quality (responders derive
more utility from health gains and are thus more willing to travel for it). There is no
difference with respect to the disutility from travel distance, readmission rates or
mortality.
5.4.3 Omitted variable bias
We also explore the possible impact of omitted hospital characteristics on our estim-
ates of marginal utility for quality and other hospital characteristics. We compare
preferences of elective and emergency patients estimated from pooled choice models
with a full set of emergency patient dummy variables interacted with all explan-
atory variables. There are 73,629 emergency patients in our sample. Only 20%
of emergency patients bypassed the nearest provider (see Appendix Figure A5.2).
Descriptive statistics for this patient group are reported in Appendix Table A5.3.
Emergency patients’ choice sets are the 50 closest providers who carried out hip
replacement surgery on at least 30 emergency patients in this year. This rules out
private and specialised providers who only treat elective hip replacement patients.
708 (1.0%) emergency patients were dropped because they attended a provider not
in their choice set. All main effects still pertain to the elective reference patient.
We report results for two different specifications. The first model in Table 5.4
compares emergency patients with elective patients who choose NHS or independent
providers. However, there are some marked differences in observed characteristics
between those two groups. For example, emergency patients are on average 12 years
older than elective patients and have over twice as many recorded comorbidities.
Hence in the second model reported in Table 5.5 we compare a set of elective and
emergency patients matched exactly on age, gender, past emergency admissions,
number of comorbidities, income deprivation and year of treatment. Additionally,
we restrict the elective patient sample to those who used an NHS provider that treats
preferred specification (full results available on request).
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at least 30 elective and emergency patients in that year; hence the choice sets are
identical for elective and emergency conditional on location.
Table 5.4: Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients
Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002*** -0.217 0.004*** -0.033 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030*** -0.571 0.045*** -0.041 0.039
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099*** -0.935 0.164*** -0.332 0.145*
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038*** -0.823 0.050*** -0.032 0.044
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072*** n/a n/a
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033*** -0.609 0.045*** -0.164 0.042***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045*** n/a n/a
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206*** -1.274 0.258*** -0.115 0.176
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015 -0.010 0.022 -0.023 0.021
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008*** 0.048 0.013*** -0.070 0.012***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004*** -0.046 0.008*** 0.006 0.007
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026 0.056 0.056 0.087 0.057
WTT(OHS change) 1.285 0.085*** 0.523 0.143*** -0.763 0.126***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.978 0.079*** -0.870 0.150*** 0.109 0.134
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.085 0.072 0.155 0.155 0.241 0.157
Number of patients 173,032 72,921
Number of providers 230 138
BIC 570,669
Pseudo R2 0.689
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated
between April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged
by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference patient’. Elective and emergency patients are not
matched on observed characteristics but the ‘reference patient’ in both patient populations is defined according to the
average characteristics of the elective patient sample. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the
marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy
variables interacted with hospital characteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of
interactions of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics
and distance (not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
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Table 5.5: Comparison of marginal utilities for elective and emergency patients - matched
sample
Elective patients Emergency patients Difference
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.220 0.004*** -0.215 0.004*** 0.005 0.005
Distance2 0.001 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.709 0.050*** -0.560 0.046*** 0.149 0.053**
NHS trust - multi-service -0.710 0.175*** -0.921 0.182*** -0.211 0.213
NHS trust - small -0.880 0.058*** -0.794 0.053*** 0.086 0.062
NHS trust - teaching -0.468 0.053*** -0.598 0.048*** -0.130 0.058*
Primary care trust -1.133 0.292*** -1.429 0.314*** -0.296 0.282
Waiting time (in months) -0.087 0.027** -0.032 0.024 0.055 0.029
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.092 0.015*** 0.034 0.014* -0.058 0.016***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.061 0.009*** -0.046 0.008*** 0.015 0.010
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.050 0.061 0.070 0.063 0.120 0.079
WTT(OHS change) 0.796 0.128*** 0.354 0.142* -0.441 0.149**
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.893 0.129*** -0.814 0.152*** 0.079 0.165
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.084 0.102 0.140 0.127 0.224 0.148
Number of patients 32,274 32,274
Number of providers 138 138
BIC 107,831
Pseudo R2 0.771
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective and emergency hip replacement patients treated
between April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged
by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities for the ‘reference patient’. Elective and emergency patients are
matched exactly on observed characteristics (age, gender, past emergency utilisation in last year (none, once, or
more), income deprivation of neighbourhood, number of Elixhauser comorbit conditions, year of treatment) and the
‘reference patient’ in both patient populations is defined according to the average (prior to matching) characteristics
of the elective patient sample. Choice sets include only providers that treat at least 30 elective and 30 emergency
hip replacement patient in this period. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal
utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model is estimated with a full set of dummy variables
interacted with hospital characteristics and other interaction terms. All models also contain a full set of interactions
of age, gender, past utilisation, Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance
(not reported). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
Both models suggest that emergency patients care less about provider OHS changes
but have similar preferences over the more traditional quality measures using read-
mission and mortality rates. In the second specification, with closely matched
patients, the estimated marginal utility of OHS changes (βEmerq =0.034) is just over
one third of that for elective patients (βElecq =0.092) and significant at p<0.05. If
we assume that emergency patients’ demand is entirely inelastic to variation in
observed elective quality and that the estimated association for emergency patients
is a result of omitted variables that affect emergency and elective patients in the
same way, then the difference in the marginal utility of OHS changes (β∆q =0.058)
can be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the true effect of OHS change score
on elective patient utility. The WTT for a one SD increase in OHS change scores then
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is 0.4km (SE=0.149), which is smaller than that reported in Table 5.2.
Table 5.6 shows the main effects from our preferred specification estimated with
additional hospital FEs. We find that PROM quality still has a statistically significant
effect on demand, whereas emergency readmission rates no longer do. The WTT to
travel for PROM quality is however 87% lower than that calculated from the results
in Table 2 (0.2km vs 1.3km). This is likely to be due to the fixed effect absorbing
part of the effect of time-invariant quality on choice. Results are broadly similar
when patients’ choice sets are restricted to NHS hospitals, although we now find a
counter-intuitive positive effect of waiting time on demand.
Table 5.6: Choice model controlling for unobserved time-invariant hospital effects
All providers (1)
NHS providers
only (2)
Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.202 0.002*** -0.231 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
Waiting time (in months) 0.021 0.024 0.053 0.012***
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.017 0.006** 0.016 0.007*
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.004
28-day mortality rate (in %) 0.038 0.020 0.021 0.026
WTT(OHS change) 0.168 0.060** 0.124 0.055*
WTT(Readmission rate) 0.089 0.066 -0.0001 0.053
WTT(Mortality rate) 0.095 0.051 0.031 0.039
Number of patients 173,032 148,629
Number of providers 230 144
BIC 411,541 260,299
Pseudo R2 0.678 0.742
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between
April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are lagged by
one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to
the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Model in (1) does not impose
restrictions on the type of provider in patients’ choice sets. Model in (2) is based on a restricted choice set
of NHS providers, thereby excluding patients that selected ISTCs. All models include indicator variables for
hospitals (not reported). All models also contain a full set of interactions of age, gender, past utilisation,
Elixhauser comorbidities, and deprivation with hospital characteristics and distance (not reported). Standard
errors are clustered at GP practice level.
5.5 The economic effects of quality on demand
We use the results from choice models to illustrate the effect of quality differentiation
on hospital demand. Column four and five of Table 5.7 provide the marginal utilities
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of the different quality measures and the willingness to travel for a one SD increase in
these measures. The sixth and seventh columns show the average total and relative
change in demand from a one SD increase in quality, and column eight gives the
own quality demand elasticities. We base our calculations on the estimates for our
preferred specification in Table 5.2. This should be kept in mind when interpreting
the results presented in this section.
Table 5.7: Effect sizes of hospital quality measures
Observed
Marginal
utility
Effect of SD increase in quality
Elasticity
of demand
Quality indicator Mean SD WTT
Demand
change
% Demand
change
Change in Oxford Hip Score 19.8 1.4 0.118 1.3 33.9 9.4 1.3
Emergency readmission rate (in %) -5.6 2.4 -0.052 -1.0 -25.3 -7.0 -0.2
Mortality rate (in %) -0.2 0.4 -0.031 -0.1 -2.2 -0.6 0.0
Notes: All calculations based on estimated marginal utilities reported in Table 5.2. WTT is the ratio of the
coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km).
Changes in volume and elasticities are averaged across hospital-year observations and are weighted by predicted
demand Ŷijt =
∑
i∈Mit Pijt.
The expected increase in demand for a SD increase in OHS is approximately
34 patients, or 9.4% of predicted demand at current quality levels. Increases in
readmission and mortality rates are associated with decreases in demand, although
the association of mortality and demand is not statistically significant. The effect of
a one SD increase in OHS is larger than that of a one SD decrease in readmission
rate.
There is substantial variation across providers in the effect of OHS change scores
on own demand (Figure 5.2). The estimated elasticities range from 0.2 to 2.4 (mean
= 1.3). About 42% of the variation in elasticities is explained by the amount of
competition a provider faces, here measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI).89 Providers in more competitive areas (low HHI) face larger quality elast-
icities than those in less competitive areas (high HHI), with elasticities falling by
approximately 0.29 per 0.1 increase in HHI (assuming a linear effect; p<0.001)
(Figure 5.3). Markets are more competitive in areas where independent sector
treatment centres are active.
89See FN 64.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of changes in hospital demand as a result of a SD increase
in Oxford Hip Score change scores and quality elasticity of demand
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Figure 5.3: Differences in quality elasticity of demand between providers in compet-
itive (low HHI) and non-competitive (high HHI) markets
142
5 Do patients choose hospitals that improve their health?
We also examine the effect of changes in the quality of other providers on a
provider’s demand. Higher cross-quality demand elasticities make it more likely
that increases in one provider’s quality will trigger an increase in the quality of
other providers. Figure 5.4 shows how cross-quality elasticities decline rapidly as
the distances between providers increase. Whereas a 1% increase in a competitor’s
PROM quality is associated with a -0.63% reduction in demand if the competitor is
located within 10 km, this reduces to -0.23% when the competitor is 30km away.
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Notes: Dashed line shows LOWESS curve.
Figure 5.4: Percentage change in demand as a result of percentage change in com-
petitor’s quality
5.6 Discussion
The collection of patient-reported outcome measures has been introduced in England
with the ambition that these new metrics of hospital quality would influence patient
choice of hospital (Department of Health 2008a). This study is the first to test the
relationship between observed hospital PROM quality and demand for elective hip
replacement surgery. It uses data on observed choices for all NHS-funded patients
treated between April 2010 and March 2013 in private and public hospitals in
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England. In order to address potential endogeneity bias we implement an empirical
strategy based on lagged explanatory variables, hospital fixed effects and a control
group design based on demand for emergency hip replacement.
Our results suggest that elective hospital demand is statistically significantly
associated with observed quality as measured by PROMs and other metrics. While
individual patients are not very sensitive to quality differences — the estimated
willingness to travel for a standard deviation increase in PROM quality is less than
1.3km — the number of potential patients in a hospital’s market implies that the
average hospital can attract an increase in elective activity of approximately 34 new
patients, or 9% of existing activity levels, if it finds ways to improve PROM quality
by one standard deviation. Hospital demand is more responsive to a one standard
deviation of PROM quality than one standard deviation of emergency readmission
rates, and there is no statistically significant association with mortality rates after
hip replacement surgery.
Our findings that choice responds to quality suggest that providers could compete
on quality to attract additional demand. However, the change in activity that would
arise after a change in quality may be modest. First, a standard deviation increase
in OHS (equivalent to 1.4 points) would be a substantial improvement in quality
for any provider and difficult to achieve. For comparison, the average year-on-year
improvement in hospital PROM scores is 0.196 OHS points, or less than 15% of the
observed standard deviation. Second, we show that the effect of quality changes
on the providers’ ability to attract patients away from local competitors diminishes
rapidly as distance increases. This may result in local quasi-monopolies where
quality improvements have little effect on demand. Finally, our estimated effect
is likely to be an upper bound estimate and our analysis on emergency patients
suggests that the coefficient of demand to quality could be up to 30% smaller. Taken
together, the incentive effect of patients ‘voting with their feet’ and demanding
higher quality is likely to be limited. Of course, whether or not providers engage in
quality competition based on published PROM scores depends primarily on whether
they perceive their demand to be elastic to quality changes and on how much they
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value their reputation. We cannot answer these questions with our data.
There are several policy levers which may be used to ensure that PROM quality
information is used to inform hospital choice (Marshall et al. 2004; Faber et al.
2009). Many patients may still not know about hospital PROM scores and more
active dissemination to the general public may be required (e.g. by adding the
information to the Choose & Book system). Some patients may find it difficult to
access this information, for example if they do not have access to the internet. There
is a lack of evidence on the extent to which patients and general practitioners are
aware of this information and consider it as part of their decision-making process.
Similarly, the information may not be sufficiently meaningful to them in its current
format. A recent study by Hildon et al. (2012) showed that a high proportion
of patients and doctors do not consider the reported PROMs to have an intuitive
metric and thus struggle to interpret provider scores. Finally, some patients may not
consider variation between hospitals sufficiently large to be considered important.
Some of these points may resolve over time, whereas others require targeted policy
intervention to improve the dissemination of quality information.
We also explore whether patient preferences vary according to observed and
unobserved patient characteristics. We find that the preference for PROM quality
increases with age and decreases with income deprivation, comorbidity burden
and past utilisation. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for preferences for
quality as approximated by emergency readmission rates. Interestingly, we do not
find evidence that preferences for quality vary with pre-operative health status as
reported by the patient herself. But because healthier patients are more willing to
travel, they have ceteris paribus a higher willingness to travel for quality. Hence,
the ‘distance bias’ described by Gowrisankaran and Town (1999) is likely to occur
not because more morbid patients request higher quality, but because they derive
different disutility from travel. This finding may be specific to the condition under
study as osteoarthritis and other conditions that require hip replacement reduce
patients’ mobility, and more severely morbid patients thus may be less able or willing
to travel.
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There remains scope for further research. For example, we cannot disentangle
whether the estimated effect is driven by patients’ choices versus general practition-
ers’ choices acting on their behalf. We conjecture it is due to both. We also did not
test whether the first release of PROM information in 2009/10 constituted news
to patients and their agents and how this changed their behaviour. For example,
analysing the effect of the public release of cardiovascular surgery report cards on
New York hospitals’ market share, Dranove and Sfekas (2008) show that the effect is
larger if the signal about hospital quality contradicts prior beliefs, and that failure
to account for prior beliefs may lead to downward biased estimates of the quality
elasticity of demand. Because PROM scores have been collected and disseminated
for all providers in England, there is no natural control group to isolate the causal
effect of information release. Finally, our findings may be specific to the condition
under study. Patients undergoing surgery with considerable risk of peri-operative
mortality may be more sensitive to quality information since the cost of choosing an
inferior provider would likely be more significant (see e.g. Gaynor et al. 2012).
In conclusion, the results reported in this chapter provide some first evidence to
suggest that hospital demand for hip replacement responds to hospital quality as
captured by changes in patient-reported health status.
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6 Conclusions
This thesis presents four empirical studies that explore the use of performance
measures based on changes in patient self-reported health status and HRQoL to
assess the costs and quality of care provided by hospitals in the English NHS. Such
information is useful to principals (e.g. patients, regulators, purchasers of care) that
want to incentivise and hold to account their agents (here: hospital providers) so
as to reduce the potential for rent extraction. In what follows, I shall first briefly
summarise the main findings of these analyses and discuss policy implications, and
then make suggestions for further research.
6.1 Summary of key findings and implications for policy
In Chapter 2 we explore the empirical relationship between hospitals’ costs and qual-
ity of care, here measured by provider mean changes in patients’ PROM scores, for
four surgical procedures. Healthcare providers often argue that resource utilisation
increases in quality, i.e. one needs to invest more to get better care. Regulators are
typically less informed about the production process and thus cannot assess these
claims. Our analysis provides little empirical evidence to support the notion that
quality is necessarily costly. Indeed, assuming a linear relationship we estimate that
higher case-mix adjusted costs are generally associated with lower quality, although
most of these estimates are not statistically significant. We find some evidence of
a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between case-mix adjusted costs and changes
in PROMs for hip replacement patients, as previously found by e.g. Hvenegaard
et al. (2011) in different contexts. However, controlling for the extra costs of quality
only has a small effect on providers’ estimated relative costs. Hence, hospitals (i.e.
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agents) may be trying to exploit their information advantage over purchasers and
regulators of care (i.e. principals) when claiming that cost variation is the result of
quality variation, not rent extraction.
There are two main implications for policy. First, even nearly a decade90 after
the introduction of Payment by Results (PbR), there remains substantial variation in
resource utilisation amongst providers of the same care. This is not readily explained
by a differential effectiveness of the treatment provided, as measured through
changes in patients’ self-reported health, or by differences in observable patient or
provider characteristics that can be assumed exogenous to the provider. This raises
questions about the ability of the current reimbursement system to incentivise cost
containment and, over time, standardise resource utilisation. Farrar et al. (2009)
have shown that the introduction of PbR was associated with a decrease in length of
stay on average. However, they did not explore whether resource use has become
more standardised after the introduction of PbR. More generally, there is a lack
of longitudinal analyses to establish whether hospital costs are still converging or
whether PbR has already ‘lost its bite’. Given the substantial variation in reported
reference costs, one would expect the latter.
Second, if cost and quality are negatively related - for at least some providers and
levels of quality - this implies scope to improve the efficiency of the service. This
raises the question why (semi-)altruistic providers have not yet amended their care
processes to achieve better health outcomes at lower costs. One possible explanation
is that providers are not aware of best practice. Another explanation is that the
immediate costs of service re-design outweigh the perceived short- to medium-term
benefits (Smith 2015). Addressing this might require a different funding model than
simply paying per unit of activity, or may not be solvable solely through market-based
incentives. If so, policy makers would be well advised to combine incentives to
reduce costs and/or improve quality with information for providers on how to do so
90The PbR system was rolled out to all elective procedures and all NHS trusts at the beginning of
the financial year 2005/6 (Department of Health 2011a). However, for a number of elective
interventions, including hip replacement surgery, the PbR system had already been implemented in
the financial year 2003/4.
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without harming service provision.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the appropriate derivation of multidimensional perform-
ance measures to assess provider performance, which might be particularly important
in the context of multiple stakeholders. Specifically, we propose a methodology to
analyse EQ-5D data to inform prospective patients and local managers about the
relative performance of hospital providers in improving different aspects of their
patients’ health. We argue that, in this specific setting, analysing each of the five
dimensions independently is more appropriate than the current practice of analysing
EQ-5D utility scores. This is because the EQ-5D utility scores are based on aver-
age preferences of the UK general population and these may differ from those of
individual patients. Also, disaggregated information may be more useful for local
managers to identify problems in the care process. Our empirical analysis shows
that provider variation in outcomes is more pronounced on those EQ-5D dimensions
that receive low weights in the UK general population tariff. Performance estim-
ates based on utility scores may therefore understate between-provider differences
since variability on dimensions with low weights will feature less prominently than
variability on dimensions with higher weights.
In constructing and publishing composite performance scores, policy makers and
those responsible for the public dissemination of such data should give more thought
to the role that value sets play therein. For example, the rationale for using the
UK general population preferences for constructing EQ-5D utility scores is well
recognised in the context of technology adoption into the reimbursement catalogue
of tax-funded healthcare systems (Siegel et al. 1997; Brazier et al. 2005). But this
does not mean that the same rationale applies when these data are used to compare
hospitals and inform a wide range of stakeholders. An intermediate solution to the
two extremes contrasted in this thesis (composite scores based on general population
preferences vs. no aggregation) may be to elicit the preferences of the relevant
population of decision-makers, in this context groups of prospective patients. Such
an approach would still involve averaging across individuals and, therefore, might
lead to mismatch between patients’ own preferences and those reflected in the
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composite score. However, patients undergoing the same procedure are likely to be
more homogeneous (e.g. in terms of age, mobility requirements, and expectations)
and the mismatch may therefore be smaller. To avoid costly elicitation exercises,
policy makers may want to draw on the existing data that has been collected as
part of the national PROM survey. For example, the PROM survey also collects VAS
data alongside the EQ-5D health profile and these two datasets could be mapped to
obtain (non-utility) weights.91
The approach advocated in Chapter 3 has a number of attractive features, not least
that it makes no assumptions about patients’ preferences regarding performance
on the different health domains and is therefore consistent with general welfare
theory. However, a drawback is that it results in multiple performance statements,
which patients and other recipients of information may find difficult to comprehend
or synthesise. To overcome this issue, in Chapter 4 we propose the use of domin-
ance criteria to identify providers that excel or perform poorly across all relevant
performance dimensions simultaneously. Dominance criteria require only weak
assumptions about the preferences of the relevant information recipients and are
therefore consistent with the normative arguments put forward in Chapter 3.
We demonstrate the feasibility and utility of this approach in Chapter 4. Specific-
ally, we study the multidimensional performance of providers of hip replacement
surgery with respect to length of stay, readmission rates, waiting times and changes
in patients’ health status. We find that all providers identified as dominant are
privately operated independent sector treatment centres (ISTCs), whereas all those
dominated by the benchmark are NHS trusts. We also find evidence of a statistically
significant negative association between length of stay and patient outcomes, some-
what analogous to the findings of Chapter 2. These results should be understood as a
starting point for further in-depth analysis of why those identified privately operated
ISTCs produce excellent results across all performance dimensions, and in how far
their best practices could be transferred to NHS hospitals.
91Greiner et al. (2003) use EQ-5D health profile and VAS data from eleven population surveys in six
Western European countries to calculate a European tariff.
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In Chapter 5 we explore the use of PROM-based performance information by
patients choosing hospitals. To this end, we estimate a hospital choice model for
all NHS patients undergoing hip replacement surgery in England between April
2010 and March 2013. We find that patients are more likely to choose a hospital
with better PROM scores, and that this finding is robust to a number of alternative
specifications. However, the effect of quality on individual choices is small, which
is consistent with the existing literature on consumer choice in healthcare (see
Brekke et al. (2014) and examples cited therein). However, because the market
for hip replacement surgery is large, providers can still attract greater demand if
they find ways to improve outcomes more than their competitors. Public release of
performance information may thus stimulate quality competition. Yet, providers’
ability to attract patients away from competitors diminishes rapidly with distance.
This may result in local quasi-monopolies in which the public release of performance
information may incentivise providers to improve their quality primarily through
concerns about their reputation, not fears over loss of activity.
If the public release of performance information is only effective in stimulating
quality competition in some regions of the country (i.e. urban areas with many
competitors) or for some specific conditions, market based incentive mechanism may
be insufficient to motivate providers in other contexts. As patients seem unwilling to
travel far for better care, this may contribute to inequalities in population health.
Hence, policy makers and regulators may want to consider other, non-market based
mechanisms to ensure that all providers strive to deliver high quality care. The newly
introduced best practice tariff (BPT) for elective hip and knee replacement rewards
providers on the basis of their relative effect on patients’ health (Monitor and NHS
England 2013), and may be one of many alternative financial and non-financial
vehicles to improve quality.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to two general issues that are of relevance
to policy makers and those administering the national PROM programme. The
first issue is data quality. For PROMs to become a credible indicator of hospital
performance, analyses must be based on a sufficiently large number of responses
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to reduce the risk of selection bias. Throughout this thesis, we have given little
attention to the issue of missing data and associated biases. However, in other work
we have explored the impact of missing data on provider performance estimates and
found those to be robust to non-response (Gomes et al. 2015). Nevertheless, low
participation rates and non-response may undermine the credibility of PROM-based
quality indicators if providers perceive them as non-representative or imprecise. The
decision to link bonus payments to participation rates in the orthopaedic BPT is
commendable, although we have cautioned elsewhere that the requirement of 50%
participation may not be sufficiently high to motivate providers to put enough effort
into data collection (Gutacker, Street et al. 2015).
The second issue is the lack of evidence on the cost-effectiveness of collecting and
disseminating comparative PROM data. Our analyses show that PROM data can be
used to assess the quality performance of providers in routine care settings. The
national PROMs programme is currently focussing on less than 4% of all elective
hospital activity92 in the English NHS, so there is scope to roll it out to other areas.
However, in doing so, policy makers must consider whether the benefits of collecting
and disseminating performance data outweigh the cost of collection. While the
direct costs can be quantified with relative ease — Maynard and Bloor (2010)
report unit costs of approximately £6.50 — the benefits to patients and the public,
e.g. in the form of better information on provider quality or reassurance of fitness
to practice, and other indirect costs have not yet been rigorously assessed. The
research reported on in Chapter 5 gives some first insights into the potential benefit
of collecting and disseminating PROM data, but more efforts are required to establish
the cost-effectiveness of collection and public reporting of performance data.
92Based on primary procedure code and data for FY2013/14 (Health & Social Care Information Centre
2015).
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6.2 Suggestions for further research
The research presented in this thesis can be extended in several directions. I would
like to highlight four areas of further research that I consider especially fruitful. In
some cases, this will require combining methodologies from the fields of regulation
and economic evaluation.
First, our finding that better patient health outcomes are associated with lower
resource utilisation requires further investigation. One area of concern is poten-
tial endogeneity between both. This may arise due to a number of mechanisms,
including unobserved confounding or simultaneity. The analysis in Chapter 4 is
more robust to confounding than previous studies in this area due to the availability
of good pre-operative health status information and adjustment for selection into
hospital. Also, other sources of evidence, like those from evaluations of enhanced
recovery pathways, support our empirical findings (Husted et al. 2008; Larsen et al.
2008; Paton et al. 2014). However, further econometric analyses based on suit-
able instrumental variables would be useful. More generally, research is required
to understand the relationship between cost and quality for more conditions and
identify the underlying factors that are amenable to policy, both to set an informed
benchmark and help providers achieve it. In many cases, econometric analysis will
be able to identify highly or poorly performing providers93 but further qualitative
research in those institutions will be required to understand how resources are
utilised to their best effect.
Second, the available PROM data collected as part of the national PROM pro-
gramme allows the assessment of short term (i.e. three or six months) health benefits
but still falls short of the ambition to measure changes in patients’ health trajectories
over time. The National Joint Registry has begun to collect follow-up PROM data
at one, three and five years after surgery (National Joint Registry 2011). These
data should prove useful in understanding the longer term effects that providers
have on their patients’ health. They may also help to alleviate concerns that the
93For example by using the methodology developed in Chapter 4.
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follow-up period in the national PROM programme is too short to capture all relevant
benefits (Browne et al. 2013). However, such information will be of limited use for
performance management purposes since it cannot be used to detect and respond to
substandard care in a timely fashion. Extrapolation techniques within a modelling
framework may be more suitable for this purpose but it remains to be seen how
precise such predictions would be and whether they would be accepted by providers
as reliable measures of their performance.94
Third, I pointed out in Chapter 1 that performance information can be used to
inform future contracts. Yet, in practice such information is mainly used retrospect-
ively, e.g. to adjust payments according to observed outcomes or challenge providers
about their quality of care. If performance information is to be used by purchasers
of care to determine which provider to contract with in the future, past perform-
ance needs to be predictive of future performance. Leckie and Goldstein (2009)
examine the predictive ability of school league tables and found past performance to
be largely unrelated to current performance. With respect to PROMs, Varagunam
et al. (2014) found poor to moderate agreement between providers’ performance
classifications (better than expected, as expected, worse than expected) over time
for hip and knee replacement surgery, and low or non-existent agreement for the
two other procedures. However, it should be noted that Varagunam et al. (2014)’s
analysis did not exploit the longitudinal nature of the data or adjust for regression
to the mean (Jones and Spiegelhalter 2009). More research is required into the
intertemporal stability of provider performance estimates to inform policy makers
about their suitability for prospective contracting purposes and prospective patients
about their utility for informing hospital choice.
Finally, the orthopaedic BPT, introduced in April 2014, will provide an excellent
opportunity to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of using financial incentives to improve
patients health outcomes. Providers will receive an 11% bonus on top of the tariff
94Conversely, such information has proven useful in establishing the cost-effectiveness of different
procedures in routine care settings. See Coronini-Cronberg et al. (2013) for an example in general
surgery.
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for hip and knee replacement surgery if they do not perform statistically significantly
worse than the national average and achieve at least 50% participation in the
pre-operative PROM survey (Monitor and NHS England 2013; Gutacker, Street
et al. 2015). Future research could evaluate the overall effect of this high-powered
incentive scheme on patient outcomes and contrast its effectiveness in motivating
previously highly and poorly performing providers. Other interesting aspects include
the incentive for providers to limit PROM survey participation — since this reduces
the probability to be detected as performing unsatisfactorily for a given level of
statistical significance — and to engage in patient selection if the case-mix adjustment
is perceived to be incomplete.
In summary, the data collected as part of the national PROMs programme have
given me the opportunity to explore variation in patients’ health outcomes following
treatment as a suitable performance indicator to assess and incentivise hospital
providers. The findings are encouraging but more work is required to make the best
use of these data to reduce information asymmetries and ensure more effective use
of resources in the English NHS.
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7.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A2.1: Effect of health gain on costs under different GLM specifications
Measure of
health gain
Log / Gamma Log / Poisson Identity / Gaussian
Est SE Est SE Est SE
Knee replacement
EQ-5D -13.0 20.8 -14.8 19.6 -15.3 20.0
EQ-VAS -80.4 37.1* -78.9 36.8* -77.3 36.4*
OKS -60.8 57.9 -61.8 55.4 -64.3 56.2
Hip replacement
EQ-5D -15.5 22.7 -18.4 24.9 -19.3 25.5
EQ-VAS -52.2 27.8 -51.8 30.1 -51.4 30.3
OHS 26.2 62.8 30.5 68.6 28.4 69.5
Groin hernia repair
EQ-5D -6.1 12.7 -6.6 12.5 -7.4 12.8
EQ-VAS -15.2 17.6 -13.8 17.1 -14.1 16.9
Varicose vein surgery
EQ-5D 16.7 9.4 12.9 7.7 11.9 6.4
EQ-VAS 35.7 15.9* 32.6 14.3* 32.0 13.4*
AVVQ 52.3 29.7 45.0 25.8 44.5 24.5
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Notes: All effects are marginal effects on the untransformed scale, i.e. they express
changes in costs for a unit change in health gain. Specification of linear predictor mirrors
that of models reported in Table 2.3. However, the models reported here do not account
for a provider random effect due to convergence problems. Standard errors are clustered
at provider level.
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Notes: Graph shows difference between fixed effects (FE) and empirical Bayes (EB)
estimates of provider effects from analysis of costs of hip replacement surgery (ad-
justed for patient characteristics). Effects are shrunken towards weighted average of
provider effects, i.e. the global average.
Figure A2.1: Difference between shrunken and not shrunken provider performance
estimates
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Table A2.6: Relationship between health outcome and costs - provider-level constraints
not modelled
Constant MCQ Non-constant MCQ
Variable H H H2
Test of joint
significance
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE χ2(2)
Knee replacement
EQ-5D -8.4 21.9 25.7 30.4 -0.7 0.7 1.22
EQ-VAS -74.2 36.2 * -113.3 46.9 * 5.5 4.6 6.05 *
OKS -54.7 67.2 343.7 217.8 -14.3 7.4 4.96
Hip replacement
EQ-5D -22.0 31.6 -321.7 154.5 * 3.8 2.0 5.16
EQ-VAS -47.4 40.5 -109.0 59.5 4.1 3.6 3.53
OHS 31.0 84.8 -2362.5 759.3 ** 61.0 19.5 ** 9.78 **
Groin hernia repair
EQ-5D -8.3 13.7 -67.3 32.8 * 3.4 1.8 4.21
EQ-VAS -11.4 16.5 -10.2 17.5 1.2 3.7 0.67
Varicose vein surgery
EQ-5D -3.1 9.2 3.6 19.5 -0.3 0.8 0.41
EQ-VAS 14.2 11.7 22.6 10.6 * 4.3 1.8 * 10.2 **
AVVQ 9.1 18.7 145.0 66.6 * -7.8 3.8 * 4.76
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
OHS/OKS = Oxford Hip/Knee Score; AVVQ = Aberdeen varicose vein questionnaire; MCQ = marginal costs of
quality; H = health outcome, i.e. the change in health status after treatment
Table A2.7: Relationship between health outcome and costs - excluding specialised
orthopaedic providers
Constant MCQ Non-constant MCQ
Variable H H H2
Test of joint
significance
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE χ2(2)
Knee replacement
EQ-5D -6.4 22.8 33.1 31.7 -0.8 0.7 1.60
EQ-VAS -78.9 37.1 * -117.6 44.8 ** 5.4 4.6 7.13 *
OKS -55.7 67.2 388.6 230.5 -15.8 7.8 * 5.18
Hip replacement
EQ-5D -23.1 32.3 -310.6 166.7 3.6 2.1 4.16
EQ-VAS -57.3 39.8 -105.6 59.1 3.2 3.5 3.65
OHS 37.0 88.1 -2,450.9 779.1 ** 63.2 20.2 ** 9.90 **
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
OHS/OKS = Oxford Hip/Knee Score; MCQ = marginal costs of quality; H = health outcome, i.e. the change
in health status after treatment
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Table A2.8: Provider effects and performance assessment by PROM instrument and
specification
Provider effectsab Change in provider effects Magnitude of
Stat. sign. adjustmentac
PROM MCQ Min Max
Stat.
insign.
Econ.
Insign.
Econ.
sign. Min Max
Knee replacement
EQ-5D constant -3,947 7,164 140 0 0
non-constant -3,802 7,147 133 6 1 731 731
EQ-VAS constant -4,720 6,538 78 62 0
non-constant -4,634 6,649 76 62 2 275 369
OKS constant -4,076 6,941 132 7 0
non-constant -4,002 6,872 126 12 1 785 785
Hip replacement
EQ-5D constant -4,278 7,482 130 8 0
non-constant -4,209 7,176 109 23 7 -1,346 393
EQ-VAS constant -4,543 7,770 112 26 0
non-constant -4,638 7,860 114 22 2 -234 512
OHS constant -4,262 7,131 137 0 1 -279 -279
non-constant -4,080 6,562 74 30 34 -3,828 404
Groin hernia repair
EQ-5D constant -874 1,705 146 0 0
non-constant -860 1,720 142 3 3 -250 -93
EQ-VAS constant -877 1,727 143 0 0
non-constant -877 1,729 145 0 0
Varicose vein surgery
EQ-5D constant -711 1,260 124 0 0
non-constant -711 1,244 121 1 2 -35 197
EQ-VAS constant -802 1,243 116 0 8 -106 115
non-constant -789 1,249 108 3 13 -327 98
AVVQ constant -821 1,231 122 0 2 -74 91
non-constant -675 1,189 112 3 9 -78 454
PROM = patient-reported outcome measure; MCQ = marginal costs of quality; OHS/OKS = Oxford Hip and
Knee scores; AVVQ = Aberdeen varicose vein questionnaire
a All effects are in GBP
b After adjusting for health outcomes
c Only for econ. and stat. significant changes. Negative numbers indicate improvements in estimated provider
performance.
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7.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A3.1: Correlation between performance estimates on EQ-5D dimensions
Mobility Self-Care
Usual
Activities
Pain /
Discomfort
Anxiety /
Depression
Mobility 1.000
Self-Care 0.343 1.000
Usual Activities 0.707 0.450 1.000
Pain/Discomfort 0.532 0.346 0.561 1.000
Anxiety/Depression 0.236 0.294 0.311 0.380 1.000
Notes: Based on J=230 hospital performance estimates. All correlations are statistically
significantly different from zero at p<0.01.
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7.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
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Table A4.3: Estimated coefficients and stand-
ard errors - multinomial hospital
choice model (first-stage)
Variable Est SE
Closest hospital 0.185 0.014***
Distance to hospital -0.197 0.003***
Distance2 0.001 0.0001***
Distance3 -0.00002 0.000002***
Number of patients 95,955
Number of providers 252
Pseudo R2 0.706
χ2(4) 120,930
*** p< 0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Legend: Est = Estimate; SE = Huber-White standard
error
Notes: Distance to hospital is measured as the straight-
line distance from the centroid of the patient’s lower su-
per output area (LSOA) to the provider’s headquarter
(NHS trust) or hospital site (ISTCs). Distance is meas-
ured in kilometres.
Table A4.4: Correlation between performance dimensions - ex-
cluding ISTCs
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.27 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.11 -0.02 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) -0.03 -0.46 -0.02 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random
effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the
correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
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Table A4.5: Correlation between performance dimensions - ac-
counting for provider average risk factors
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.21 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.19 -0.17 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) -0.08 -0.35 0.07 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random
effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the
correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
Table A4.6: Correlation between performance dimensions -
risk-adjustment based on HES data only
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.16 0.01 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.41 1.00 -0.01 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.28 -0.37 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) 0.04 -0.47 0.17 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at provider
level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation between random
effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient level. Bold indicates that the
correlation is statistically significantly different from zero at the 95% level.
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7.4 Appendix to Chapter 5
Table A5.1: Mixed logit choice model
Mean Standard deviation
Variable Est SE Est SE
Distance (in km) -0.184 0.002***
Distance2 0.000 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.530 0.030***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.603 0.099***
NHS trust - small -0.791 0.038***
NHS trust - specialist 1.023 0.072***
NHS trust - teaching -0.445 0.033***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.467 0.045***
Primary care trust -1.159 0.206***
Waiting time (in months) 0.013 0.015
Change in Oxford Hip Score 0.118 0.008*** 0.000 0.001
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.052 0.004*** 0.000 0.001
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.031 0.026 -0.002 0.005
WTT(OHS change) 1.287 0.085***
WTT(Readmission rate) -0.981 0.079***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.086 0.072
Number of patients 173,032
Number of providers 230
BIC 461,041
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Random coefficient (mixed) multinomial logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement
patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. OHS change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortal-
ity rate are lagged by one year. Coefficients are marginal utilities. Random coefficients are specified for OHS
change, readmission rate and mortality rate and estimates. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality
variable to the marginal utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Interaction terms with
patient characteristics not reported (available on request). Standard errors are clustered at GP practice level.
The mean coefficients do differ from those reported in Table 5.2 for the conditional logit model if there is less
rounding.
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Table A5.2: Sensitivity analyses
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
Main effects
Distance (in km) -0.183 0.002*** -0.184 0.002*** -0.184 0.002*** -0.207 0.003***
Distance2 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000***
NHS trust - medium -0.508 0.032*** -0.530 0.030*** -0.540 0.031*** -0.643 0.036***
NHS trust - multi-service -0.656 0.090*** -0.615 0.099*** -0.612 0.097*** -0.604 0.098***
NHS trust - small -0.740 0.037*** -0.792 0.038*** -0.790 0.038*** -0.909 0.042***
NHS trust - specialist 1.019 0.071*** 1.002 0.072*** 1.065 0.073*** 1.047 0.083***
NHS trust - teaching -0.502 0.033*** -0.432 0.033*** -0.412 0.032*** -0.513 0.037***
Independent sector treatment centre -1.472 0.068*** -1.522 0.037*** -1.398 0.044***
Primary care trust -1.071 0.200*** -1.153 0.206*** -1.111 0.206*** -1.195 0.213***
Waiting time (in months) 0.033 0.018 -0.193 0.076* 0.007 0.015 -0.029 0.018
Change in PROM score 0.104 0.007*** 0.115 0.008*** 4.935 0.284*** 0.121 0.010***
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) -0.054 0.004*** -0.052 0.004*** -0.054 0.004*** -0.054 0.006***
28-day mortality rate (in %) -0.044 0.024 -0.032 0.026 -0.026 0.026 0.033 0.035
Interaction with distance
x Patient age -0.001 0.000*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.002 0.000*** -0.002 0.000***
x Male 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.002**
x Past utilisation -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002
x Comorbidity count -0.005 0.001*** -0.004 0.001*** -0.003 0.001*** -0.001 0.001
x Income deprivation -0.179 0.015*** -0.186 0.017*** -0.189 0.018*** -0.241 0.022***
Interaction with waiting time
x Patient age 0.003 0.000*** 0.008 0.002** 0.003 0.000*** 0.003 0.001***
x Male -0.018 0.010 -0.068 0.051 -0.010 0.009 0.001 0.012
x Past utilisation -0.005 0.012 0.049 0.059 -0.007 0.012 0.008 0.013
x Comorbidity count -0.036 0.007*** -0.057 0.033 -0.018 0.007** -0.016 0.007*
x Income deprivation 0.032 0.086 1.180 0.458* 0.083 0.084 0.007 0.107
Interaction with change in PROM score
x Patient age 0.001 0.000*** 0.001 0.000* 0.047 0.010*** 0.001 0.000
x Male 0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.005 -0.300 0.214 -0.002 0.006
continued
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Table A5.2: Sensitivity analyses
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE
x Past utilisation -0.014 0.006* -0.008 0.007 -0.327 0.240 -0.012 0.007
x Comorbidity count -0.009 0.003** -0.009 0.003** -0.475 0.128*** -0.004 0.004
x Income deprivation -0.389 0.046*** -0.448 0.047*** -18.634 1.698*** -0.568 0.056***
Interaction with 28-day emergency readmission rate
x Patient age 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000**
x Male 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.003 0.004
x Past utilisation 0.012 0.004** 0.012 0.003*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.010 0.004**
x Comorbidity count 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
x Income deprivation 0.082 0.026** 0.124 0.026*** 0.138 0.026*** 0.121 0.034***
Interaction with 28-day mortality rate
x Patient age -0.002 0.001* -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
x Male -0.051 0.021* -0.053 0.022* -0.049 0.022* -0.058 0.031
x Past utilisation 0.039 0.030 0.049 0.026 0.047 0.026 0.060 0.032
x Comorbidity count -0.001 0.015 -0.010 0.015 -0.009 0.015 -0.004 0.018
x Income deprivation -0.059 0.172 -0.023 0.168 -0.049 0.167 -0.230 0.210
WTT(PROM change) 1.174 0.086*** 1.261 0.086*** 1.284 0.076*** 1.078 0.089***
WTT(Readmission rate) -1.042 0.081*** -0.983 0.080*** -1.034 0.079*** -0.824 0.089***
WTT(Mortality rate) -0.125 0.067 -0.091 0.073 -0.074 0.074 0.055 0.059
Number of patients 176,471 173,032 171,737 148,629
Number of providers 233 230 225 144
BIC 473,568 460,956 450,787 299,221
Pseudo R2 0.645 0.637 0.639 0.701
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05
Notes: Conditional logit model of choice of hospital for elective hip replacement patients treated between April 2010 and March 2013. PROM change, waiting time, readmission
rate and mortality rate are lagged by one year if not otherwise stated. Coefficients are marginal utilities. WTT is the ratio of the coefficient on the quality variable to the marginal
utility of distance evaluated at the median distance (in km). Interaction terms with distance2 and provider type not reported (available on request). Standard errors are clustered
at GP practice level.
Model (1) - PROM change, waiting time, readmission rate and mortality rate are contemporaneous. Based on observed choices for patients treated between April 2009 and
March 2012. Since April 2012 PROM scores have been reported separately for primary and revision hip replacement surgeries, so that our measures of PROM quality are no
longer comparable.
Model (2) - Proportion of patients waiting longer than 120 days substituted for waiting time (both lagged).
Model (3) - Lagged EQ-5D change scores substituted for lagged OHS change scores.
Model (4) - Patients’ choice sets exclude independent sector treatment centres.
176
7 Appendices
Table A5.3: Descriptive statistics - emergency sample
Variable Obs Mean SD ICC
Patient characteristics
Distance travelled (in km) 73,629 14.2 27.1
Distance travelled past closest provider (in km) 73,629 4.2 25.4
Number of providers within 10km radius 73,629 1.0 1.4
Number of providers within 30km radius 73,629 5.4 5.4
Age 73,629 80.9 9.8
Male 73,629 0.27 0.44
Past utilisation 73,629 0.65 1.17
Number of Elixhauser conditions 73,629 0.99 1.56
Income deprivation 73,629 0.14 0.10
Provider characteristics
Observed volume 394 186.9 87.1 80.7%
Waiting time (in months) 394 3.0 0.7 46.1%
Change in Oxford Hip Score 394 19.4 1.3 49.1%
28-day emergency readmission rate (in %) 394 5.99 2.20 38.2%
28-day mortality rate (in %) 394 0.20 0.25 5.3%
Obs = Observations; SD = Standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient.
Notes: Patient characteristics for patients choosing provider between April 2010 and March 2013.
Provider waiting time, change in Oxford Hip Score, readmission rate, mortality rate are based on
elective patients treated by the respective providers and are for financial years 2009/10 to 2011/12.
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